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Abstract 
This doctoral dissertation proposal is comprised of three separate chapters, all of which uses the 
nationally representative uniform survey Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the 
relationship between health, insurance, health care and health outcomes. Below, the brief intro-
duction for each section is provided: 
 Chapter I: Medicare Part D and  Patients' Well-being 
 Chapter II: Parent's  Health Insurance and Informal Care 
 Chapter III: Job Insecurity and Health (with Dr. Ayyagari) 
In chapter I, I explore how Medicare Part D (MD) affects the well-being of the severely sick 
patients both in the short- and in the long- term. I employ difference-in-difference (DD) alongside 
the instrumental variable (IV) model. The estimated results imply MD significantly improves 
mental health and increases regular drug utilization for the elderly. However, it neither systemat-
ically improves out-of-pocket payment (OOP) nor improves mortality across all waves. This 
suggests that MD provides an efficient mechanism to improve mental health and drug utilization, 
but might not necessarily enhance survival rate and financial burden for vulnerable patients.  
Chapter II investigates the relationship between informal care provided by the children and the 
take-up of health insurance by the near-elderly and elderly parents, and how the correlation is 
influenced by parent’s Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of
 
viii 
Daily Living (IADLs). The results indicate that when the endogeneity is controlled for, informal 
care systematically crowds out the take-up of private long-term care (LTC) insurance whereas 
“crowds in” the take-up of the total plan including supplement insurance plans (TSP). Neverthe-
less, the degree of both crowding-out and “crowding-in” effect is reduced when the severity of 
ADLs/IADLs disability level grows. Our study reflects (a) the strong demand for TSP and more 
additional health coverage within household budget line (b) and the potential gap between 
healthcare demands by the parents and the informal care provided by the children and the potential 
gap between the healthcare demands by the parents and the formal care covered by the insurance. 
Our estimates are robust to alternative measures of informal care. 
The final chapter III examines the causal effect of subjective job insecurity on health, using 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects (FE) and instrumental variable (IV) specifica-
tions. The estimate implies that the negative impact of job insecurity is more pronounced for 
certain outcomes such as mental health and the emergence of new health conditions.  Job insecu-
rity provides a powerful prediction on subsequent job displacement and real income loss. 
Sub-population such as low-employability/better-educated individuals or males responds more to 
job insecurity than their counterparts.  
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Chapter I 
Medicare Part D and Patients’ Well-being: Benefits and Costs 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter aims to uncover the impact of Medicare Part D (MD) on the understudied well-being 
of the vulnerable and severely sick patients by investigating both the short- and the long-term 
effects. We employ difference-in-difference (DD) along with instrumental variable (IV) model to 
account for unobserved disturbance and endogeneity. The estimated results imply two-sided ef-
fects: MD significantly improves mental health both in the short run and in the long run, and in-
creases regular drug utilization in the long run. Countering this, MD neither statistically improves 
out-of-pocket payment (OOP) nor improves mortality in all periods. This suggests that the benefit 
of MD might be ambiguous: it potentially provides an effective mechanism to improve mental 
health and drug utilization, but might not necessarily enhance survival rate and financial burden 
for ill patients in the long run.   
Keywords: Difference-in-Difference, Medicare Part D, Well-being, Health, OOP, Mortality, 
Drug Utilization 
JEL Classification: I11, I13, I18, I38 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Medicare, commonly referred to Original Medicare (MO), is the federal health insurance program 
(FHIP) created in 1965 for individuals aged 65 and over, regardless of income, medical history or 
health status. It was expanded in 1972 to cover individuals under age 65 with permanent disabili-
ties. The enrollment in Medicare is either based on the age threshold of 65 or certain health con-
 
2 
ditions for below 65-year old individuals. Medicare Part D (MD), also called the Medicare pre-
scription drug benefit, is a U.S. federal government program to subsidize the costs of prescription 
drugs and insurance premiums for Medicare beneficiaries. MD went into effect on January 1, 2006, 
by the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 and thereafter served nearly 41 
million of the 57 million people with Medicare in 2016 (Megellas, 2006). The impact of MD is 
extensive and has been documented by a large literature. 
Literature finds that MD affects health, although in a somewhat heterogeneous way. Kaestner 
et al. (2010) show that MD does not notably impact patients’ self-rated health. Countering this, 
Afendulis, He, Zaslavsky and Chernew (2011) suggest that health is improved through the evi-
dence that nondrug healthcare utilization for the elderly decreased after MD was introduced. 
Similar applied work dealing with mortality finds that MD reduces the annual mortality of the 
elderly by 2.2 percent (Huh and Reif, 2017).  
In this study, we concentrate on the four measures of the well-being of severely ill patients, 
including mental health, drug utilization, out-of-pocket payment (OOP) and mortality. All of these 
are viewed as vital components of the well-being of the patients. The sample of patients in this 
study incorporates four types of severe diseases: cancer, stroke, heart problem, and diabetes. 
0F
1
Studies reveal that these four diseases are among the eight leading causes of death incidences in 
2015 in the U.S., with diseases of heart ranking at the top and cancer following the second 
(Murphy et al., 2017). However, very little is known about whether patients with these conditions 
can benefit from the MD reform. And if they do, which categories of health outcomes are im-
proved? If they do not, what are the costs? 
These concerns remain unanswered in the literature. As such, we contribute to the literature by 
examining how the formal implementation of MD impacts the various aspects of well-being for 
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the patients. Further, one limitation of the previous literature is that it does not differentiate 
between the long-run and the short-run impact of MD. Neither can we know whether the level of 
significance or magnitude evolves over time or not. This study examines the way MD affects pa-
tients’ well-being both in the short and in the long run. Another concern is that previous work 
generally considers all near-elderly or elderly cohorts as one research group; however, the degree 
of heterogeneity across groups might be large and thus the effect may be different for specific 
vulnerable subgroups such as severely ill patients. These patients generally bear more financial 
risks and health shocks and thus demand more assistance and care accordingly. By employing data 
from the 2002-2014 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, our research adds to 
the literature by comprehensively exploring the impact of MD on the major concerns of well-being 
alongside comparing the gap between MD-eligible and MD-ineligible patients over time.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the review of the literature. Section 3 
describes the endogeneity problem. In section 4, we show the empirical strategy. Section 5 and 6 
introduce the data and the results respectively. Section 7 concludes. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
MD is an important component for Medicare and a large body of literature examines the impact of 
MD on medical care utilization and health outcomes. MD has succeeded in multiple ways such as 
improving the quality of health care for Medicare recipients and substantially increasing the frac-
tion of Medicare beneficiaries on prescription drug coverage (Duggan et al., 2008).  
MD pays for most (near 80 percent) of the drug costs, plans bear 15 percent, and enrollees with 
partial subsidy pay either 5 percent of total drug costs or $3.35/$8.35 for each generic- and 
brand-name drug respectively after a certain cut-off payment is met (The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1 The sample is restricted to the patients who have any of the four diseases in the current wave. 
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Foundation, 2018). 1F
2
Due to the high-coverage cost shared by a health plan, prescription drug 
coverage (PDC) could significantly drive up the utilization of drugs (Khan, 2006). In contrast, 
prior to its formal implementation, nearly one-fourth elderly do not have sufficient PDC, most of 
whom are exposed to soaring OOP stress (Safran et al., 2005). The financial crisis, including OOP, 
is even worse for drug-dependent patients. With the introduction of the MD, the OOP costs are 
reduced noticeably for the elderly at the onset though (Ketcham and Simon, 2008).  
It has been shown that drug coverage influences the access to medications (see e.g., Yang et al., 
2008; Duggan and Morton, 2010) and it might also change the use of prescription drug for the 
patients(Zhang et al., 2009). Before the MD reform, some senior individuals without drug insur-
ance cannot obtain sufficient and effective treatment due to incomplete coverage. With the in-
troduction of MD through, the OOP stress decreases and this facilitates the access to medications 
for patients who previously experienced great costs. The study by Khan (2006) finds that PDC, 
particularly MD, significantly drives up drug utilization, but has no effect on hospital admissions. 
Countering this, the effect of prescription drug plan on hospitalizations indicates that Part D is 
associated with an 8 percent reduction in hospital admissions (Robert et al., 2014). Despite its goal 
to improve medication usage, access to medications through the channel of cost-related non-
adherence (CRN) does not improve after the initialization of MD for mental-ill beneficiaries 
(Zivin et al., 2009). This suggests that the situation of a patient’s not filling or refilling a pre-
scription due to the reason of cost is not improved even post MD.   
Part D has been shown to reduce the overall rate of hospitalization by 4.1 percent, which is 
attributable to the positive health effects causing the elderly to reduce the use of nondrug health  
                                                     
2 Data is accessible from https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/whats-in-the-administrations-5-part-plan-for-medi
care-part-d-and-what-would-it-mean-for-beneficiaries-and-program-savings. 
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care (Afendulis et al., 2011). Part D could narrow racial or ethnic disparities in hospital utilization 
as well (Mahmoudi, Jensen, and Tarraf, 2015). Enrollment in MD is associated with lowered uti-
lization of drug when patients reach the “doughnut hole” regardless of coverage in the zone (Zhang 
et al. , 2009). 
On the other hand, since many drugs, including brand-name products, are covered by most of 
the plans in MD, it could expand beneficiaries' access to cancer treatments as well (Bowman et al., 
2006). MD could increase the adherence to medications lowering the risk of cardiovascular events 
for patients with hypertension, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia (Zhang et al., 2010). MD can facili-
tate sizable growth in drug utilization for the elderly (Lichtenberg and Sun, 2007). It becomes 
imperative that the elderly improve the access to treatments achieving desirable outcomes (Aruru 
and Salmon, 2013). However, other contemporary studies find the utilization of healthcare is the 
opposite. Ayyagari, Shane and Wehby( 2017) explore the impact of MD on the access to the 
emergency department (ED) and find that the frequency of visiting ED with non-emergency care 
contracts. This implies that Part D might provide the potential to better manage the exploitation of 
healthcare. Further evidence comes from the study by Liu et al. (2011), which finds no evidence of 
improvement in ED for those eligible for Part D during its first year of implementation.  
The applied work reveals mixed effects on OOP as well. Medicare is an expensive market and 
Part D costs the federal government around $108.0 billion gross spending in 2016. On the one 
hand, Part D  is associated with sizable reductions in OOP spending (Engelhardt and Gruber, 
2011),  and it is also a major benefit to seniors and works well once enrollment is completed 
(Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 2006). The study by Mott et al. (2010) shows that it is associated 
with 17.6 percent reduction in OOP. Another study by Stubbings and Lau (2013) also confirms the 
cost-lowering effect of MD. The financial cost is a priority in the beneficiaries’ choice of pre-
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scription coverage (De Natale, 2007). MD provides competitive options with relatively low cost 
compared with MO: MD enrollees with earning ($85,000/individual; $170,000/couple) pay an 
income-related monthly premium surcharge, which ranges between $13.00 and $74.80 in 2018 in 
addition to the monthly premium for their specific plan (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2015).2F
3
 It saves patients’ cost among the elderly (Lichtenberg and Sun, 2007). The addition of MD 
may help reduce OOP expenses for transplant recipients who have Medicare (Chisholm and 
Roberts, 2006). Robert Kaestner et al. (2014) also find that Part D is associated with a 7 percent 
decrease in Medicare expenditures. In contrast, MD is shown to provide only a limited scope of 
relief for healthcare costs (Briesacher et al., 2010).  Ketcham, Kuminoff and Powers (2016) sug-
gest that one of the reasons is that the elderly may place more weight on the foreseeable plan 
premiums rather than on unforeseeable OOP costs, which counterfactually inflates their ultimate 
payment. 
Mortality has been one major concern as it directly measures the effectiveness of the policy.  
Part D helps patients prevent or delay the onset of disease and defer mortality (Semilla, Chen, and 
Dali, 2015). Drug innovation has significantly reduced the cancer mortality rate by 8.0 percent 
(Lichtenberg, 2014). Dunn and Shapiro (2014) evaluate the impact of MD on mortality for the 
population over 65 and find that cardiovascular-related mortality drops substantively. Huh and 
Reif (2017) suggest that MD reduces elderly mortality by 2.2% annually, which was driven pri-
marily by cardiovascular but not cancer. In contrast,  Briesacher et al. (2015) find that Part D is not 
attributable to a sizable reduction in mortality. From the national level, during the period 
1955-2014 the U.S. mortality rates for males and females have both declined steadily, among 
which 65 or older individuals maintain at a stable long-term downward trend. The most recent 
                                                     
3 Refer to https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicares-income-related-premiums-a-data-note. 
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SEER cancer statistics review shows that the death rate of cancer decreased by almost 2 percent 
(Singh, Henley, and Ryerson, 2017). 
4
  
A study by Ayyagari and Shane (2015) finds that MD systematically relieves depressiveness 
symptom among elderly individuals. A similar relief impact is found for chronic pain relative 
activity limitations  (Ayyagari, 2016). 
The diseases in this study are more severe than other types of health shock on average, causing 
more social hazard through multiple channels and many patients might have to live with the 
symptoms for years at the expense of reduced productivity. We hope the research concentrating on 
the channel of life-threatening diseases could facilitate policy intervention oriented for optimal 
solution additional to technical advancement.   
One issue with the applied research so far is that how the well-being of severely ill patients is 
comprehensively impacted both in the short term and in the long term is not clarified yet. Neither 
do we know how effective the MD plan is for vulnerable individuals. We revisit these issues and 
investigate them from a more in-depth perspective by estimating the impacts over time. The ac-
cumulative and time-lagged effect is examined simultaneously. Our paper aims to fill these gaps 
through a quantitative study.  
These severe diseases are particular in that they cause high personal and high social risks. They 
contribute to one of the major death incidences as well. Uncovering the extent to which the 
well-being can be improved is one of our major goals. Additionally, our study employs one sole 
data source for the purpose of minimizing exterior disturbance, which might arise in the case of 
combining multiple data sources, the ultimate goal in this study is aiming to be the first research in 
                                                     
4 Data are available through the source: 
https://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=2&pageSEL=sect_02_zfig.03.html. 
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evaluating the impact of a health reform on under-concerned cohorts and thus providing reference 
for the intervention oriented for optimal effect.  
3 ENDOGENEITY ISSUE AND SOLUTION 
The main research question in this study is to assess the impact of MD on severe patients’ 
well-being, including mental health, regular drug utilization, OOP and mortality. However, one of 
the major concerns is the potential of endogeneity, especially in the case of OLS specification. An 
endogeneity problem occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the unobserved error 
term. There are well-known reasons for endogeneity. The first is a confounder influencing both 
independent and dependent variables. The second is a reverse causality between the independent 
and dependent variables of a model. The third concern is how to address the issue if the endoge-
neity exists. Though literature deals with partial welfare effect of the patients, it does not address 
the endogeneity essentially (see e.g., Kircher et al., 2014). Therefore one cannot clarify whether 
the improved welfare is solely attributable to the MD or other exterior or internal shocks. 
The potential endogeneity in this study comes from the PDC of the patients. In this study, we 
aim to concentrate on the more vulnerable individuals. The major concern about endogeneity is 
that certain unobserved confounder affects both the MD eligible (65 years old or above patients, 
excluding below-65 patients with disability conditions. These individuals are defined as our 
treatment group) and MD ineligible (below-65 cohorts, who are defined as our control group) 
patients in a different way over time. The question concerning PDC in the prior-2006 surveys is 
designed as follows: “Have the costs of your prescription medications been completely covered by 
health insurance, mostly covered, only partially covered, or not covered at all by health insurance?” 
We define those providing completely covered, mostly covered or partially covered response as 
the ones with PDC while those not covered at all as the without-PDC patients and those unknown 
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or who refuse to answer are eliminated. Aside from this, another question asks about whether 
Medicare supplemental or Medigap plans help pay for the prescription drug.  The patients covered 
by either of these two plans are treated as having PDC coverage, therefore the prescription cov-
erage includes the portion from MD as well as the portion from non-MD insurances.  
In order to address the potential endogeneity, we employ a Difference-in-Difference (DD) 
model. The assumption in this study is that the unobserved characteristic associated with the dy-
namics of the outcome variable is to be balanced between the MD- eligible and ineligible cohorts. 
The identifying assumption is the parallel trend before the implementation. We estimate the trend 
gap over periods between the eligible and ineligible cohorts. If the trend gap is not significant at 
each period prior to MD, then the pre-trends for eligible and ineligible patients are parallel. Thus 
there is no existence of potential endogeneity impacting both cohorts in a systematically different 
way over time before MD was implemented. 
4 METHODOLOGY 
We first estimate the causal effect of MD on patients’ well-being through a differ-
ence-in-difference (DD) model, which is illustrated in equation (1). The treatment group (MD 
eligible) consists of the 65-73 years old patients, who are eligible for MD. The control group (MD 
ineligible) is comprised of 50-64 years old patients and thus is ineligible for MD. To achieve this, 
we further restrain this cohort to the non-permanent-disability patients due to the reason that below 
65-year old patients may qualify for Medicare and thus MD based on adverse health conditions. 
By excluding them, the control group is systematically not impacted by the MD.  
 The dependent variable 𝑦 denotes patient 𝑖′𝑠 well-being at year 𝑡, including mental health, 
prescription drug utilization in the past two years, OOP since the last wave, mortality or other 
health outcomes of concern. The independent variables include the following: one dummy indi-
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cator ID for MD eligible group (1 for the 65-73 years old patients eligible for Medicare, and 0 for 
the 50-64 years old patients ineligible for Medicare), fixed effects for waves, other control vector 
of covariates 𝑋 include socioeconomic status or demographics such as age, age squared, gender 
(male as the reference group), race indicators for Black/African and other race(White/Caucasian as 
the reference), marital status indicators for never married and other marital status (the married as 
the reference), indicators for college or higher education (high school or less education as the 
reference). 
 
 The DD coefficient  𝛽2 is our main parameter of interest and captures the double differences 
(DOD) effect in our specification: a positive sign implies that the MD-eligible patients are more 
likely to have a higher outcome of 𝑦 such as higher value in mental health, greater likelihood of 
regular utilization of prescription drug, higher OOP payment or higher mortality rate. The term 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 denotes post-MD waves, depending on the outcomes we observe therefore the onset of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 
might be equal to 2006 or 2008. As for drug utilization and OOP, the ambiguous survey design 
potentially covers both pre-2006 and post-2006 data, thus we eliminate wave 2006 for these two 
specific outcomes. 𝑇 is the waves that 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 might theoretically cover at large, depending on the 
length of periods we are concerned about. As such, the broadest spectrum that 𝑇 covers is termed 
as the time set {2006,2008,2010,2012,2014}, which is the long-run definition. The narrowest 
spectrum T covers is termed as the set {2006} or {2008}, which is the short-run definition. By the 
selection of different values of T, we obtain short-run or long-run result respectively.  
 
 
 
 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐 ∙ 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕 ∙ 𝑰𝑫 + ∑ 𝜷𝟑𝒕 ∙ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕
𝑻
𝒕=𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐
 + 𝜷𝟒 ∙ 𝑰𝑫 + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝝐𝒊𝒕 (1) 
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By design, the DD estimator assumes that no other unobserved factors are systematically driving 
the differential trends in well-being between the MD-eligible and MD-ineligible population, which 
is generally called the parallel time-trend assumption. The DD model estimates the intent-to-treat 
effect, and the eligibility for enrolling in MD is based on the age characteristic of the patients. 
However, due to heterogeneities, a certain fraction of MD-eligible patients might choose not to 
participate in the program and the non-participation might be correlated with some factors that 
researchers do not observe. Therefore, we also estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) 
through an instrumental variable (IV) model and present the corresponding result. The technique is 
based on the methodology in the study by Ayyagari and Shane (2015). The instrumented explan-
atory variable is one dummy variable indicating PDC and the coverage of drug tends to be en-
dogenous. We employ the interaction term of  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝐷 as the instrumental variable. The exclu-
sion restriction assumptions are: (1) the IV is correlated with the endogeneity of drug coverage, as 
post-MD more eligible patients are more likely to opt in the program; (2) the instrument is un-
correlated with un-observables as it is exogenously determined.  
As discussed so far, without the formal implementation of MD, we assume that there is a 
parallel time trend for both eligible and ineligible cohorts. To justify this, we test whether the 
parallel trend assumption holds by testing the model in (2). The coefficient 𝜆1𝑡 captures the dif-
ference between the eligible and the ineligible individuals within the same wave and the magni-
tude of the p-value illustrates whether the trend is parallel or not. The dependent 𝑦 denotes any of 
the four concerned outcomes. All the other covariates are similar to those previous discussions. 
Literature reveals that income is prone to be endogenous as individuals with higher income might 
have better access to healthcare and thus potentially have better health outcomes than otherwise 
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(Cardak, 2004). To check whether this endogeneity happens in a sizable way, we also include log 
of the household income to perform a robustness check.
 
4F
5
  
 
 
 
5 DATA 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) was designed to follow age-eligible individuals (mostly 
over 50) and their spouses as they made the transition from active workers into retirement and 
obtained detailed information in a variety of domains: demographics, health status, housing, 
family structure, employment, income, health, and life insurance. The data used in our research 
come from 2002-2014 waves RAND V.P including the period both before and after the introduc-
tion of MD, which makes the observation over time feasible. The data collection period, which 
reflects the timing of the interview, varies for each wave. For wave 2004, the interview was 
conducted from March 2004 through February 2005. The 2006 interview was conducted from 
March 2006 through February 2007 and it covered February 2008 through February 2009 for the 
subsequent 2008 interview.  Wave 2004 and earlier waves are before the introduction of MD; 
wave 2008 and later are post-MD implementation. Wave 2006 is an exception as it potentially 
covers both post- and pre-2006 data due to its past two-year polling in the survey questions. Due to 
this ambiguousness, we, therefore, eliminate wave 2006 for the two outcomes of OOP and drug 
utilization. We cluster the regression at the household level.  
                                                     
5 Household income includes the correspondent and the spouse. 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝝀𝟎𝒕 + ∑ 𝝀𝟏𝒕 ∙ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 ∙ 𝑰𝑫
𝑻
𝒕=𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐
+ ∑ 𝝀𝟐𝒕 ∙ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕
𝑻
𝒕=𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐
+ 𝝀𝟑 ∙ 𝑰𝑫 
+𝜼 ∙ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝝐𝒊𝒕 
(2) 
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Our final sample includes the following: 24053 observations for mental health, 19843 obser-
vations for drug utilization, 15930 observations for OOP, and 3888 observations for mortality 
respectively.  
5.1 HEALTH  
We study the mental health of the respondents in this paper. Mental health measures the depression 
level, based on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D) scale (D. E. Steffick, 
2000). The CES-D score is commonly used to indicate the level of mental health and it is the 
summing of five "negative" indicators minus two "positive" indicators. The negative indicators are 
utilized to measure whether the respondent experienced the following sentiments all or most of the 
time: depression, everything is an effort, sleep is restless, felt alone, felt sad, and could not get 
going. The positive indicators are employed to measure whether the respondent felt happy and 
enjoyed life, all or most of the time. The scale of CES-D in this study varies from 0 to 8. By the 
nature of its definition, the higher score of CES-D thus denotes a lower level of mental health in 
the past week.  
5.2 DRUG UTILIZATION  
In the HRS survey, one direct question asks the regular prescription drug utilization as follows: 
“Do you regularly take prescription medications in the past two years?” The answer can be “Yes” 
or “No”. We treat yes-response respondents as regular utilization and set to one, and zero other-
wise. 
5.3 OOP  
OOP is based on the question inquiring about the monthly premium and measured in U.S. dollars, 
“On average, about how much have you paid out-of-pocket per month for these prescriptions since 
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the last interview/in the last two years?”  MD covers prescription drug and thus post the 
implementation, the utilization of prescription drug is expected to rise.  
5.4 MORTALITY 
In HRS, there is a question asking the death year of the correspondent, we redefine the mortality 
status equal to one if the death year is equal or earlier than the interview year and equal to zero 
otherwise.  
5.5 OTHER COVARIATES 
Socioeconomic status (SES) can have a positive effect on health status and demonstrate social 
causation, as is evidenced by (Hay, 1988). We choose the covariates potentially impacting the 
well-being of the patients such as age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, and education. In 
the robustness check, we supplement the log of the household income too. There are variables 
indicating the start-year interview and end-year interview. Part of the interviews continued to the 
next year, from which the correspondents’ ages are calculated. Age squared is added for the 
purpose of capturing any non-linear correlation between MD and health outcomes. We discard 
records with missing values for these covariates. 
6 RESULTS  
6.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 1 illustrates the summary statistics by year for patients’ health outcomes from 2002 to 2014. 
Table 2 is the summary by MD eligibility.  
From Table 1, we can compare the evolution of outcomes over time. For instance, prior-2006, 
the mean value of mental health is 1.611 in 2004 and post-2006 it gradually reduces from 1.659 in 
2006 to 1.543 in 2014. As for regular drug utilization, the fraction of patients increases from 93.9 
 
15 
percent in wave 2004 to 94.9 percent in wave 2008.5F
6
 In the first year of MD implementation, MD 
take-up is higher than any other single wave, reflecting the potential demand for healthcare cov-
erage.  
Taking from the national level, the OOP threshold for catastrophic coverage (patients pay a 
relatively small coinsurance amount or copayment for covered drugs) increases steadily from 
$3,600 in 2006 to postulated $5000 in 2018 since MD’s initial onset (The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2018). In contrast, HRS shows that the expenditure on OOP reduces over time, which 
peaks at 174.91$/month in 2004, thereafter it gradually reduces to a monthly payment of $80.64 in 
wave 2014. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics by MD eligibility. It is evident that the average age of 
the MD-eligible cohort is older than MD-ineligible cohort (69.1 years old versus 58.4 years old). 
Generally, the patients in the eligible cohorts have lower household incomes, higher ratios of 
less-educated individuals and lower ratios of married individuals. 
6.2 TEST OF THE PARALLEL TRENDS ASSUMPTION 
First, Table 3 shows the results of the test of the parallel-trend assumption for each outcome. The 
reference wave is 2014 for mental health, drug utilization and OOP and the reference wave is 2012 
for mortality due to non-availability of death incidence in wave 2014. The parameters investigated 
here are the interaction term between the MD-eligible cohorts and each wave. As such, we 
measure the difference between MD-eligible and MD-ineligible patients during the specific wave. 
The results for I(Age≥65)×2002 and I(Age≥65)×2004 are our major concerns. 
In general, the parallel trends are insignificant at conventional levels. For all the outcomes, the 
estimated results illustrate that the coefficients for I(Age≥65)×2002  and I(Age≥65)×2004 are all 
                                                     
6 Note that the mortality rate is zero in 2014, and the dependent variable is a discrete dummy indicator thus we 
eliminate this wave from the sample for mortality-related analysis. 
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close to zero, indicating that before the MD implementation the trends of outcomes are parallel for 
the MD-eligible and MD-ineligible cohort.  
6.3 RESULT FOR MENTAL HEALTH  
We estimate the effect of MD on mental health both in the short term and in the long term based on 
the specification (1). The results are summarized in Table 4. Since income tends to be the en-
dogeneity potentially impacting the enrollment of MD and health, we add additional control co-
variate- log of household income- to the baseline models and check the sensitivity for all the 
outcomes, which is illustrated in Table 5. After controlling this variable we find that our estimate 
results are robust to this alternative specification. The results of headlines including the subsequent 
outcomes in the tables are the dependent variables that we are concerned about and these are 
separate estimation with different post-MD periods. The coefficient for Post×I(Age≥65) is our 
main coefficient of interest.6F
7
  
Column (1) denotes the post-MD period including wave 2006 only, while column (5) denotes 
the post-MD period including 2006-2014 waves. Other columns can be deduced in an analogous 
way. First, the sign of the coefficient for Post×I(Age≥65) is positive and statistically significant for 
all the periods. MD significantly improves the mental health of patients either in the short run or in 
the long run. The magnitude of impact grows from -0.189 in wave 2006 to -0.203 in wave 2012. 
The prior-2006 average mental health for the MD-eligible cohort is 1.624, implying that in the 
short run patients’ mental health is improved by 11.6 percent; while in the long run, the im-
provement effect is 12.5 percent after the introduction of MD. These improvements are sizable and 
thus economically significant too. 
                                                     
7 Other than high-school-or-less and college-or-higher education, there exists other type of education in the HRS but 
with only one observation in wave 2014, we eliminate this sole one record from the sample. 
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For other covariates, age contributes to mental health positively and it is statistically signifi-
cant for the majority of the waves. Mental health increases with age. Age squared is added to check 
for any potential of nonlinear effect on mental health. Compared with White/Caucasians, 
Black/African Americans and other race have worse mental condition both in the short-run and in 
the long-run perspective. The similar trend is observed for women and the cohorts that are not 
married. In contrast, college or higher educated individuals have better mental health than 
less-educated patients. The long-run impact is generally consistent with the short-run impact. The 
positive relationship between MD and mental health evolves over time in a consistent way, im-
plying an accumulating effect.  
The impact through the channel of education is consistent with the study by Chevalier and 
Mayzlin (2006), who show that education reduces the transition to depression as well as substan-
tial returns to education in terms of improved mental health.  And all these findings are not in 
conflict with Ayyagari and Shane (2015). 
6.4 RESULT FOR DRUG UTILIZATION 
Further, we estimate the impact of MD on prescription drug utilization in the past two years, for 
which the results are listed in  Table 6.  
The most important finding is that the coefficient for Post×I(Age≥65) is positive for all the 
post-2008 waves and statistically significant beginning in 2010. MD does not facilitate drug uti-
lization in the short run but the impact is significant in the long run. The magnitude of impact 
implies that post MD, the likelihood of growth in drug utilization increases from 1.3 percent in 
2008 to 2.8 percent in 2014, indicating an accumulating over-time effect. The prior-2006 average 
level of drug utilization is 95.4 percent for MD-eligible patients. The economic magnitude is rel-
atively small in contrast with the level of statistical significance. 
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MD-eligible patients tend to use drugs more regularly than what they did previously. And this 
trend is progressing over time. The long-run impact is more prominent than the short-run impact. 
The utilization of drug increases with age. Females tend to use drug more regularly than males. 
Minorities such as Black/African Americans and married patients are more likely to increase 
utilization in the long run. The effect on drug utilization does not differentiate through the channel 
of education.  
6.5 RESULT FOR OOP 
In Table 7, we obtain the DD outcome for OOP. The DD coefficient for Post×I(Age≥65) is nega-
tive over time. It is not statistically significant in all waves. MD does not significantly reduce the 
financial burden for patients either in the short run or in the long run. However, based on the 
magnitude of the coefficients, the reduction of OOP is substantive compared with the prior-2006 
average value of 168.17, it decreases OOP for MD-eligible patients by about 13.6 percent in the 
short run (wave 2008) and about 11.03 in the long run (wave 2014). The impact is economically 
significant for all the periods though.   
The impact on OOP presents a unique characteristic different from the applied work, implying 
that these patients have a differentiated structure of OOP compared with the cohorts in other 
studies. Women steadily face more severe financial stress than men, as is the same for White pa-
tients. The effect on OOP does not differentiate through channels like marital status or education. 
6.6 RESULT FOR MORTALITY 
Mortality is one major concern in many health insurance reforms. We present the short- and 
long-run impact on mortality in Table 8. The DD coefficient for Post×I(Age≥65) is negative for all 
periods but none of them is statistically significant. MD does not improve the mortality for the 
patients either in the short run or in the long run. From the magnitude of the coefficients, the re-
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duction of mortality is sizable compared with the prior-2006 average value of 1.68 percent. As it 
reduces mortality for MD-eligible patients by about 1.8 percent in the short run (wave 2008) and 
about 1.1 percent in the long run (wave 2014). MD seems to have no statistically significant impact 
through the channel of mortality. One possible explanation for this is the patients in this study 
generally are either severely or acutely ill cohort needing immediate, persistent or effective as-
sistance, while prescription drug covered by MD can only meet the partial end of demands.  
6.7 IV RESULTS  
We employ the interaction term of Post×I(Age≥65) as the instrument variable for prescription drug 
coverage and perform the test of IV specifications for all the outcomes. Results are illustrated in 
Table 9 to Table 12. 
In Table 9, we compare the results of the OLS regression with IV model for mental health, 
presenting first-stage results of 2SLS. The assumption is that IV is strongly correlated with the 
endogenous variable but in the meantime not correlated with the unobservables. PDC denotes 
Prescription Drug Coverage and PT denotes the term Post×I(Age≥65).  
The instrument is significantly correlated with PDC in the first stage as the F statistics evolves 
from 33.40 in the short run to 1646.55 in the long run. In the OLS regression, we find a positive 
association between PDC and mental health level. When the endogeneity is controlled for, we find 
that MD is associated with significant growth in mental health either in the short run or in the long 
run. The significant results in the IV model are generally consistent with the previous finding in 
the DD model. Most R-squared values in the IV model remain at commensurate levels to those in 
the DD model.  One counterfactual finding is that immediate post-2006, the magnitude is larger 
than any other periods, one possible explanation is that this is a transitional period of health plans, 
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therefore more fractions of patients transfer to MD and thus the expectation of health improvement 
is larger than the non-transition period. 
A similar comparison of regular drug utilization is summarized in Table 10. The instrumental 
variable, which is Post×I(Age≥65), is consistently highly correlated with prescription drug cov-
erage as the F statistics are greater than the “rule of thumb” value (10 in most cases) for all the 
waves. The IV result is consistent with the DD result. MD significantly facilitates regular drug 
utilization for the patients in the long term.  We do observe a similar impact in the short term 
though. 
Table 11 shows the results of OOP in the comparison of IV and OLS. The impacts of the di-
rection and the levels of significance are consistent with our DD model. It is not statistically sig-
nificant for all the waves but economically significant. On the other hand, the level of significance 
in OLS is larger than IV and DD. We also present the first-stage outcome of 2SLS, among which 
all the F-statistics are well above the “rule of thumb” value, and therefore the exclusion restriction 
assumption of the IV is satisfied. 
In Table 12, we find that mortality result remains at insignificant levels, as in the DD estimate.  
Except for the one below-ten F statistic in wave 2006, all others are well above 10. OLS and IV 
both support that MD neither improves the mortality in the short run nor in the long run at con-
ventional significance levels.  
6.8 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To check how sensitive our estimated results are, we supplement alternative specifications and 
compare the sensitivities for the outcomes in all periods. The results are shown in Table 13 to 
Table 16. First, we change the fixed effects of the year in the baseline model to an indicator of the 
post-MD dummy and apply this to all subsequent sensitivity checks. In the second alternative 
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specification, we further add fixed effects of census divisions.7F
8
 In the third set of robustness test, 
we supplement the census-division level average unemployment rate. Finally, we add the inter-
action of post-MD indicator and average unemployment rate. We find that the results are robust to 
these alternative specifications. The estimated outcomes are essentially unchanged both in the 
short run and in the long run. 
6.9 PLACEBO TEST 
In the first set of placebo check (not shown), we assume that the 57-64 years old cohort is qualified 
for MD yet the other 50-56 years old cohort is not, then estimate the same DD baseline model. We 
do not find statistically significant differences between these two assumed “treatment” and “con-
trol” group. None of the DD coefficients for all the outcomes is significant either in the short run or 
in the long run.  We then advance to the second set of placebo test, where we assume that MD is 
available to the previously defined 65 or older MD-eligible group in wave 2004, all the other 
conditions are unchanged.  By employing the same baseline DD model, we find a consistent in-
significant result for all the outcomes. This further justifies the conclusion that the estimated im-
pact in mental health improvement, drug utilization growth, OOP and mortality is attributable to 
the implementation of MD and the ineligible group is systematically unaffected. 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
First of all, our research suggests that Part D reform does improve severely ill patients’ well-being 
for certain outcomes. The benefits are MD significantly improves mental health and increases 
regular drug utilization; countering this, MD neither improves OOP nor mortality over time. MD 
sizably increases patients’ mental health both in the short run and in the long run.  
 
                                                     
8 Exclude the one census division that is outside the U.S. 
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Improvements in mental health are observed in 2006 and later. Significant improvement is 
observed for regular drug utilization but only in the long term. Our finding of mental health is 
consistent with the documented literature (see e.g., Kaestner et al., 2010; Ayyagari and Shane, 
2015), suggesting that the mental health and drug utilization are important channels where MD 
works well. Nevertheless, both have an economically sizable effect. The sample in this study has 
more severe patterns of diseases that completely differ from many others. Another caveat is that 
our study focuses on a limited range of near retirement patients only. How the characteristics vary 
for other age range might need further investigation. 
The study contributes to the literature by examining the impact on patients’ well-being, in-
cluding mental health, drug utilization, financial burden, and mortality from the onset of MD to a 
relatively long time later. These vulnerable cohorts attract rare concern albeit they might essen-
tially need more attention. We provide evidence that MD does not statistically mitigate the 
financial burden for the most vulnerable population. Insurance reforms typically are characterized 
by a lagged effect, indicating that the effect might not be evident until a certain period of time 
passes. The finding implies that we cannot neglect the potential that the impact might either come 
into real effect over time or might not be accumulated to a significant level. While comprehen-
sively evaluating reforms of health insurance is one of the major concerns, either observing only 
short-term effect or observing only long-term effect could be incomplete. Our study quantifies the 
value of impact over time through observations in a relatively long period, which has not been 
explored in other studies so far. One implementable avenue in the future is that whether it is at-
tributable to the specific characteristics of the United States, or other countries with similar 
healthcare system illustrate analogous effects; or whether less severely ill patients trend in a sim-
ilar way.  
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Chapter II 
 
Parent’s Health Insurance and Informal Care: Complement or Substitute? 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter investigates the impact of informal care provided by the children on the take-up of 
health insurance by the near-elderly and elderly parent, and how the relationship is affected by 
parent’s Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) 
disability level. How to purchase an optimal cost-efficient portfolio of health plans is one of the 
major decisions the aging individuals might face in their senior age due to the inherent tradeoff 
between plans. Our estimate accounts for unobserved heterogeneity by employing individual-level 
fixed effects and instrument variables (IVs). The results suggest that when the endogeneity is not 
controlled, neither public nor private plans take-up is sizably affected. In contrast, when the en-
dogeneity is controlled for, informal care systematically crowds out the take-up of private 
long-term care (LTC) insurance whereas “crowds in” the take-up of total supplement plans (TSP). 
However, both crowding-out and “crowding-in” effect are reduced if the severity of ADLs/IADLs 
disability level increases. Our finding indicates one of the reasons the private LTC market shrinks 
is attributable to the substitutional informal care provided by the children. It also reflects the de-
mands for additional insurance coverage. The results are robust to alternative measures of informal 
care. 
Keywords: Health Insurance, Informal Care, Long-term Care, Crowd In, Crowd Out, Substitute, 
Complement 
JEL Classification: G4, I1, I190, Z1 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we concentrate on how informal care (IC) provided by the children affects the 
take-up of health insurance by the parent.
 
8F
9
  To evaluate how the results vary with different 
measures of informal care, we observe the impact by informal care presented in multiple ways in 
this study: (1) specific supports for Instrumental Activities of Daily Living and Activities of Daily 
Living (IADLs/ADLs); (2) the total hours of help provided by the children last month; (3) the total 
days of help provided by the children last month. The employment of these different measure-
ments serves the purpose of comparing the extensive and intensive margin of informal care. The 
effect of informal care provided by the junior generation can be pronounced on the senior gener-
ation. One typical instance is that it could affect the take-up decision of the health insurance 
bundle, such as private and public plans, for the seniors. 
 Private long-term care (LTC) insurance is a formal care plan that mostly helps people unable 
to care for themselves for a relatively long period. LTC insurance covers long-term care services 
and supports promoting independence or quality of life, including personal and custodial care (e.g., 
non-skilled care) in a variety of settings such as the home, a community organization or other 
facility. 9F10 Although the cost of LTC insurance depends on the type, the duration, and the care 
provider, generally it is expensive compared with other types of health insurance(Brown and 
Finkelstein, 2009).  
There is much concern of uncertainty of being medically dependent and thus needing care 
when an individual is aging over time, the extent of disability and the long-term care caused (Barr, 
                                                     
9 Literature might use different measure of informal care. For instance, Bonsang (2009) employs the average total 
number of hours of informal care received from the children. Since it collects only no more than three informal 
caregivers, thus the total effect might be underestimated accounting for all received informal care. Our study addresses 
this issue by incorporating all informal caregivers, and the result is consistent when employing the total time of 
support provided by the children. 
10 The typical services in LTC include custodial and non-skilled care, such as assisting with normal daily tasks like 
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2010). Thus far, the take-up rate of LTC insurance is low, which is in sharp contrast with the fact 
that the likelihood of depending on LTC services is high for aging individuals. Contrary to the paid 
formal care, the informal care provided by the children usually incurs no additional expenditure. 
Therefore, if informal care can substitute the services covered by the LTC insurance, a sizable 
crowding-out effect (i.e., the increase in the provision of informal care causes a reduction in the 
take-up of LTC insurance) is expected. 
That being said, LTC insurance is shown to be incomplete insurance  (Costa-Font and 
Courbage, 2015) and individuals might fail to purchase (see e.g., Meier, 1999;  Pestieau and 
Ponthiere, 2010). The issue has been investigated in a broad context, encompassing both many 
European countries  (e.g., Costa-Font and Courbage, 2015) and the United States (e.g., Brown and 
Finkelstein, 2011). The former finds trade-offs between the insurance take-up and informal care 
for individuals who have the need for LTC but without sufficient funds to cover their needs 
whereas the latter study indicates that the features of public insurance impose an implicit tax on 
private insurance and crowd out the purchase of private plan like LTC insurance. 
In this paper, we aim to identify whether there is any crowding-out (i.e., the substitute) or 
“crowding-in” effect (i.e., the increase of informal care causes the take-up of public plans to in-
crease accordingly or complement) by informal care on the take-up of health insurance, including 
both public and private plans. 10F11Uncovering the relationship is meaningful as the cost of health 
plans and optimization of the purchased bundle is often the time one major concern. Public debate 
intensifies over how to restructure public plans to better address the demands of an aging popula-
tion while also limiting cost growth (Langa et al., 2001). In the meantime, LTC expenditure grows 
by more than 100% as a percentage of GDP in many European countries and it is postulated to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
dressing, feeding, using the bathroom. 
11 As private LTC is one special case of private plans and is measured independently in our study, we separate it from 
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remain the same trend until the middle of this century (Comas-Herrera et al., 2003). As such, one 
suggested solution to decelerate the growth in LTC expenditure is to encourage the provision of 
informal care provided by the family members to their frail parents. The family is a major source 
of care for elderly individuals and it is less costly than many formal care arrangements. This so-
lution may lessen LTC expenditure only if informal care is an effective substitute for formal care 
(Bonsang, 2009). Our study complements the work by showing that the substitution effect (or 
equivalently, crowding-out effect) on private plans might be accompanied by the complement 
effect (or equivalently, crowding-in effect) on total supplement plans (these include the supple-
ment plans of private and public insurance) if informal care as a whole substantively reduces the 
financial burden of the near-elderly and elderly individuals. Thus it is especially fulfilling for 
many developing areas or financially restricted households in industrialized countries, where in-
dividuals do not have sufficient health care coverage or where the insurance market is proven to be 
incomplete.  
The chapter proceeds in the following direction. In section 2, we comprehensively evaluate the 
previous work that has been completed. Section 3 introduces the empirical framework. In Section 
4, we present the data. Results, as well as the robustness check, are shown in section 5. And the 
policy implications and future extensions are discussed in closing. 
2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
LTC incurs a vital financial risk for the elderly (Huber et al., 2005), the impact of which on the 
seniors and the juniors can be detrimental. When the elderly dependents exhaust available re-
sources to exploit insurance-covered health service, they might ultimately resort to other feasible 
help such as the unpaid informal care by their children (Courbage and Eeckhoudt, 2012).  
                                                                                                                                                                           
the general terms of private plans. 
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That said, applied work has shown that informal care can impact both the benefactors and the 
beneficiaries. Informal care-relatives, family or friends providing mostly unpaid care support to 
frail parents compared with those formal care that is mostly paid help-is critical for the adequate 
continuum of care between informal and formal care (Sinha et al., 2013).  
When making the decision of purchase of LTC insurance, the parent might consider the likely 
response on the children’s side such as when caregivers are the children who earn relatively low 
wages (Zweifel and Strüwe, 1998). Most informal carers are women with a low educational level, 
low social class or even without employment. Family caregivers might represent an alternative 
source of care (Pauly, 1990). Although a private LTC market is universally available in the U.S., 
only a small proportion of people essentially hold these plans.   
The market for private LTC insurance does not expand as promisingly as other insurance 
markets due to its high cost or idiosyncratic reimbursement policy embedded. One evidence is that 
the average annual expenditure of formal care approximates 60,000 dollars (Kassner, 2004). For 
those who enter nursing home care market, almost 17 percent of individuals spend more than three 
years there. These stays are unexpectedly costly: one-year staying in the nursing home typically 
costs more than $50,000 for a private room and increases over time (MetLife Mature Market 
Institute, 2010).  The national average costs for LTC in the U.S. in 2016 indicate that: (i) $253 a 
day or $7,698 per month for a private room in a nursing home; (ii) $20.50 an hour for a health aide; 
and (iii) $20 an hour for homemaker services such as helping with cooking or running errands.11F12  
As when becoming dependent is uncertain, the expenditure in LTC varies to a large extent, 
standard economic models propose that risk-averse individuals place high importance on the ca-
pacity to tackle these shocks through insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008). However, the scale 
                                                     
12 The summary is based on the data from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The rates are charged by 
non-Medicare certified agents. 
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of this market is small in the U.S., only four percent of LTC expenditures are cost-shared by pri-
vate plans, with remaining one-third paid by out-of-pocket payment (OOP). 
The relationship between LTC and informal care can be rather mixed and complicated though 
(Courbage and Eeckhoudt, 2012). Help provided by the children to the parent who suffers from 
adverse health or disabilities might play a crucial role in avoiding the high costs of in-home and 
in-institution care (Ermisch, 2014). Therefore, it can serve as an effective substitute for formal 
LTC, which usually operates in paid domestic services or institutional care in the case where care 
demands of the elderly are relatively low or are not skill-dependent. Informal care can delay 
nursing home entry (Charles and Sevak, 2005). On the other hand, informal care might be a 
complement to LTC or paid health care likewise (e.g., nursing care) (Bonsang, 2009) or to doctor 
and hospital visits  (Bolin, Lindgren, and Lundborg, 2008). For instance, seniors who use paid 
home care service usually are recipients of informal care as well (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, 2010). On the opposite side, formal community-based care can drive down the uti-
lization of informal care too(Christianson, 1988). If informal care increases the marginal effect of 
insured formal care, they can be a complement to each other. 
There might be multiple factors impacting the provision of informal care. Pauly (1990) de-
velops an intra-family moral hazard model and suggests that the provision of informal care by the 
children is endogenous as the extent of LTC purchased is correlated with the extent of provided 
informal care or the reverse. This relationship directly affects the bias of the crowding-out effect. 
Under a vNM utility framework, Courbage and  Eeckhoudt (2012) propose a model showing that 
the optimal level of insurance is correlated with the level of informal care, the opportunity cost, the 
cost of formal care and the share in the bequest when the premium is paid by the parent and chil-
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dren regardless of altruism level.12F13 In reality, when the parent has multiple options to select, the 
optimal insurance might be related to the quality of those services as well.  
Our contribution to the literature comes from several channels. The first is that little is known 
about the “crowding-in” effect if any exists. Even less work discusses both “crowding-in” and 
crowding-out effect with empirical evidence in a combined way.  For instance,  Langa et al. (2001) 
find a complementary relationship between the increase in formal home health care and a rela-
tively high level of social support. Bolin, Lindgren, and Lundborg (2008) find informal care is 
complementary to doctor and hospital visits. Bonsang (2009) also suggests that informal care 
decreases low-skilled home care utilization while serves as a complement to high-skilled home 
care. If informal care reduces the marginal benefit to the health of medical care, the relationship is 
a substitute. Contrastingly, if informal care increases the marginal benefit to the health of medical 
care, their relationship is a complement. For the former substitute case, one typical example is that 
the parent may value paid home or institutional formal care less if a child caregiver is available to 
support with informal care. For the latter complementary case, it might apply in both inpatient and 
outpatient care. In the hospital, an informal caregiver serving as an advocate may improve the 
quality of skill-dependent formal care because the caregiver could help capture the errors in 
medicine administered or notify the medical staff anything going wrong. For outpatient care, a 
child informal caregiver may improve a parent’s health by transporting the parent to medical 
appointments. (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004). However, these are the only two studies we found 
discussing both substitution and complement effect. On the other hand, informal care might ob-
serve no statistically significant effect (Mellor, 2001). More others find a substitution effect be-
tween informal care and formal care (see e.g., Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Van Houtven, and Norton, 
                                                     
13 In reality, a child might purchase formal long-term care for the parent if the opportunity cost reaches the extent that 
it exceeds the cost of the paid formal care itself  (Hanley, Wiener, and Ham, 1991).  Specifically, when children are 
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2008; Bolin, Lindgren, and Lundborg, 2008). Our study aims to complement the documented 
literature by uncovering the coexistence of the substitution and the complement effect.   
The second contribution is to investigate how these effects are influenced when the level of 
ADLs/IADLs disability of the elderly person changes. Literature finds that at a low level of disa-
bility the relationship between informal and formal care is complementary, but for highly handi-
capped individuals the role might shift to a substitute (Bonsang, 2009). The third is the dis-
tance-based IVs incorporating co-resident case. Distance-based IVs are employed in the past work 
(Bonsang, 2009) but co-residency is excluded. In the meantime, Bonsang (2009) uses the number 
of sons, the number of daughters of the respondents and their interaction with the informal care as 
the instruments, restraining the sample to above-65 years old individuals without children. One 
concern is that the first-stage statistics are not reported, thus it is difficult to evaluate the potential 
weakness of the IVs if any presents. In the case of weak identification, the point estimate is dis-
torted and the results of two-stage least square (2SLS) might be misleading due to bias. The fourth 
is that much work examines the post-enrollment healthcare utilization for aging individuals, 
whereas our study explores the take-up or the enrollment of the healthcare plans. And the fifth is 
the measured informal care presents in multiple ways, all of which are robust by comparing the 
results of alternative measures. 
Our estimates are divided into two clear-cut sections: (i) crowding-out effect consistent with 
the previous work and “crowding-in” effect for total supplement plans seldom investigated so far; 
(ii) how the effects are compromised by the disability level. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
financially responsible for their parents, in such case the cost of care enters the child’s concern. 
 
34 
3 METHODOLOGY 
In this study, we concentrate on the impact of children’s informal care on parent’s health-relative 
events such as the take-up of health plans and the cost of healthcare. The model is characterized by 
the following (fixed-effects model): 
 
 
 
Where dependent variable 𝑌 denotes total supplement plans, private plans, LTC insurance or OOP 
of parent 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝐼𝐶 is the indicator of children’s informal care, including care for ADLs , care 
for IADLs and amount (hours/month, days/month) of help by the children. Both IADLs and ADLs 
care are binary variable equal to zero coded as no ADLs/IADLs informal care by any child and 
equal to one coded as at least one child supports with ADLs/IADLs care in the case of extensive 
measure. And in the intensive scenario, informal care is the time of help provided by the children 
during the last month.  𝛼 and  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 denote individual-  and wave- level fixed effects respectively.  
Covariates  𝑋 are the controls including demographics, family characteristics and socioeco-
nomic such as parent’s age, parent’s age squared, parent’s marital status and labor status, as these 
covariates affect either health insurance take-up of the parent or the availability of informal care. 
Coefficient 𝛽2 captures the impact of informal care on parent’s health care take-up, both publicly 
and privately.  
3.1 ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM 
We treat informal care provided by the child as endogenous. 13F14 The baseline model is defined in 
the specification (1) accounting for individual fixed effects (FE). While FE could absorb 
                                                     
14 Applied work treats informal care as both endogenous and exogenous. For endogenous case, one can refer to the 
studies by Van Houtven, Coe and Skira (2013) or (Bolin et al., 2008),whereas for exogenous case, one can refer to the 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏+𝜷𝟐 ∙ 𝑰𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∙ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 ∙ 𝜶𝒊  + 𝝐𝒊𝒕 (1) 
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time-invariant effects, it could not eliminate the potential collinearity between the informal care 
and other omitted factors. There might be certain un-observables impacting both the parent’s 
take-up of the plans and the children’s provision of informal care such as the altruism of the 
children or the parent. Capturing the degree of bias is difficult in some cases though. The level of 
informal care provided by caregivers may depend on the extent of health plans held by the parent, 
which  Pauly (1990) terms as an intra-family moral hazard. Instrument Variable (IV) is an alternate 
methodology to mitigate the endogeneity problem (Costa-Font and Courbage, 2015).  
The endogenous variables include the informal care provided by the children. The informal 
care presents in three ways: (1) ADLs/IADLs informal care by any child; (2) the number of hours 
children helped the parent last month; (3) the number of days children helped the parent last month. 
To differentiate the source of impact, the first case of help profile of informal care is divided into 
three distinct categories: (1) help with ADLs; (2) help with IADLs; (3) help with both ADLs and 
IADLs.  The results in case (2) and case (3) reinforce that the estimates of the case (1) and are 
robust to alternative measures of informal care. Thus how informal care is measured does not 
change the analysis essentially. 
3.2 INSTRUMENT VARIABLE(S) 
To address the endogeneity problem, we employ an IV model corresponding to equation (1), 
which overcomes both endogeneity and reverse causality issues. The IV for the endogeneity in the 
baseline model is the distance proximity to the closest child.  In our study it is based on the ques-
tion:” How near is the closest child?” and is categorized as (i) the child co-resides with the parent; 
(ii) the child lives within 10 miles from the parent; (iii) or lives over 10 miles from the parent. 14F
15 
                                                                                                                                                                           
study  such as (Van Houtven et al., 2013). This study treats it as endogenous, as in the real world, child’s informal care 
is more likely to be correlated with un-observables such as the altruism degree of the child.  
15 The other studies using distance proximity as the IV might not necessarily incorporate the case of co-residence (see 
e.g., Bonsang, 2009). 
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The exclusion restriction assumptions for the IVs are: (i) they are correlated with the endogeneity; 
(ii) uncorrelated with the random error.  
While multiple studies show that distance proximity is an important variable for the provision 
of informal care although it might be endogenous to the supply of informal care (see e.g., Charles 
and Sevak, 2005; Stern, 1995). We check that the distance-based IVs in our study are not en-
dogenous by showing that the children do not choose to provide informal care based on the 
parent’s health level. By inter-acting the IV with ADLs/IADLs disability levels, it is illustrated 
how the effect is reduced when the parent’s disability condition deteriorates.  
4 DATA 
The data used in our study come from 2002-2012 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
on a biennial basis. The survey reports a detailed longitudinal demographic, educational, and labor 
market information for the individuals aged 50 or older. We use the HRS Rand file containing 
cleaned and processed variables (Sonnega et al., 2014). Countering to the frail cohort used by 
many papers (see e.g., Boaz and Muller, 1994; Ettner, 1994; Jr., 1993), our sample is a cohort 
focusing on the near elderly having at least one living child.  
The informal care provided to the parents in this study includes the care for ADLs and IADLs. 
ADLs are defined as the Activities of Daily Living indices, include bathing, eating, dressing, 
walking across a room, and getting in or out of bed. Correspondingly, IADLs include activities 
such as using a telephone, taking medication, handling money, shopping, preparing meals. For 
ADLs and IADLs, they are based on the following questions: ”Count the number of children who 
help with ADLs/IADLs.” We re-categorize these two similarly, set them equal to zero if the parent 
receives no ADLs/IADLs support from any child, and equal to one if the parent receives 
ADLs/IADLs support from at least one child. 
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4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION CRITERIA 
To isolate other potential sources of informal care and thus concentrate on the effect of children’s 
informal care, we restrain the sample to the 50-72 years old parents who have at least one living 
child and thus exclude those having no children at the time of the survey. The marital status of 
parents could be married, spouse-absent married, divorced, separated, widowed or never mar-
ried.15F16 These parents do not receive informal care from other relatives and do not utilize the 
nursing home service.16F17 
4.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Our dependent variables include the take-up of private LTC insurance, total supplement plans, 
private plans and OOP in the past two years.  
(i) PRIVATE LTC 
The private LTC insurance measure is based on the question:“ Not including government pro-
grams, do you now have any long-term care insurance which specifically covers nursing home 
care for a year or more or any part of personal or medical care in your home?” It thus incorporates 
the nursing home and at-home health services taken by the individuals. Long-term care policies 
aim to provide payment assistance with ADLs/IADLs for individuals utilizing a long period of 
at-home or in-institution care  (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009).17F18 LTC dependency captures the 
needs for health care that arise from health problems or disabilities and is supposed to extend over 
a relatively long period of time. 
(ii) TOTAL PLAN INCLUDING SUPPLEMENTS (TSP) 
                                                     
16 Unknown marital status is eliminated from the sample. 
17 When parents do not reside in nursing home, on average they might not have been heavily depending on formal care 
service or too disabled to value the informal care. 
18
 Wiener, Hanley, Clark and Van Nostrand (1990) have more detailed discussion about ADLs/IADLs and it might 
differ in measurement across countries. 
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As for the total insurance plans including supplement plans (hereafter TSP), the question is asked 
as follows: “Calculate the number of supplement plans for those with Medicare, or the number of 
private plans for those without Medicare”.  This variable represents all the plans mentioned but 
excludes LTC insurance. 
(iii)  PRIVATE PLAN OTHER THAN LTC 
More specifically, the measure of the private plan other than long-term care (hereafter non-LTC 
private) is according to the response to the following question in the survey: “Now, we would like 
to ask about all the other types of health insurance plans you might have, such as insurance through 
an employer or a business, coverage for retirees, or health insurance you buy for yourself, in-
cluding any (Medigap or other supplemental coverage). If the respondent has Medicare coverage 
and respondent receives Medicare/Medicaid through an HMO, do not include long-term care in-
surance. Other than your Medicare HMO you’ve just told me about, how many other such plans do 
you have?  Or otherwise: do not include long-term care insurance or anything that you have just 
told me about. How many other such plans do you have?” An insignificant effect denotes that there 
is no sizable substitution relationship between non-LTC private plans and informal care. 
(iv) OOP 
For the outcome OOP, respondents are asked to estimate OOP medical expenditures since the 
previous interview for re-interviews or in the previous two years for new interviews.  
For all the questions, respondents can choose to answer “Not known” or “Refuse to answer”. 
We eliminate those observations with vague or missing values. 
4.3 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Other covariates in the study include age, age squared, marital status, labor status of the respondent, 
and dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 in the baseline specification. In the extended sensitivity 
 
39 
check, we also include the log of the household asset, the log of the household income, number of 
living siblings, number of living children, drinking behavior, current smoking status and the 
self-rated health level of the parent. 18F19 
The labor status of the respondent is divided into two categories: either continuing paid work 
or stop working completely. The number of living children is re-categorized into three groups: no 
living child, one living child, and at least two living children. The number of living siblings is 
re-termed into two groups: no living sibling or at least one living sibling. With respect to drinking 
behavior, it is based on the inquiry asking whether the respondent ever drinks. For smoking 
take-up, it is equal to 0 if the individual answers no smoking in that wave and equal to 1 otherwise. 
Self-rated health level is based on the question as follows:” Would you say your health is excellent, 
very good, good, fair, or poor?” The response is divided into five categories: 1 “excellent”, 2 “very 
good”, 3 “good”, 4 “fair”, and  5 “poor”.  
5  RESULT 
5.1 GENERAL SUMMARY 
Table 17 and Table 18 present the preliminary evidence and summary statistics in our HRS data, 
separated by the informal care of IADLs and ADLs.  
Table 17 divides the sample by informal care of ADLs.  Long-term care insurance take-up ratio 
is less in the ADLs informal care than in the non-informal care sample (6.1 percent versus 11.0 
percent). Whereas the number of total plan take-up is larger for the former (1.642 on average 
versus 1.550). The average age and the number of siblings are almost at the same levels. More 
individuals in the former subsample receive a high school or less education (93.6 percent versus 
78.1 percent). The household income and asset for the latter are higher than the former, with an 
                                                     
19
 The household income and asset include the respondent and spouse only. 
 
40 
nual income $74009 versus $25714 and total household asset $432928 versus $111532. Generally, 
the ratio of parents reporting fair or bad health in the informal care sample is greater than the ratio 
in the non-informal care sample. More parents in the informal care sample have two or more living 
children.  
In Table 18, we illustrate the sample by informal care of IADLs.  The trend is similar as in the 
summary by ADLs, and LTC insurance take-up ratio in the informal care sample is smaller (4.7 
percent versus 11.1 percent).  The same trend is observed for the number of TSP take-up (1.652 on 
average versus 1.549). More individuals are less-educated in the informal care subsample (94.1 
percent versus 77.9 percent). Their household income and asset are generally lower. And, more 
parents report fair or bad health in the informal care recipient subsample. 
5.2 FIXED-EFFECTS RESULT 
Table 19 presents the fixed-effects estimate of children’s informal care on parent’s take-up of 
health insurance, including private LTC insurance, TSP, private plans and OOP based on equation 
(1). 
The majority of the results suggest that informal care has no significant effect on all the four 
outcomes of concern at the conventional levels, implying a neither crowding-out nor “crowding-in” 
effect by informal care on parent’s health insurance take-up or expenditure when the endogeneity 
of informal care is not controlled for. We present the results by types of informal care: (1) 
providing ADLs care only; (2) providing IADLs care only; (3) providing both ADLs and IADLs 
care. For all the types of informal care, the result is consistently insignificant.  
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5.3 IV RESULT 
The instrument variable (IV) we employ in the baseline specification is the geographical proximity 
from the parent to the closest child.19F20 The assumption is that the IV is strongly correlated with 
informal care but uncorrelated with the unobserved random factors.20F21  The IV specification results 
are shown in Table 20.   
The estimated result implies that informal care provided by the children systematically crowds 
out the take-up of private LTC plan for the parent. It is consistent in all three types of discussed 
informal care. Generally, the magnitude of effect due to the informal care of ADLs is larger than 
that of IADLs. ADLs generally include basic living activities, indicating that this type of informal 
care has a stronger substitution effect on the corresponding formal care covered by insurance and 
is mostly less skill-dependent. Further, in the case of receiving both types of informal care, the 
magnitude of the crowding-out effect is larger than either type of informal care, suggesting the 
more informal care provided the more substitutional relationship between informal care and for-
mal LTC insurance take-up. The add-up effect of two separate care is slightly larger than the case 
receiving both types of care but generally within a comparative level. Specifically, this is similar 
for the “crowding-in” effect on TSP. Countering to the effect on LTC plan, informal care coun-
terfactually “crowds in” the take-up of TSP. As such, informal care serves as a complementary role 
for TSP. The effect is consistent with alternative measures of informal care.  
Quantitatively, Table 20 also illustrates that in the case of extensive measure of informal care, 
receiving ADL informal care reduces the probability of the take-up of LTC insurance by 0.514 and 
the crowding-out effect is 0.357 for IADL care. In the case of providing both types of care, the 
                                                     
20 The categories of the IV include: (i) co-resident; (ii) living within 10 miles; (iii) living more than 10 miles. 
21  We employ alternative IVs at later section based on the discussion of the endogeneity of the IV. 
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reduction effect in probability is 0.747. Contrastingly for the supplement plans, it increases their 
numbers on average by 1.478, 1.003 and 2.108 respectively. 
The crowd-out effect on LTC insurance reflects the strong substitution relationship between 
informal care and LTC plan and the demand of cost saving by the parent, whereas the “crowd-in” 
effect reflects that parent’s demand of health services not covered or not readily provided by the 
private LTC plan. The IV results indicate that informal care serves as the substitution for LTC and 
complement for the supplement plans after the endogeneity is controlled for. Whether the quality 
of public plans such as a public LTC insurance is higher than the quality of a private LTC insur-
ance, arouses a debate in the documented literature. Staffing levels are higher in publicly operated 
homes than private ones, whereas the latter is higher in processual quality (Winblad, Blomqvist, 
and Karlsson, 2017). Private long-term care plan usually operates under the framework of pri-
vatization; in contrast, the public counterpart usually operates accompanied by not-for-profit 
purpose. While privatization is one way to enhance efficiency, it has the issue of being more prone 
to lower quality levels for the purpose of reducing costs and generating more profit (Prizzia, 
2001).On the other hand, not-for-profit nursing homes, on average, deliver higher quality care than 
do for-profit counterparts (Comondore et al., 2009; Aaronson, Zinn, and Rosko, 1994). In order to 
minimize the operation cost, the quality by the private market is generally low (Davis, 1993). LTC 
recipients in the not-for-profit sector have a lower death rate, lower infections and lower hospi-
talizations (Spector, Selden, and Cohen, 1998).21F
22
   
To check how the estimated results vary when informal care is measured in different ways. We 
observe the case of informal care measured in hours of help per month and days of help per month 
provided by the children as well, the IV estimates from Table 21 to Table 24 are consistent with the 
case where informal care measured in ADLs/IADLs. Informal care crowds out enrollment of LTC 
 
43 
insurance and crowds in enrollment of TSP. Thus, the outcomes are robust regardless of which 
types of informal care used. 
Informal care significantly reduces OOP. This might be an integrated effect of crowding out of 
LTC insurance and “crowding in” of TSP. In general, the cost increase in TSP is offset by the cost 
reduction in private LTC. Informal care mitigates the financial burden for the parent. 
5.4 INTERACTION EFFECT BY DISABILITY LEVEL 
In Table 25 and Table 26, we check whether there is a differentiated effect based on parent’s ADLs 
or IADLs disability level respectively. 22F23  
To achieve this, we introduce into the empirical model the interaction between informal care 
and the ADLs or IADLs disability level of the parent. As the model now has one extra endogenous 
variable and thus requires additional instruments as well, for which we add the interaction of the 
distance from the closest child and the ADLs/IADLs disability level.  
Table 25 presents the impact on the health insurance take-up by informal care based on the 
level of ADLs disability of the parent. The coefficient for informal care is negative and significant, 
same as the previous section, indicating a sizable crowding out effect on LTC insurance at the 
presence of informal care. In contrast, the interaction term between informal care and the ADLs 
disability level is positive and significant, which implies that the substitution effect is reduced for 
the parent suffering from a higher disability level.   The result of IADLs is similar.23F24 In comparison, 
the direction of impact on TSP is reversed. The coefficient for informal care is significantly posi-
tive, which indicates a sizable “crowding in” effect on TSP and the negative and significant sign of 
interaction term between informal care and the ADLs disability level implies that the “complement 
                                                                                                                                                                           
22 We are cautious to make the conclusion that the complementary or “crowd-in” effect is causal. 
23 The disability index is based on the number of ADLs/IADLs deficit. ADLs deficit levels range from 0 to 5, whereas 
IADLs deficit levels range from 0 to 3. The IADL criterion can be counted as a rough proxy for serious cognitive 
impairment. 
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effect” is reduced as the disability of the parent becomes more severe.24F
25
  When it changes to 
IADLs, the outcome is consistent and comparable. 
This finding is correlated with the characteristic of the sample. First, in our final sample, the 
total number of individuals is 19873 and the number of individuals with Medicaid, Medicare or 
TRI-CARE/CHAMPUS/CHAMP-VA (any of these plans provides public medical care for vet-
erans and their dependents) 12251, the ratio of public plan coverage is 61.6 percent. If breaking out 
the coverage by age, the number of under-65 years old individuals enrolled in government-plan 
Medicaid is 1764 (coverage rate 11.4 percent); whereas for Medicare, the number is 1952 (cov-
erage rate 12.6 percent). In contrast, the number of 65 or above elderly enrolled in Medicaid is 
1253 (coverage rate 12.4 percent)   and the number is 9829 for Medicare-enrolled elderly (cov-
erage rate 90.9 percent). The average number of supplement plans for 65 or above elderly is 2.1 
with a maximum number of 8 plans. And the average number of supplement plans for under-65 
years old near elderly is 1.2. This implies that other than Medicare or private plans, on average the 
individuals possess at least one additional supplement plan, either public or private. The under-65 
years old individuals might qualify for Medicare by health conditions due to disability.  
Among the people having the public plan(s), the number of individuals who have at least one 
TSP plan (either public or private) is 12208 and thus the fraction of coverage is 99.6 percent.  
Almost all individuals with the public plan have one or more supplement plans. This reflects the 
mechanism that individuals potentially demand other types of health insurance not covered by the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
24 Bonsang (2009) finds a similar mitigating effect on formal care when the disability level of the parent increases. 
25 Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest declaring instruments to be weak if the first-stage F-statistic is less than 10 with 
one endogenous variable. Stock et al. (2001) propose another procedure of rule of thumb for multiple endogenous 
variables, from which the characterization of the set of weak instruments is based on the included endogeneity, the 
number of instrumental variables, and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS or desired maximal 
size of a 5% Wald test. Andrews, Moreira, and  Stock(2004) also indicate that the assumption of normality can be 
taken away at the cost of having only asymptotically valid rather than exactly valid tests. The presented first-stage 
results in TABLE 9 and other relative tables indicate no weak-IV issue based on the 10% critical value proposed by 
applied work. 
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basic packages of the public plans, private LTC insurance or informal care. And the demand for 
coverage of cost-efficient health insurance could be urgent. In our sample, the number of publicly 
covered people having supplement plan and private LTC plan is 1920, indicating the ratio of 
coverage is 9.7 percent.  This result is similar to the roughly 10 percent of private LTC insurance 
coverage for elderly individuals in the study by Brown et al. (2004).  As such, the cohort satisfies 
the characteristics of below: the nursing care being primarily paid for through OOP, with a small 
portion of low-income residents receiving comprehensive LTC insurance through Medicaid, a 
larger portion of individuals using only limited coverage of LTC plan by Medicare, and remains 
using private LTC insurance or informal care by family support if they have access to these re-
sources.  
In the years when individuals are close to retirement, they will need retirement income to pay 
for health care, urgent care and skill-dependent care not covered by Medicare or other public plans. 
In addition, some needy elderly demand more LTC insurance such as plan covering ADLs or 
IADLs care that they cannot support themselves. Public and private programs pay for merely part 
of the cost of long-term care. Medicare provides limited coverage for LTC on the skilled nursing 
facility and home health benefits, which focuses on short-term or skilled nursing care and therapies. 
Medicaid provides broader coverage for LTC but is only accessible for low- income and assets 
households. Medicaid helps paid roughly 40 percent of the nation’s total long-term care ex-
penditure of $150 billion and 44 percent of the cost on nursing home care in 1998 (Feder, Komisar, 
and Niefeld, 2018).  On the other hand, for those with limited or not qualify for public LTC cov-
erage, the health insurance demands are not necessarily low. As such, they might search other 
channels of coverage to insure against the potential risks.  
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Second, whether an individual needs LTC insurance might be correlated with the level of 
dependency or disability. Limitation in ADLs or IADLs is defined as needing hands-on or standby 
assistance from others to maintain normal daily activity, and the limitation is expected to last for at 
least a couple of months. Informal care might be an option for those having children’s support; 
however, the range of the care provided by the children is generally limited, mostly focuses on 
non-skilled support and covers a relatively short-term period. As when the disability level of the 
parent increases, the informal care by the children is considered to provide only limited substitu-
tion effect for the formal care. When a disabled parent is more dependent than usual case, he/she 
might require more help and the care usually lasts a longer period than usual. In a highly needy 
case, individuals are expected to utilize more skill-dependent nursing care with longer stays. As 
such, disabled parents are more likely to choose to stay in the LTC plan rather than opt-out from it 
to bailout from the dependency and the burden of healthcare cost. 
For TSP, the coefficients on ADLs/IADLs are positive and significant, as indicated by the 
previous finding. This result consistently implies that more informal care is significantly corre-
lated with more supplement coverage. Nevertheless, this “crowd-in effect” reduces when the 
disability level increases. This might indirectly reflect the fact that either public or private sup-
plement plans can only address portion of the health insurance demands by the parent with a higher 
disability or the capacity of addressing health plan demands reduces when parent’s disability level 
increases. 
In Table 26, we calculate the disability index by employing the parent’s IADLs difficulty 
levels.  Generally, the results are consistent with the case when the disability index is measured by 
using the parent’s ADLs deficiency levels.  Informal care serves as a crowding-out effect for LTC 
insurance and the substitution effect is lower for the parents whose disability level is higher. The 
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impact on TSP is the opposite: “crowd-in effect” for TSP but the “complement effect” is reduced 
with the growth of severity in parent’s disability level.  
Table 27 and Table 28 are the cases where informal care denotes the hours/days that children 
helped during the last month and their interactions with the parent’s ADLs/IADLs disability re-
spectively.  The results do not change essentially though: informal care crowds out LTC insurance 
and “crowds in” TSP sizably. In the meantime, these effects are significantly reduced when the 
parent’s ADLs/IADLs disability level increases. 
5.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
To check the sensitivity of our results, in Table 29 and Table 30, we perform the first set of ro-
bustness check of the baseline IV estimates.  As income or wealth tends to be endogenous, we 
include these two confounders in the baseline specification to perform the first-round sensitivity 
test. The resulting outcome indicates it is robust to this alternative specification. Informal care 
systematically crowds out LTC insurance and “crowds in” TSP. The second concern is about the 
channel of informal care available to the parent. More living children and more living siblings are 
likely to impact how readily the parent can access support.  Further, health-relative behaviors such 
as smoking and drinking behaviors tend to affect the health conditions of the parent, and they thus 
potentially affect the take-up of health insurance. In addition, risk-averse parents might purchase 
more health insurance due to poor health than otherwise. In the third set of sensitivity check, we 
incorporate the characteristics of the child such as his/her working status, whether an own child, 
whether a stepchild and the number of children providing health care support. All of these present 
consistent results as in the baseline specification: crowding-out effect on LTC insurance and 
“crowding-in” effect on TSP. 
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So far, the analysis does not include the parents living in a nursing home who potentially 
constitute a non-negligible proportion of formal care. It thus may affect the results if the decision 
to institutionalize an individual represents a substantive substitute of formal care for informal care 
(Pezzin and Schone, 1999). We then incorporate these individuals into the sample and re-perform 
the estimate on LTC insurance and TSP, the IV results as well as the corresponding robust check, 
are essentially comparative to the outcomes excluding the nursing subsample.25F26 
One might be concerned about the potential that the children might relocate to live closer in 
geographic proximity to the parent or the reverse if the informal care from other relatives is not 
available, if the parent is poorer in health or if the healthcare is not available for the parent (Charles 
and Sevak, 2005). In this case, the parent’s health affects children’s relocation preferences. As 
such, the aforementioned IV based on distance tends to be endogenous. To check, we estimate the 
number of children living within 10 miles on parent’s health levels. The health uses three measures: 
self-rated health level, ADLs disability level, and IADLs disability level.  All the results in Table 
31 imply no existence of significant selection effects. Therefore children do not choose to live 
nearer to the parent or vice versa based on parent’s health conditions. 26F27  
The interaction terms in Table 27 and 28 indicate how the “crowd-in” and crowd-out effects 
change with parent’s disability level based on the intensive measure of informal care. Generally, 
they are consistent with the distance-based IV results. Either effect is reduced when the parent’s 
disability level increases. The result based on IADLs is similar to that based on ADLs disability. 
The result based on hours per month is similar to that based on days per month. All of these imply 
that informal care reduces the enrollment of LTC insurance and increases the take-up of TSP, and 
the direction of impact reverses when the parent becomes more dependent.  
                                                     
26 For conserving space purpose, the estimates are omitted but available upon request. 
27  Charles and Sevak (2005) also find that the probability of children’s living within 10 miles is not higher when 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this study, we investigate the concern of substitutional and complementary effects of children’s 
informal care on parent’s health insurance take-up.  Our estimate operates through a fixed-effects 
specification and its corresponding IV concentrating on the United States market. The estimate 
indicates that informal care systematically crowds out private LTC insurance and “crowds in” 
supplement plans including public and private plans.  Accounting for the 97.9 and 96.9 percentage 
points of individuals without ADLs/IADLs informal care, receiving ADLs/IADLs informal care 
reduces the take-up of LTC insurance by 50.3/34.6 percentage points for these individuals. And 
increases the average number of supplement plans by 1.45 and 0.97 respectively. 
The effects are reduced when parent’s ADLs/IADLs disability level increases.  The effect of 
ADLs care is consistent with the effect of IADLs care, and it is also the case when informal care is 
measured in alternative ways. As when we employ the informal care measured in hours per month 
or days per month, the outcomes do not change qualitatively. On the other hand, our results sug-
gest that the relationship between formal and informal care is sensitive to the dependency status of 
the parent, represented by the ADLs/IADLs disability indicator. 
We find that when the endogeneity is not controlled, informal care does not crowd out any 
outcomes being concerned, and the financial burden of the parent is not affected in a significant 
way. Nevertheless, when the endogeneity is controlled for, informal care serves as the substitution 
for private LTC insurance and the complement for the public supplement plans. The magnitude of 
the effects is lowered when the parent’s disability level is more severe. This reflects the strong 
demand for additional insurance coverage across the near-retirement elderly as they enter the 
senior age.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
regression on parent’s health variables. 
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Further, the positive correlation with total supplement plans reveals that certain unobserved 
health or financial characteristic is positively linked to the informal care provided by the children. 
The informal care provided by the children is mostly not skill-dependent and limited in range and 
sometimes might even be accompanied by high opportunity cost, Thus, the substitute effect on 
LTC insurance reflects that the parent, on average, has the demand for not skill-dependent care. On 
the other hand, highly dependent parent, indicated by the ADLs/IADLs disability level, might not 
count on the support from the children. In contrast, he or she might resort to paid formal care to 
bail out from the dilemma. Further, the more take-up of supplement plans indirectly reflects the 
fact the care provided by the children cannot completely cover the healthcare demanded by the 
parent. Informal care increases the marginal benefit of total supplement plans. Our result about the 
complementary relationship to the supplement plans is not in confliction with the literature (see 
e.g.,  Harold, Houtven, and Norton 2008). 
The finding in OOP is consistent with the reduction effect explored by applied work (see e.g., 
Ermisch, 2014). However, contrary to the “disincentive” of seeking insurance documented in the 
literature, our study indirectly indicates a new mechanism of active seeking of budget controlling 
and insuring against health risks. This is accompanied by crowding out LTC insurance and 
“crowding in” more public/private supplement plans. 
This study is meaningful in part is that it formally uncovers the causal effect of informal care 
on LTC insurance take-up, the correlation with public/private supplement plans and clarifies the 
possible channels of effect under a family-interaction framework. We quantify how the impact is 
altered by the severity of the disability level. Our study provides vital two-fold implications for 
both public health policy and the private health market. The first one is consistent with the 
most-studied private LTC market, where policy might work well when subsidizing the informal 
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caregiver such as the national family caregiver support program, or reimbursing the provider of 
private LTC in an appropriate way accounting for the potential issues such as moral hazard. The 
second is for the concern on the cost growth of public plans. Our study implies that the small-scale 
private LTC market might be attributable to multiple reasons: (1) commensurate level of informal 
care provided by the children; (2) high cost of the private LTC insurance. As more individuals 
deviate to public programs at the receipt of informal care, the financial burden for public financing 
increases. And how well these public supplements work in an incomplete market might need extra 
investigation. Public plans such as Medicaid have an interest in limiting their costs (Grabowski, 
2007). Our study reflects the demand of cost reduction, increasing coverage of the extra health care 
for the near-retirement individuals and how these are affected when the individuals progress the 
degree of dependency. This continues to be the focus of research in the coming decades if more 
industrialized or developing countries join the list of the aging society.  
Compared with the studies focusing on older than 70 of age cohort in the documented literature, 
the age range of our sample is generally younger and thus less frail on average. This cohort might 
plan health care at an earlier time. The crowd-out effect is causal but the “crowd-in” effect might 
not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. The trend is accompanied by an effect of cost reduc-
tion, it is more likely that the elderly or near-elderly wish to have more comprehensive health 
coverage to insure the risks of health shocks within an acceptable budget. Another limitation is that 
how much detail supports the parent has received from different children, for which we cannot 
differentiate as the poor information of the measure in the data. In addition, we do not differentiate 
the concentration level of the long-term care market, as low market concentration signifies that 
greater numbers of firms operate and severer competition, and thus probably more nursing home 
bed supplies, higher quality of service and lower cost for the patients within the market (Davis, 
 
52 
1993). The presented effects might be altered by these uncounted factors. Also, the intra-family 
model in our study is a simplified version; in reality, it might be more complicated though. If the 
children curtail caring activity in response to the parent's purchase of  LTC insurance (expected in 
case of a low wage rate), the purchase of LTC insurance would run counter to the parent's interest 
as the need to cater child’s response.  In contrast, in the case where the children earn high wages, 
LTC purchase decision may lie in the parent's preference  (Zweifel and Strüwe, 1998). Neither do 
we account for the case when the premiums are paid by the children, which might alter the scenario 
systematically (Hanley, Wiener, and Ham, 1991). Thus one possible avenue for future work would 
be to explore the effects accounting for these potential confounders. Another feasible extension 
might be to clarify whether all the outcomes in this paper present a specific geographic charac-
teristic. All of these to a large extent depend on whether the more commensurate levels of data are 
measured in these ways. 
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Chapter III 
 
Job Insecurity and Health 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines the causal effect of subjective job insecurity on health, including self-rated 
health, mental health, chronic health conditions, BMI/obesity, drinking and smoking behavior. We 
employ pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects and instrumental variable (IV) speci-
fications. By employing an indicator for firm-level permanent layoffs as the IV, we find that job 
insecurity has a negative effect on certain outcomes such as mental health and the emergence of 
new health conditions. Job insecurity predicts future job displacement and income loss.  
Keywords: health, job insecurity, unemployment, endogeneity, instrumental variable, well-being 
loss 
JEL Classification: I100, J3, J200 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Job insecurity can deteriorate health (Caroli and Godard, 2016).  Literature also documents that 
unemployment has an adverse effect on health and lowers the expectancy of life. Being unem-
ployed can lead to a significant and negative effect on health (see e.g., Otterbach and Sousa-Poza, 
2016; Mandal, Ayyagari, and Gallo, 2011)and on income (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan, 1993). 
In the most severe situation, it might be associated with an increased risk of mortality (see e.g., 
Sullivan and Wachter, 2009). For older-male workers, mortality rates in the period after job dis-
placement are more than one-half higher than otherwise would have been (Sullivan and Wachter, 
2009). When the impact of dismissal from the job is unexpectedly escalated from an individual 
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level to a sector level, it might even present the characteristic of inter-country “spill-over” effect. 
The workers in countries with strong employment protection legislation suffer from job insecurity 
in a degree comparable to the workers in less protected countries (Caroli and Godard, 2016). 
Though difference exists between the two (unlike unemployment, job insecurity usually involves 
no essential or immediate loss of income or real social status), the impact of job insecurity can 
spread sometimes in such a way that its adverse effect tends to be under-estimated as the negative 
and unobservable components tend to be neglected. Job insecurity is detrimental to health because 
it can cause stress (Sverke, Hellgren, and Näswall, 2002) and health symptoms such as eyestrain, 
skin and ear issues and stomach and sleep disorders (Cheng et al., 2005). It is also negatively 
correlated with depression-related diseases (J. E. Ferrie, 2001). 
A large body of literature shows that causal evaluation is challenging as subjective job inse-
curity tends to be endogenous (see e.g., Caroli and Godard, 2016). Job insecurity can influence 
various health events; on the opposite side, ill health can negatively affect the subsequent em-
ployability or job insecurity of the subject, which is the concern about reverse causality. Another 
conundrum comes from selection issue when unhealthy workers are systematically selected to be 
dismissed (Krug and Eberl, 2018) or unhealthy workers select into jobs with low/high insecurity. 
To address these concerns, we employ a firm-level IV, which is an indicator of a permanent 
reduction of labor force inside a specific firm. As the mass layoff within an organization is ex-
ogenous to the health of the individual workers, the IV is thus not endogenous and facilitates the 
identification of causal estimate. As such, we aim to revisit the long-debated issue of the impact on 
health by subjective job insecurity. Other than the IV, this study also contributes to the literature by 
observing a much broader range of health outcomes. The major finding is that after controlling for 
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the endogeneity, job insecurity has a negative effect on mental health and the emergence of health 
conditions. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review. Section 3 describes 
the methodology and section 4 presents the data employed in this study. Section 5 reports our 
estimated results and Section 6 concludes and provides feasible avenues for future work. 
2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The impact of job insecurity27F
28
 on employees’ well-being has received a great deal of attention in 
psychological and economic research.  
Job insecurity is harmful to health. The insecurity (or the fear of being involuntarily fired from 
the job)  is shown to detrimentally impact symptoms such as headaches and skin issues (Caroli and 
Godard, 2016) and is strongly related to mental distress (Lau and Knardahl, 2008). In addition, a 
growing literature in psychology, economics, and sociology reveals that job loss and job insecurity 
correlate with the incidence of depression and heart attack  (see e.g., Goldsmith and Darity, 1996; 
Burgard, Brand, and House, 2009). The detrimental effect of job insecurity on mental health is 
larger for workers who place high importance on job security. It thus suggests that firms should 
exert effort to make employees more employable in order to reduce the negative impact of job 
insecurity (De Jong, Wiezer, and Joling, 2008). 28F
29
High levels of job insecurity may also increase 
mental health issue such as distress (McDonough, 2000). The increment in fear of unemployment 
                                                     
28  (Green, 2011) shows that job insecurity might include uncertainty over valued job features in the current 
job(including fears over promotion and relocation) and lack of continuity of the current job. Job insecurity might arise 
from job rotation or role difference (Ho, Chang, Shih, and Liang, 2009). However, in this study we focus on the 
probability of involuntary current job loss for non-self-employed employees (or who working for others). 
29 Literature has heterogeneous measures with respect to mental health. The study by Green (2011) computes mental 
health based on the feelings in the previous four weeks. The questions ask how much of the time being nervous, 
feeling down, feeling calm and peaceful and being a happy person. Responses are on a 6-pt scale from “All of the time” 
to “None of the time”. Hellgren  and Sverke (2003) use the 12-indicator General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12; 
Goldberg, 1979). The scale is a screening test developed for the purpose of detecting non-psychiatric health (Banks et 
al., 1980). The items are scored ranging from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates no perceptions of mental health complaints and 
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substantially curtails the mental health status of employees (Reichert and Tauchmann, 2011). In-
dividuals who report insecurity present markedly greater odds of mental and physical health 
problems (Strazdins et al., 2004) and thus are significantly associated with a worsened risk of poor 
health (László et al., 2010).  
One potential channel of impact comes from job satisfaction  (Heaney, Israel, and House, 1994) 
and absenteeism (Chirumbolo and Areni, 2005). Job insecurity is shown to correlate with negative 
work attitudes, with insecure employees in management position reporting decreased work effort, 
trust, career satisfaction and career optimism (Roskies and Guerin, 1990). With increased 
perceived job insecurity, permanent employees have lower levels of job satisfaction, work 
engagement accompanied by a deteriorating level of job exhaustion (Mauno et al., 2005). As such, 
job insecurity is related to reduced levels of identification with the organization, suggesting that 
employees' organizational citizenship behaviors are partially driven by evaluations about the 
perceived belongingness to the institution (Piccoli et al., 2017). Permanent employees and those 
who experienced high levels of subjective job insecurity are more likely than their counterparts to 
work while ill (Heponiemi et al., 2010). Job insecurity exerts a negative effect on life satisfaction 
as well (Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009). Countering this, job satisfaction is boosted 
when individuals report a high level of optimism with respect to job insecurity (Zheng et al., 
2014).   
Higher subjective job-loss probabilities are associated with higher earnings declines and pro-
vide a significant predictive power on unemployment as well (Stephens, 2004). In the severe case, 
job insecurity can cause inflated unemployment rate (Luechinger, Meier, and Stutzer, 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 indicates frequently perceived health complaints. Others use the depressive symptoms as the indicator of mental 
health (Burgard, Brand, and House, 2009). 
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Subjective labor insecurity tracks the dismissal rate and tends to be greater for less-educated older 
workers (Green, 2009).  
Job insecurity can impact behaviors likewise. Job stress is observed to be positively related to 
continuous smoking behavior among ever smokers (Ayyagari and Sindelar, 2010) and to negative 
behavior such as decreased work effort (Roskies and Louis-Guerin, 1990). In the extreme case, it 
is found to be associated with the burnout of self-control (Westman, Etzion, and Danon, 2001). 
However, as is shown by previous documenting work, it is a huge challenge to evaluate the 
causal impact of subjective job insecurity on health outcomes as the variable of job insecurity 
contributes to the issue of potential endogeneity. The first concern is that different socioeconomic 
individuals might perceive job insecurity in a different way and thus report different levels of 
health. In many cases, however, it is hard to capture the degree of bias. Reverse causality is a 
second major concern because poor-health individuals tend to be less as productive, thus experi-
encing worse job insecurity or unhealthy workers tend to be hired on insecure/secure occupations. 
The third comes from the issue of the weak instrument, in such case the power of IV (e.g., the 
unemployment and labor protection legislation situation) for job insecurity is compromised and 
thus a precise point estimate on health is hard to achieve  (Caroli and Godard, 2016). The fourth 
issue comes from selection bias as unhealthy workers might select into low/high insecure indus-
tries or occupations.  
Many studies constrain to the potential threat of a job loss while others extend it to the re-
placement of employment, encompassing the working employees who have insecure jobs by 
definition: part-time, or temporary and thus mostly only used to buffer short-term labor demand in 
the labor market. Workers in such market consider job insecurity as an inseparable component of 
their career experience and therefore possess relatively consistent beliefs about the labor market 
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and their professional prospects. Mostly, job insecurity captured by this cohort is negatively linked 
with their health. Contrastingly, workers in the stable labor market, are usually hired based on a 
long-term basis, and thus perceive an unprepared or unexpected job-insecurity shock at expo-
sure(Jane E Ferrie, 2001). These workers usually experience the change from the feeling of safe 
work in the firm to distressing insecurity.  The rise in job losses and the corresponding adverse 
impacts among workers in this steady labor market are correlated with the suddenly perceived job 
insecurity (Wachter, Gordon, Piore, and Hall, 1974).  
In this study, we focus on the cohort who is working. 29F
30
 We concentrate on this cohort being 
potentially affected by unemployment but not being dismissed due to the reason that if they indeed 
experience a worsening in health, then the overall impact of unemployment on health tends to be 
not fully taken into account (A. Reichert and Tauchmann, 2011).  
Second, our study complements recent studies by employing a fine-tuned instrument making 
the precise point evaluation possible. A firm-level layoff indicator provides hints about how 
healthy that specific entity is and consequently whether the labor status of one employee exten-
sively “spillovers” to the others, just as in the case of a firm-level mass layoff. It thereby estab-
lishes a much clearer causal impact between the perceived labor market and health outcomes than 
previous applied work. Literature employs either country-level or market-level shock (see e.g., 
Caroli and Godard, 2016). The macro-level shock might efficiently capture the causal effect if the 
causal link correctly exists. And individuals are likely to be affected by the whole economy; 
however, shock at the firm level is more relevant. Reverse causality evolves to be a concern if 
                                                     
30 Another indispensable component is the workers who are self-employed, as they are the owner of the businesses and 
the perceived job insecurity is supposed to be disparate from those working for others. Owners on average have more 
control on the resources within the firms. Compared to paid employees, self-employed individuals have lower job 
insecurity (Millán, Hessels, Thurik, and Aguado, 2013). In this study, we do not investigate in detail into the part-time 
market, but focus on the working-for-others individuals and thus not self-employed. In contrast, we use the full-time 
employees as a sensitivity check. 
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unhealthy workers are more likely to be employed in insecure/secure jobs or if adverse health 
causes individuals to fear more they could be displaced.  
All of these generate a tough challenge for efficient point estimate. Even the most recent 
economic literature controlling for unobserved heterogeneity inadequately addresses the potential 
risk of reverse causality biasing the estimates (see e.g., Green, 2011; Knabe et al., 2010). In the 
study by Green (2011), for instance, absence IV with multiple endogeneities, they rely on 
controlled time-invariant effects and FE-RE Heckman specification to identify the causal effect; 
however, it is possible that there are other time-varying variables associated with both job inse-
curity and outcome that is not controlled for.30F31 Our study aims to provide a more effective causal 
effect of subjective job insecurity on health by addressing these issues through robust IV speci-
fications. In interpreting this, it is helpful to work from a theoretical and econometric viewpoint 
explicitly recognizing the possibility that health impact by job insecurity may vary across the 
subpopulations, depending on such characteristics as gender, education, and employability. This 
perspective helps to reconcile the varieties of findings in other applied work, and thus illustrates a 
useful framework for facilitating new insights about the connection between job insecurity and 
health impact. 
The connection between job insecurity and health has found a negative relation. However, the 
strength of the link varies sizably across studies. Some indicate a weak correlation (see e.g., 
Hellgren, Sverke, and Isaksson, 1999), others reveal a moderate relationship (Author, Cavanaugh, 
Noe, Cavanaugh1, and Noe2, 1999), with remains report a strong correlation (Ameen, Jackson, 
Pasewark, and Strawser, 1995). Given this debated context, revisiting this issue is meaningful. We 
aim to identify the effect by extending to much broader health outcomes than previous work.  
                                                     
31 One example is that the existence of time-varying expertise across the workers. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
The baseline model is defined as the following pooled-OLS specification: 
 
 
 
Where the dependent variable  𝑌 denotes health (i.e., self-rated health and mental health,) of in-
dividual 𝑖 at time 𝑡, or health behaviors (i.e., any new health conditions since the last interview, 
BMI, obesity, ever drinking behavior, and smoking behavior during the current wave). 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 is the 
fixed effects for waves and 𝐷𝑖𝑣 is the fixed effects for census divisions. 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑆 captures the de-
gree of job insecurity and is measured in one-percent increment from 0 to 100 percent, Coeffi-
cient 𝝀𝟐 is thus our main parameter of interest. It is expected to be positive based on the hypothesis 
that job insecurity deteriorates health. Control covariates 𝑋 in the baseline include a vector of 
demographic and socioeconomic status such as age, age squared, gender, race, education, marital 
status, log of the household asset, log of the household income, length of current job tenure in year, 
whether the  respondent is covered by the employer’s plan, and firm size, while 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the random 
error disturbance.  
To capture individual time-invariant effect, we employ the fixed-effects specification in (2). αi 
is the individual fixed effects for individual i. The advantages of fixed effects specification include 
allowing the individual- and time- specific effects to be correlated with explanatory variables. 
Neither does it require an econometrician to model the correlation patterns (Hsiao, 2007).  And if 
there are some time-invariant effects herein, they increase precision by absorbing substantial 
variation in the main outcomes and thus avoid completely attributing the impact on the outcome 
to the sole key variable(s). All the other covariates are similar to those in the previous discussion.  
𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝝀𝟏 + 𝝀𝟐 ∙ 𝑱𝒐𝒃𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽 ∙ 𝑿𝒊𝒕+𝝀𝟑 ∙ 𝑫𝒊𝒗 + 𝝀𝟒 ∙ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (1) 
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Since the subjective capture of job insecurity tends to be endogenous, we further employ the IV 
corresponding to the equation (1) and equation (2) respectively to evaluate its under-control im-
pact.  The IV for job insecurity is  𝐶𝐹𝐷𝑍, which is the indicator of a firm-level mass layoff and is 
exogenous to workers’ health (Sullivan and Wachter, 2009). 𝐶𝐹𝐷𝑍  is a dummy indicator and 
equal to one if the firm does experience a permanent shock in labor reduction and 0 otherwise. To 
be specific, it is based on the question in the survey:” Has your employer experienced a permanent 
reduction in employment since [month, year respondent started current job/respondent’s last in-
terview month, year/current interview month, 2 years ago /you started working there](permanent 
employment reductions are sometimes called downsizing)?”  The provided answer is either “Yes” 
or “No”. We eliminate those observations with missing or unknown information. The identifica-
tion assumptions of the IV model are: (i) the IV is correlated with the endogeneity; and (ii) not 
correlated with the error disturbance. 
4 DATA  
We use longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to estimate the effect of the 
subjective job insecurity on health and health behaviors. The data used in our research come from 
the 1998-2014 periods on a biennial basis.  Due to the specific design of the questionnaire in wave 
2008, we exclude it from our sample as it does not set up the same question as in other waves about 
the possibility of losing one’s job. The HRS was designed to follow age-eligible individuals 
(mostly > 50) and their spouses as they made the transition from an active worker into retirement 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑱𝒐𝒃𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿𝒊𝒕+𝜷𝟐 ∙ 𝑫𝒊𝒗 + 𝜷𝟑 ∙ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕  + 𝜷𝟒 ∙ 𝜶𝒊
+ 𝝐𝒊𝒕 
(2) 
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and obtained detailed information in a variety of domains: demographics, health status, family 
structure, employment, and income, and insurance.  
Totally there are 10 census divisions in the HRS dataset; we drop the one that is not the U.S. or 
not inside the U.S. territory, which is not of the major concern in this study. And those whose race 
characteristic falls to none of the three categories are eliminated as well. 
We use the data from RAND V.P HRS, encompassing the workers whose labor status is 
working but not self-employed at the time of the survey. In Table 32, we list the sample selection 
criteria, all of which are excluded due to the characteristic of non-major concern in this study or the 
specific survey design of that wave. The number of individuals is calculated on a person-year basis. 
The original sample has observations of 159,067. After dropping out non-White/Caucasians, 
Black/Africans or other race, the number of observation reduces to 159,041. This amount curtails 
further to 158,821 observations (or 33,458 individuals) if excluding the census division outside the 
U.S. and reduces to 31,249 when accounting for the missing information of losing one’s job and all 
other covariates. We then constrain to the interested 50-64 years old cohort, generating an ob-
servation of 22,711. The final sample size fixes to 21,692 (or 9594 individuals) when only not 
self-employed working employees are extracted.  
4.1 HEALTH MEASURES 
The mental health definition in our study comes from the concept of depression based on a score 
on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D), the scale of which can be found in  
(Diane Elizabeth Steffick, 2003). The CES-D score is the sum of five "negative" indicators minus 
two "positive" indicators. The negative indicators measure whether the respondent experienced the 
following sentiments all or most of the time: depression, everything is an effort, sleep is restless, 
felt alone, felt sad, and could not get going. The positive indicators measure whether the re-
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spondent felt happy and enjoyed life, consistently all or most of the time. We use the value of 
depression index CESD, which varies from 0 to 8 in the sample, as the level of mental health. Thus 
the higher the value of this score, the worse off mental health and the higher the level of depression 
it indicates. 
For self-rated health, it is treated in a similar way as mental health. In the survey, this variable 
is divided into five categories: 1 “excellent” 2 “very good” 3 “good” 4 “fair” 5 “poor”. We take the 
original value of the original five categories to represent the actual level of self-rated health. The 
question is asked as follows:” Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or 
poor?”  A higher number indicates lower self-rated health. 
The number of new adverse health conditions measures the set of variables summarizing the 
increase in the number of health conditions since the last interview. It is reset to 0 if no new health 
conditions emerge, and equal to 1 if the respondent answers a positive-number response. The 
health conditions are the sum of indicators for whether a doctor has ever told the respondent that he 
or she has ever had a particular disease. The eight included diseases are high blood pressure, di-
abetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, psychiatric problems, and arthritis.  
BMI indicates the body mass index and obesity is re-defined as those whose BMI is 30 or 
above. For smoking take-up, it is equal to 0 if the employee answers no smoking in that wave and 
equal to 1 otherwise. With respect to drinking behavior, it is asked whether the respondent ever 
drinks alcohol beverage. 
4.2 JOB INSECURITY 
As for job insecurity, we employ both continuous and tercile measure to capture the potential of 
non-linear impact. In the survey, job insecurity is in one percent increment, spanning from zero 
percent to 100 percent. To quantify this, the survey asks as follows:” On the same scale from 0 to 
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100 where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 100 equals absolutely certain, what are the chances 
that you will lose your job during the next year?” While in the tercile measurement, job insecurity 
is divided into three equal-size subcategories and we use the lowest tertile as the reference. 
4.3 OTHER COVARIATES 
The variable for work in HRS summarizes the labor force status for the respondent at each wave. 
Our sample consists of the employees who are working but not self-employed at the time of the 
survey. The relative question is asked as follows:” Are you working now, temporarily laid off, 
unemployed and looking for work, disabled and unable to work, retired, a homemaker, or what?” 
The respondent can choose to answer with the options: 1 “working now”,   2 “unemployed and 
looking for work”, 3 “temporarily laid off, on sick or other leave”, 4 “disabled”, 5 “retired”, 6 
“homemaker”, 7 “other”. Our sample is comprised of the employees working currently and 
working for others. To identify the latter status, we further combine another question concerning 
self-employment in the study, it is designed as:” On your current main job, do you work for 
someone else, are you self-employed, or what?” We choose those who responded with “someone 
else” and exclude the individuals who provided the answer with “self-employed”. 
Other covariates include gender (females as the reference group), race (with White/Caucasians 
as the reference), education (high school or less as the reference), marital status (taking never 
married as the reference), whether the respondent is covered by the employer’s plan (no coverage 
as the reference), log of the household income, log of the household asset, 31F
32
current job tenure 
length in year (three quantiles and the lowest as the reference) and the size scale of the firm (di-
vided into three categories: small-scale (smaller than 50 employees and taken as reference); me-
dium (between 50 and 100 employees); large-scale (over 100 employees). 
                                                     
32  The household income and household asset include the respondent and the spouse only. 
 
67 
4.4 INSTRUMENT VARIABLE  
The major concern of this study comes from the endogeneity arising from the job insecurity. We 
instrument perceived job insecurity by another observation about whether the firm experienced 
permanent reduction with regard to employment. Firm-level employment reduction should be 
exogenous to individual workers’ health developments (Sullivan and Wachter, 2009).To quantify, 
it is based on the question in the survey:” Has your employer experienced a permanent reduction in 
employment since [month, year respondent started current job/ respondent’s last interview month, 
year/current interview month, 2 years ago /you started working there]?” 32F
33
The intuition and as-
sumption are that: (1) if a certain firm does cut down the labor on a large scale and thus the un-
employment rate is high, the caused level of anxiety and uncertainty of job prospect across the 
employees is correspondingly high within that specific context, leading to a certain level of re-
sponse in health-relevant behavior or health outcome. (2) firm-level downsize is exogenous to an 
individual’s health and thus not correlated with the unobservables. 
5 RESULTS  
5.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 33 presents the summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables while Table 
34 provides the summary for those whose firms experienced permanent mass layoff and those who 
did not. The data constitution does not show a significant difference across the two compared 
groups. For the variable CFDZ, which reveals whether current firm experiences permanent labor 
reduction, males and females do not differ essentially: the percentage is 27.9 and 26.3 respectively.  
Similarly, the means for self-rated health are 2.434 and 2.414 respectively. As for mental health, 
                                                     
33 Notice that the endogeneity of job insecurity indicates the upcoming one year frame, whereas the instrument var-
iable of firm downsize varies between periods. Constraining the IV to within-year job insecurity yields comparable 
results. And the IV is effective in that it satisfies the exclusion restriction assumption: (i) correlated with the en-
dogeneity; and (ii) not correlated with the error disturbance. 
 
68 
the values are .955 and 1.185 respectively, indicating that women have a slightly lower level of 
mental health on average.  The likelihood of losing one’s job (or equivalently job insecurity) is 
16.61 percent for males and 16.96 percent for females. In either case, the majority is married (84 
percent for men versus 70.1 percent for women). 
Though the average level of non-permanent reduction in the labor force is a little bit larger for 
women, the trend is reversed with respect to smoking and drinking. Specifically, a noticeable 
contrast of 70.4 percent in drinking men compared with 60.7 percent in drinking women. The 
majority of individuals have a high school or less education: 67.7 percent for the men and 72.1 
percent for the women.  For both cohorts, more than one-half individuals work in medium-scale 
(between 50 and 100 employees) or large-scale (larger than 100 employees) firms on average. 
In Table 34, we list supplement measure of summary by CFDZ. For the covariates such as BMI, 
age, and marital status, we do not observe significant gap across the mean values. However, nu-
ance does exist between the two subcategories. For instance, individuals in the non-permanent 
reduction cohort are more likely to (14.76 percent) report a lower probability of losing their job 
than their counterparts (22.33 percent). Likewise, the ratio of high school or less education is a 
little bit greater for the former (71.3 percent versus 67.1 percent). And the household income is 
slightly lower for the former cohort as well. The employees in either cohort appear to be more 
likely covered by the employer-provided plan. Figure 1 plots the distribution of job insecurity and 
the fraction of individuals with zero job insecurity is over 40 percent whereas those with 100% job 
insecurity constitute less than one-tenth. 
5.2 RESULT  
We estimate the impact of subjective job insecurity on health for the periods from 1998 to 2014 
excluding specific wave 2008, which are presented in Table 35 to Table 44. Table 35 to Table 39 is 
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pooled-OLS or fixed-effects regression outcomes while the remains show corresponding IV re-
sults after controlling for the endogeneity. 
Table 35 is based on a continuous measure of job security. For each outcome, we control for 
the same characteristics as the baseline including gender, race, education, age, age squared, marital 
status, log of the household income, log of the household asset, current job tenure length, firm size, 
whether the correspondent is covered by the employer’s plan. The dummy controls include waves 
(from 1998 to 2014 with 2008 excluded) and census divisions (with the one outside the U.S. ex-
cluded). These are taken as the covariates in the baseline. When the endogeneity is not accounted 
for, continuous measure of job insecurity significantly impacts self-rated health and mental health: 
a higher level of job insecurity significantly deteriorates both categories of health. Job insecurity 
seems to be negatively correlated with almost all adverse health outcomes except for smoking and 
drinking take-up: it increases the incidence of any new adverse health conditions, BMI, obesity. 
Coefficients in Table 35 implies that when job insecurity grows by one percentage, self-rated 
health rises by 0.00301 points on average and mental health grows by 0.00707 points. And the 
likelihood of having any new health conditions increases by 0.0333 percentage points. Generally, 
better-educated and wealthier individuals are less likely to experience adverse health shocks than 
otherwise whereas those having employer-provided plan coverage experience worse health out-
comes.33F
34
 When taking into account the average levels of mental-health 0.955 and 1.185 for men 
and women, this thus implies that 0.74 percent and 0.60 percent of average mental-health deteri-
oration for males and females respectively. 34F
35
 
                                                     
34 We also take into account the inflation effect over time and transform household incomes and household assets of all 
waves to 1998-wave dollars, then perform the estimates and the results are essentially not changed. In the subsequent 
analysis including IV specifications, we apply same logic and obtain similar outcomes. 
35 We perform same POOLED-OLS estimate by using different definitions of outcomes: (a) redefine self-reported 
health to one if poor or fair and equal to zero otherwise; (b) redefine mental health to one if level is no less than 3 and 
zero otherwise; (c) number of new health conditions; (d) drinking behavior for the recent three-month period; (e) 
number of new health conditions ever. The results are essentially not changed.   
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Table 36 presents the corresponding specification by adding individuals’ fixed effects, which 
are not accounted for so far. High job insecurity consistently reduces the level of mental health 
significantly. The coefficients in the fixed-effects specification are generally lower than their 
pooled-OLS counterpart. When fixed individual traits are allowed for, the estimated impact can be 
reduced (Ferrer-I-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).  On the other hand, when job insecurity is meas-
ured in a continuous way, it has no impact on other health outcomes such as self-rated health, the 
incidence of any new adverse health conditions, BMI, obesity and drinking take-up at the 
conventional levels. Thus, when individual-level fixed effects are accounted for, the channel of 
impact seems to concentrate on the deterioration of mental-related diseases or depression symp-
tom if any exists. 
Coefficients in Table 36 imply that when job insecurity increases by one percentage, the nu-
meric value of mental health rises by 0.00217. Job insecurity appears to be negatively correlated 
with the level of mental health. Accounting for the average mental-health levels of .955 and 1.184 
for men and women, this indicates a deterioration of 0.229 percent for males and 0.184 percent for 
females respectively. The impact is statistically significant. The magnitude is relatively small and 
thus not economically prominent though. Our study suggests that individuals with an increased 
perception of job insecurity deteriorate their health significantly. 
In Table 37, we present the respective tercile estimates of job insecurity on health outcome by 
employing both pooled-OLS and fixed-effects specification. The results consistently imply that 
the impact on health by job insecurity seems to be nonlinear. As when job insecurity increases 
from lower tercile to a higher one, the growth in the coefficients is not linearly proportional with 
regard to job insecurity. For instance, for mental health at tercile 2 in the fixed-effect specification, 
the coefficient is -0.0702 whereas it is 0.308 in tercile 3, an over tenfold increase in magnitude. 
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The impact is not proportional in linearity, generally, at higher tercile, the negative impact on 
health is more pronounced than that of the lower tercile, reinforcing a positive correlation between 
poor health and job insecurity. 
In Figure 2, we plot how mental health and any new health conditions change with the job 
insecurity. In a broad way, the graphical presentation is consistent with Table 37 in that, (i) mental 
health and any new health conditions deteriorate with job insecurity; and (ii) the upward-trend 
relationship proceeds in a non-linear way.35F
36
 
5.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOB INSECURITY AND DISPLACEMENT 
Job insecurity is an effective prediction of subsequent unemployment and income loss (Stephens, 
2004). In this and the following section, we discuss whether job insecurity accurately predicts the 
incidence of job loss and income loss. To identify the former, we define the displaced or laid-off 
workers as those who left their previous employer between waves and the reasons of leaving are 
either “Business closed/moved” or “Laid off'”. Nearly 404 workers (roughly 5.3%) in the sample 
are displaced between waves.
 
36F
37
 
Figure 3 illustrates the direct relationship as well as the predicted marginal effect with a 
95-percent confidence interval between the perceived job insecurity and subsequent job dis-
placements. The lower-section dashed line is the ratio of workers suffering a subsequent dis-
placement by job insecurity and the upper-part solid line is the predicted marginal result.37F
38
 Our 
marginal-effect specification is consistent with the actual trend of incidence. The figure indicates 
                                                     
36 Job insecurity is rounded to tenth of percentage level. In the subsequent graphical presentations, we follow the 
similar logic. 
37 For any reasons such as poor health/disabled, better job, family care or retired, we term them as job leavers and 
totally 744 (around 9.7%) individuals are job leavers. 
38 The marginal effects are derived by calculating at the average level of other covariates. 
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that there is a positive correlation between the workers' job insecurity and the actual incidence of 
job displacement. The ratio of layoff increases with job insecurity.38F
39
  
Table 38 is the estimated result of the marginal effect on job displacement by job insecurity, 
which provides an alternative illustration complementary to Figure 3. Column (3) to (4) is the 
outcome for layoff. The baseline result using only job insecurity as the covariate is presented in 
column (3). Column (4) adds the control covariates discussed in the previous baseline specifica-
tion. The coefficients in both layoff specifications are positive and statistically significant, im-
plying the prediction of displacement by job insecurity is powerful and thus the measured job 
insecurity in this study is non-trivial. In ideal status, workers perceiving 10 percentage of job in-
security might expect the equivalent percentage of displacement. The flatter trend of actual dis-
placement implies that some portion of the workers exaggerates the subjective perception of job 
insecurity.39F
40
 Qualitatively, the predictive effect on layoff is consistent with the study by Stephens 
(2004).40F
41
 
5.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOB INSECURITY AND INCOME LOSS 
To identify the predictive estimate on income loss by job insecurity, we employ the individu-
al-level actual annual income data. 41F
42
Income loss is termed as one if the income of the upcoming 
wave is less than the income of current wave for the individual working for the previous employer 
and zero otherwise. Figure 4 is the comparison between real-income loss and the prediction of 
marginal effect with a 95-percent confidence interval. The trend patterns are consistent in the two 
                                                     
39 The acute downturn starting at 60% job insecurity is comparable to the previous trend pattern for mental health, 
suggesting that individuals with a higher likelihood of displacement are also accompanied by a lower status of mental 
health (or higher value of depression). This downturn might be attributable to temporary recovery of the economy. 
40  The large-scale economic recession happening in 2000s might partially explain this phenomenon. 
41  In this section and the subsequent income loss marginal effect estimates, we also employ the probit specification 
and the outcomes are not changed qualitatively. 
42  Individual income data is different from the household-level income in that it only includes the income of the 
respondent and does not incorporate the income of other family members. 
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specifications: the likelihood of income loss generally increases with job insecurity. When job 
insecurity increases above 90 percent, the probability of earning loss is more prominent than in 
other levels.42F
43
 
Column (1) to (2) in Table 38 is the marginal effect prediction of earnings loss by job insecu-
rity and the result is consistent with Figure 3 in that the probability of annual earning loss sys-
tematically increases with job insecurity. Consistently, all the results indicate job insecurity has a 
statistically significant and positive impact on the likelihood of subsequent income loss.
 
43F
44
 Job 
insecurity is an efficient prediction of both future job displacement and individual earning loss.44F
45
 
5.5 ANTICIPATION EFFECT OF FIRM-LEVEL LAYOFF 
To identify the anticipation effect of firm-level mass layoff on job insecurity, we estimate whether 
the one-wave later downsize of the current firm (CFDZ) has an impact on current job insecurity 
and constrain to workers working for the same employer. The methodology is similar to the 
previous discussion. In the alternative specification, we add contemporaneous CFDZ. The OLS 
linear estimate in Table 39 indicates subsequent firm-level layoff significantly “anticipates” the 
present job insecurity in both specifications.45F
46
 Column (1) and (2) estimate job insecurity at time t 
relating to CFDZ at time t+1, whereas column (3) and (4) add contemporaneous CFDZ at wave t as 
well. For both specifications, the coefficients for CFDZ are positive and significant. The firm 
might have multiple options in downsizing decisions when faced with adverse shocks and might 
take into account the uncertainty about the possibility of being laid off next year affects workers’ 
                                                     
43 The job displacement and income loss both indicate the variations between waves, whereas the time slot for job 
insecurity in the study is the next one year. Constraining the dependent variables to within-year job insecurity yields 
comparable results to the presented outcomes. 
44 In alternative specification, we extend the workers to also incorporate the cohort not working for previous em-
ployers, the results are essentially similar. 
45 Our income estimate is different from Stephens (2004) in that we employ the actual individual-level earning data, 
whereas their study only uses the postulated possibility of earning loss and thus our estimate is more powerful alt-
hough qualitative results are similar. 
46  We also perform the estimate by extending to all workers and the result does not changed qualitatively. 
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performance this wave. To balance, the timing of downsizing can vary substantially. Specifically, 
a one-time sweeping cut in the workforce called “big bang” and waves of cuts called “gradualism” 
are commonly used two policies (Jeon and Shapiro, 2007). Our OLS specification indicates that 
future mass lay off does have an anticipation effect on current individual job insecurity, suggesting 
that the firm might exploit the current layoff information to the decision of upcoming layoff. For 
the magnitude, it seems like that the weight of next-period layoff constitutes at most one-third of 
the total weight on average. In contrast, in the fixed effect specification, the anticipation effect of a 
mass layoff at t+1 on job insecurity at time t disappears and the coefficients for layoff at t+1 are 
insignificant now. Therefore, in the baseline FE model that we employ, firm-level layoff does not 
have an anticipative power on current job insecurity. For concurrent mass layoff, it still has a 
systematic impact on contemporaneous job insecurity. Overall, it appears that the rational ex-
pectation of job insecurity by combined firm-level layoff lies around the threshold of 10%. This 
value is commensurate with the case where real layoff happens to an individual worker. Thus 
previously discussed exaggerated magnitude of jog insecurity might partially attribute to the im-
pact by the future firm-level layoff. 
5.6 IV RESULTS 
Table 40 is the instrumental variable (IV) estimation for the pooled OLS discussed previously. 
When instrumenting job insecurity, our estimate suggests that the qualitative impact on health 
outcomes is not changed systematically. Health deteriorates with job insecurity. As expected, after 
controlling the endogeneity of job insecurity, all the outcomes except BMI, drinking and smoking 
take-up systematically increase.46F
47
   
                                                     
47 The tercile-IV estimate of job insecurity requires more instrumental variables, however, we are not able to find as 
many effective IVs in HRS, thus the corresponding tercile-IV results are not presented herein. We perform 
POOLED-OLS IV estimate by using different definitions of outcomes: (a) redefine self-reported health to one if poor 
or fair and equal to zero otherwise; (b) redefine mental health to one if level is no less than 3 and zero otherwise; (c) 
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One might notice that these results are much larger than those estimated by OLS, and the 
corresponding standard errors are quite large as well. The increase in the coefficients in the IV 
specification might be attributable to several potential sources of endogeneity. Specifically, 
measurement error is one major concern in survey data (Olson, 2006). It might lead to bias in the 
OLS estimate. This is attributable to the reason if there is a gap (or measurement error) between 
true job insecurity and observed job insecurity, the reliability of observed job insecurity is com-
promised (Griliches, 1977). 
Further major concern focuses on the weak IV issue, as when the F-test of the excluded re-
striction is less than the “rule of thumb” value 10 then the effectiveness or power of the IV is 
generally cast with doubt. All of the F statistics in our study are well above 10. The first-stage 
coefficients range from 8.574 to 8.609 (all significant at conventional levels). F statistics range 
from 356.66 to 415.85.  
Table 41 is the IV estimation for the fixed-effects model accordingly. When accounting for the 
endogeneity of job insecurity, mental health and any new health conditions statistically signifi-
cantly deteriorate.  For all the other outcomes, we do not observe sizable impact though. Analo-
gous to the aforementioned strategy, we track the potential existence of weak-instrument issue by 
testing the first-stage specification in the 2SLS. Consistent with the previous finding, F statistics 
range from 96.00 to 122.23.  All the first-stage coefficients are significant at conventional levels.47F
48
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
number of new health conditions; (d) drinking behavior for the recent three-month period; (e) number of new health 
conditions ever.  The results are qualitatively similar. We estimate for all the outcomes by using different measures of 
job insecurity as well: (1) redefine to one if job insecurity is no less than 50% and zero otherwise; (2) redefine to one if 
job insecurity is no less than 90% and zero otherwise; (1) divide the original job insecurity by 100 thus make the scale 
of job insecurity distribute between 0 and 1. The results do not change essentially. 
48 We perform fixed-effects IV estimate by using different definitions of outcomes: (a) redefine self-reported health to 
one if poor or fair and equal to zero otherwise; (b) redefine mental health to one if level is no less than 3 and zero 
otherwise; (c) number of new health conditions; (d) drinking behavior for the recent three-month period; (e) number of 
new health conditions ever. The results are qualitatively similar. We estimate for all the outcomes by using different 
measures of job insecurity as well: (1) redefine to one if job insecurity is no less than 50% and zero otherwise; (2) 
redefine to one if job insecurity is no less than 90% and zero otherwise; (1) divide the original job insecurity by 100 
thus make the scale of job insecurity distribute between 0 and 1. The results do not change essentially.  We perform the 
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To evaluate whether job insecurity has a heterogeneous impact on men versus women, we 
stratify the sample by gender and estimate the fixed-effects IV model separately for each sub-
sample. Table 42 is the corresponding result. Job insecurity does not differentiate on mental health 
by gender and it is deteriorated significantly for both genders at conventional levels, which is not 
in conflict with the estimate in Table 41. However, women do suffer less from job insecurity than 
men with respect to the magnitude of impact. Literature documents that males and females sys-
tematically differ in their level and profile of job insecurity, the former generally are more insecure 
than the latter cohort (Rosenblatt, Talmud, and Ruvio, 2010). There is evidence that gender dif-
ferences in support derived from social participation may partly account for the gap of the mental 
health level among women compared to men (Kawachi and Berkman, 2001). For men, work and 
thus earning money for the household is still the core of their role in society, whereas the availa-
bility of an alternative role such as taking care of the non-adult children can make job loss not as 
distressing for women (De Witte, H., and Wets, 1996). Our finding implies a similar result shown 
in the study by (Ferrie et al., 1995), who reveal less deterioration in health among insecure women.  
On the other hand, the difference between men and women with respect to mental health does not 
imply that potential job loss is harmless for the well-being of women as they are more likely than 
men to extend their concern to non-financial issues (Rosenblatt et al., 2010). And thus are more 
vulnerable in exposure to unexpected severe health shocks such as cancer, stroke, and heart 
problem. In our finding, females are more salient and sensitive in the incidence of new health 
conditions than males when job insecurity grows in levels.   
To further estimate whether job insecurity has a differentiated impact through the channel of 
education, we employ a similar stratification strategy as the gender case. Table 43 illustrates the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
POOLED-OLS, POOLED-OLS IV and fixed-effects IV estimates for the current smoking behavior of ever smokers, 
none of the outcomes is statistically significant. 
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corresponding results. When accounting for education, mental health deteriorates significantly 
both for college or higher educated and high school or lower educated individuals. Job insecurity 
does not differentiate the impact on health through the channel of education. However, the mag-
nitude of the impact is not the same though; higher-educated individuals suffer a 
worse-deteriorated effect on these two outcomes. They suffer more lowering in mental health level 
and emergence of any new health shocks. Another finding is that differentiation validates through 
the channel of obesity level: high job insecurity systematically increases the likelihood of obesity 
for better-educated individuals. Literature shows that higher-educated people are more responsive 
to exterior shock than high-school graduates (Wozniak, 2010).  These people are generally more 
likely to be hired in higher positions such as managers in a firm and might react more strongly to 
the potential loss of a job as the belief in “meritocratic individualism”(Roskies, 1990). Negative 
thus career setback would cause self-doubt or even despair, and consequently to a downsize in 
health, which is called the “status inconsistency” hypothesis by Schaufeli and VanYperen (1992). 
Our result suggests that the more highly educated are likely to experience much more severe status 
inconsistency because of their perception of potential risk of being dismissed from the labor force, 
which in turn results in poorer health and a higher likelihood of health shock. The significant effect 
on obesity implies that job insecurity can have a twofold negative impact for the higher-educated 
workers: health deterioration accompanied by losing control of body mass level at the exposure of 
“status inconsistency”.  
We further estimate whether the impact on health is heterogeneous based on the employability 
level of the workers. The relative question about employability asks: “Suppose you were to lose 
your job this month. What do you think are the chances that you could find an equally good job in 
the same line of work within the next few months? Zero means absolutely no chance and 100 
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means absolutely certain.”48F
49
 Low-employability workers are termed as 50 percent or lower 
chances of finding another job, whereas high-employability workers incorporate the individuals 
responding over 50-percent chances. The result is presented in Table 44. The estimate implies that 
job insecurity differentiates through the channel of workers’ perception of employability. 
Low-employability workers significantly deteriorate mental health, but it is insignificant for 
high-employability employees. The negative impact on health is more pronounced for the 
low-employability cohort. 49F
50
 
5.7 PLACEBO TEST 
Studies show that maternal morbidity can lead to ill-health of the child (see e.g., World Health 
Organization, The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn, 2011; Frankel and Wamboldt, 1998) and 
child’s social development (World Health Organisation, 2008). On the other hand, an unhealthy 
child can cause higher levels of stress for the parent (Bonis, 2016). In the meantime, height is a 
vital factor indicating the health level of an individual in his or her growing age. However, 
individuals generally stop piling up in height at a certain age. Therefore, the job insecurity status 
of an adult individual should not affect his or her height post adulthood or the parent’s 
longevity/mortality status if such a cross-generational or determined link in health exists absence 
the selection bias based on health. In contrast, when unhealthy workers are selected into certain 
labor sector systematically, then the job insecurity perceived by this cohort systematically biases 
the health of the parent or the height of his or her own. As such, a sizable bias reveals the pathway 
of selection. Complying with this, we perform a placebo test to check whether child’s perception 
of job loss causes a substantial effect on parents’ mortality/longevity and working child’s height 
                                                     
49  In the past work, employability might be captured by either the unemployed or the employed (Green, 2011). In this 
study, we focus on the latter. 
50 Applied work has shown that employability strongly moderates the effects of unemployment and of job insecurity 
on health literature  (see e.g., Green, 2011; Witte and Cuyper, 2015; Cuyper et al., 2008). 
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level, as are illustrated in Table 45. We do not observe statistically significant effect over all these 
outcomes; therefore the selection issue based on the child’s health conditions is not of existence. 
5.8 LAGGED EFFECT 
To check whether the current perception of job insecurity has an impact on future health, or 
equivalently, whether past capture of job insecurity affects current health level, we perform the 
lagged-effect estimate. The results in Table 46 suggest that the immediate or concurrent impact of 
job insecurity on health outcome differs from the lagged effect. Neither of the two-year later nor 
the four-year later effect is statistically significant. However, we do not observe sizable longer 
than four-year impact as the first-stage specification indicates that it is not significant anymore and 
F statistics are less than the most acceptable value of “rule of thumb” 10. Although consistency lies 
in the contemporary negative impact on health development, nuance exists between our lagged 
impact over time and the finding by Sullivan and Wachter (2009). They reveal that the negative 
impact on mortality by job displacement continues in a significant way even after a long-term 
period; instead, our study implies that the concurrent positive correlation with health might be 
compromised beyond two-wave period.   This suggests that actual job displacement might exert a 
longer time period of negative impact on health than pre-layoff job insecurity. 
5.9 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Endogeneity is a major concern when evaluating the causal effect of job insecurity on health. In the 
most severe case, bias might be unexpectedly huge and thus the sensitivity of the estimate is open 
to questions. To address this major concern, we consider multiple specifications that control for 
variables likely to capture the differences. We summarize additional robustness checks reinforcing 
that our baseline results are not affected by alternative specifications including “prepared” job 
insecurity. 
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As job insecurity is an inseparable and consistent component of part-time or temporary 
workers, if a high dismissal or insecure industries/occupations rely more on part-time workers to 
meet the needs of labor demand, a disproportionate fraction of the workforce tends to be elimi-
nated from the sample to the extent that we exclude not full-time workers. Therefore in the first set 
of robustness check, we concentrate on the full-time workers only and the resulting outcome in 
row (1) of Table 47 indicates that our baseline fixed-effects IV estimate is robust to this alternative 
specification. Mental health substantively deteriorates, and in the meantime, any new health con-
ditions are increased systematically.   
So far, we do not account for the varieties with respect to job industries and occupations. 
Different occupations and job industries capture job insecurity in their own ways. For instance, 
certain unstable industries or occupations tend to regularly expose to health-damaging labor en-
vironment and thus workers are less productive and less productive workers tend to be less healthy 
(Sullivan and Wachter, 2009). Or it might be the case less healthy workers select into these in-
secure industries or occupations. If unhealthy workers are more likely to be employed based on 
industries/occupations than healthy counterparts, the estimate tends to overestimate the impact 
(Caroli and Godard, 2016). Therefore we add these two fixed effects then check the sensitivity to 
these potentials. The result in row (2) is quite consistent after controlling for industries and oc-
cupations specifications. It should thus be of little affected if any of these biases exist.  A limitation 
of HRS data is that we do not have a direct measure of “prepared” or “non-prepared” job insecurity. 
To proceed, in the third set of sensitivity check, we restrict the workers to exclude those having a 
second paid job to evaluate the bias arising from “prepared” or “pre-perceived” job insecurity by 
working-age employees. The result in row (3) is robust to adding this specification. An alternative 
case of “pre-perceived” job insecurity is that our sample covers the cohorts who are close to 
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retiring age, if workers deciding to retire report their job insecurity to a less severe extent, the 
impact on their health by layoff or business closure should be mediated by this “preparedness” 
(Michaud, Crimmins, and Hurd, 2016). To explore this issue, we add additional control of post-65 
years old subjective work expectations. Row (4) indicates that the impact is not changed essen-
tially. Another concern is that people might tend to choose integral numbers like 0, 50 when pro-
vided with multiple options, in such cases the estimates might not reflect the real capture of the 
subjective job insecurity and thus the results are biased. To check the potential existence of this 
issue, in row (5) we exclude the patterns including these special integral values and the outcomes 
do not change essentially. 
Bunch of literature reveals that income is prone to be one source of endogeneity (Lundborg, 
2013). Although our study does not encounter the similar issue of scarce income information that 
is vital for reducing the bias (Caroli and Godard, 2016), endogeneity caused by income or asset 
becomes a concern if the bias is non-negligible. As higher income or asset tend to impact the 
volume of health services that workers can afford to purchase and thus affect their level of health 
accordingly. And income pooling within the household can be seen as a source of support in case 
of employment loss. Insecurity about losing one’s job can be expected to decline as the income of 
other household member increases (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). Applied work suggests a 
strong correlation between income and health (see e.g., Deaton, 1999). Analogously, the 
household total asset might serve as a similar function at the perception of job loss.  In the sys-
tematic presence of such scenario, our estimate is biased. The direction of bias might depend on 
the covariance between income/asset and job insecurity. To test whether this bias presents in a 
significant way, we eliminate the household asset and the household income and then re-perform 
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the evaluation for the fixed-effects IV, and the result in column (2) of Table 48 implies it is robust 
to this alternative specification.  
From the workers’ perspective, the employer-provided plan coverage and length of tenure 
might affect how they capture the job insecurity of mass layoff. At a firm level, the size scale of the 
firm is another cofounder impacting the worker’s subjective perception of labor stability. We then 
account for these factors and the obtained result is shown in column (3). The third concern is that 
the perceived job insecurity is heterogeneous across employees with different family characteris-
tics. As workers with more dependents to support might capture job insecurity in a more drastic 
way, thus, the characteristics of the family might be one of the endogeneities impacting job in-
security as well. Family characteristics such as the labor force status of the spouses and number of 
living children affect how the employees capture the job insecurity. Column (4) implies that our 
estimate is not sensitive to this specification. Further, in order to check the bias due to other 
characteristics of current or past job such as working conditions, experience, the bias due to lower 
motivation or less productivity, or any other factors relative to job relocation or promotion, we add 
the fourth set of specification, where we encompass other characteristics of labor force or psy-
chological factors such as whether current job needs moving heavy loads, whether the current job 
requires lots of physical effort, number of jobs with missing dates,  whether moved to less de-
manding work, whether enjoy work, whether current job requires stoop/kneel/crouch, whether 
required more difficult things, whether current job requires good eyesight, and whether the re-
spondent is looking for a second job. The resulting set of the robust check is illustrated in column 
(5) of Table 48. In any specifications, the outcome is consistently stable. Increased job insecurity is 
sizably related to the significant worsening of mental health and the emergence of new adverse 
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health conditions. Thus, the concerns of endogeneity potentially arising from the sources noted 
above are not of major concern.  Our estimates are robust to these alternative specifications. 
The final concern is our estimates are based on a cohort of workers aged between 50 and 64 
years old (near elderly and prior to retirement). However, senior workers generally tend to react to 
job insecurity in a different way than junior counterparts on average as resuming to the status of 
labor if dismissed is differentiated, accompanied by a lower likelihood of returning back to the 
labor market for this senior cohort (OECD, 2015).
 
50F
51
 In such a case, people might be concerned 
that the results herein are driven by a particularly significant effect of job insecurity on health for 
certain specific age cohorts. We check that our findings with regard to concerned health outcomes, 
it is robust to the inclusion of a broader range of workers by re-estimating our aforementioned 
fixed-effects IV on the new cohorts (45-68 years old cohort).51F
52
 The results are qualitatively un-
changed.  We cannot extend the age to much younger or older individuals due to two reasons: 
either sample size is too small or the majority of the advanced elderly are not in the labor force 
already. The inclusion of the latter might bias our estimate downward as this category of indi-
viduals usually reaches the retirement age, or the resulting comparative low productivity leads to 
their expectation of being dismissed from the labor force if any exists. 
Overall, we consider the estimates in the sensitivity check as indicating a reasonable degree of 
robustness to the sets of additional control variables and specifications. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Our study provides evidence that subjective job insecurity significantly worsens mental health and 
raises the likelihood of incidence for new health conditions and thus increases the risk of exposure 
to severe-adverse health shocks such as cancer, heart disease and stroke for near-elderly workers. We 
                                                     
51 Denote Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
52 The results are omitted for the purpose of conserving space. The outcomes are available upon request. 
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do not observe the sizable impact on other health outcomes such as self-rated health, BMI/obesity, 
smoking and drinking take-up in the IV specification. However, gender- and education- based 
subpopulation responds to job insecurity in different ways. Male workers are more likely to suffer 
more in mental health than their counterparts, while better-educated individuals are more likely to 
increase the likelihood of obesity than less-educated individuals. The negative impact of job in-
security on health outcomes does not imply a time-lagged effect, at least within a four-year period. 
And employability does not systematically change the qualitative impact on health by job inse-
curity; however, it compromises the magnitude of negative effect to a large extent. Employability 
is negatively correlated with job insecurity. Workers with high employability respond to health in 
a systematically different way compared with workers with low employability. The subjective 
perception of job insecurity is a highly significant predictor of subsequent job displacement and 
individual earnings loss. Neither is it a trivial measure in that the firm-level reduction in em-
ployment effectively anticipates job insecurity. 
Given the severity of the early 2000s economic recession in the U.S., it is feasible that our 
results somewhat overstate the average impact of job insecurity on negative health shocks. 
However, the qualitative effects of job insecurity on other aspects of workers’ health outcomes are 
reasonably robust across firms, industries, and occupations. It, therefore, provides a good indica-
tion of the direction and rough magnitude of the effects that can be expected for the 
near-retirement workers. We show the causal effect of job insecurity on various health outcomes in 
a sample of near-elderly workers in the United States. We instrument job insecurity by the 
firm-level dismissal indicator, which is a more precise IV than other IV(s) employed (e.g., national 
or regional unemployment rate) in the documented literature. Investigating data from the 
longitudinal survey, we indicate that when individual-level fixed effects are not taken into account 
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at all, the potential endogeneity with respect to job insecurity tends to deteriorate almost all of the 
health outcomes except smoking/drinking take-up in the pooled-OLS estimate. When accounting 
for the endogeneity of job insecurity in its IV specification, the qualitative result does not change 
essentially. On the other hand, the fixed-effects IV specification implies that the negative corre-
lation is limited to a certain scope such as mental health when encompassing individual-level 
unobservable. Specifically, gender- or education- based sub-samples respond to job insecurity in 
more sensitive and idiosyncratic ways than their counterparts for some health outcomes such as 
obesity. Some respects the findings of this study reinforce the negative effects of job insecurity on 
health reported in the documented literature. Thus we provide a complementary and positive ref-
erence for possible policy intervention in the ever-changing labor context.  
One caveat is that we neither differentiate the impact on the near elderly from those much 
younger (e.g., younger than 40) nor advanced elderly cohorts (e.g., older than78). Potentially they 
might not be completely representative of those of the typical job-insecurity workers and the latter 
two cohorts could show disparate characteristics. Workers of near elderly are generally more 
prepared for a new transition to retirement. However, for below 50-year old workers, the negative 
consequences of job insecurity or layoff are much severer. As their increasing family responsi-
bilities and curtailed financial resources are more stressing and their “spillover” cost of real layoff 
or potential layoff is socially much oppressive and wider. Thus the comparison of the nuance is to 
be taken as one of the future extensions. Further, neither do we account for cultural effects. Nev-
ertheless, cultural values such as individualism and collectivism could moderate the relationships 
between job insecurity and personal-level health outcomes (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 2010). 
Further, although our study does take into account employability, it does not take into account 
other potential moderators such as unionization status either (Sverke and Hellgren, 2002). Re-
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gardless of the level of job insecurity, union co-workers typically express more loyalty to the or-
ganization than their non-unionized counterparts. Counterfactually, high job insecurity might lead 
to enhanced loyalty reactions in order to redress one's attractiveness in the organization and 
thereby possibly remedying insecurity (Hirschman, 1972). Unfortunately, the missing or poor 
measure regarding these variables in HRS prohibits a comparable estimation. Thus future research 
would lie in the impact on the health-damaging effects combined together with relative moderators 
if the commensurate level of data is available. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1  HEALTH OUTCOMES SUMMARY BY YEAR 
  2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Mental 
Health 
N 3,119 3,532 3,523 3,322 3,685 3,580 3,272 
Mean 1.635 1.611 1.659 1.538 1.542 1.567 1.543 
Std. Dev. 2.049 2.051 2.088 2.035 2.049 2.058 2.043 
Drug Uti-
lization 
N 3,453 3,832 3,744 3,483 3,852 3,709 3,394 
Mean .938 .939 .947 .949 .935 .941 .939 
Std. Dev. .240 .237 .223 .219 .246 .234 .239 
Mortality N 3,454 3,832 3,744 3,483 3,853 3,715 3,395 
Mean .0083 .014 .008 .008 .007 .007 0 
Std. Dev. .0912 .120 .093 .093 .084 .088 0 
OOP 
($/Month) 
N 2,582 2,871 2,304 2,601 2,893 2,784 2,192 
Mean 148.57 174.91 91.42 84.52 92.19 90.61 80.64 
Std. Dev. 1085.34 708.09 323.34 162.93 180.48 165.73 140.58 
Part D N - - 3,744 3,483 3,853   3,715 3,395 
Mean - - .260 .216 .167 .162 .164 
Std. Dev. - - .439 .411 .373 .368 .370 
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Table 2  SUMMARY STATISTICS BY ELIGIBILITY 
Treatment Group 
(MD eligible) 
 Control Group 
(MD ineligible) 
 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
ZN Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Age 14,479 69.1 2.563  11,021 58.4 3.849  
Gender:         
Male 14,479 .500 .500  11,021 .462 .498  
Female 14,479 .499 .500  11,021 .537 .498  
Race:         
White/Caucasians 14,479 .797 .401  11,021 .702 .457  
Black/African 14,479 .159 .366  11,021 .198 .398  
Other Race 14,479 .042 .201  11,021 .099 .298  
Marital Status:         
Married 14,479 .659 .473  11,021 .710 .453  
Never Married 14,479 .024 .153  11,021 .039 .194  
Other  Marriage Type 14,479 .316 .464  11,021 .249 .432  
Education:         
High School Or Less 14,479 .818 .385  11,021 .776 .416  
College or Higher 14,479 .181 .385  11,021 .223 .416  
Household Income 14,479 55574.8 85250.3  11,021 79575.9 169075.9  
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Table 3  PRIOR-MD PARALLEL TRENDS  
 (1) 
Mental 
Health 
(2) 
Drug  
Utilization 
(4) 
OOP  
(5) 
Mortality 
I(Age≥65)×2002 0.119 -0.103 2.278 -0.0587 
 (0.104) (0.0738) (55.09) (0.0783) 
I(Age≥65)×2004 0.0740 -0.0893 15.52 -0.0400 
 (0.103) (0.0769) (27.25) (0.0790) 
I(Age≥65)×2006 -0.0914 - - -0.0701 
 (0.105) - - (0.0799) 
I(Age≥65)×2008 -0.0497 -0.0919 -13.41 -0.0759 
 (0.1000) (0.0751) (8.774) (0.0822) 
I(Age≥65)×2010 -0.147 -0.0189 -20.96** -0.0512 
 (0.0898) (0.0731) (9.197) (0.0865) 
I(Age≥65)×2012 -0.142* -0.0197 -0.958 - 
 (0.0827) (0.0699) (8.316) - 
Year Dummies X X X X 
Control Covariates X X X X 
N 24053 19781 15930 3888 
R
2
 0.059 0.010 0.005 0.032 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The es-
timate results in our study are clustered at the household level. Control covariates 
including demographics are employed in the estimate but omitted in the result for 
brevity purpose. The covariates include age, age squared, gender, race, marital 
status, education, and the indicator for the MD-eligible cohort. 
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Table 4  MENTAL HEALTH DD RESULT  
 (1)Mental 
Health 
~2006 
(2)Mental 
Health 
~2008 
(3)Mental 
Health 
~2010 
(4)Mental 
Health 
~2012 
(5)Mental 
Health 
~2014 
Post×I(Age≥65) -0.189** -0.166** -0.193*** -0.203*** -0.184*** 
 (0.080) (0.072) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
Treatment 0.212** 0.245*** 0.215*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 
 (0.082) (0.075) (0.070) (0.068) (0.067) 
Age -0.108 -0.128* -0.107* -0.107* -0.095* 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.062) (0.056) (0.052) 
Age Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.357*** 0.347*** 0.333*** 0.331*** 0.332*** 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039) 
Black/African Ameri-
cans 
0.175** 0.130* 0.128** 0.131** 0.119** 
 (0.074) (0.068) (0.061) (0.057) (0.054) 
Other Race 0.386*** 0.376*** 0.370*** 0.365*** 0.364*** 
 (0.125) (0.116) (0.099) (0.089) (0.082) 
Never Married 0.555*** 0.567*** 0.597*** 0.565*** 0.510*** 
 (0.168) (0.155) (0.138) (0.121) (0.112) 
Other  Marriage Type 0.724*** 0.700*** 0.673*** 0.643*** 0.619*** 
 (0.064) (0.059) (0.053) (0.050) (0.047) 
College or Higher -0.650*** -0.668*** -0.657*** -0.627*** -0.626*** 
 (0.055) (0.050) (0.046) (0.044) (0.042) 
N 10180 13505 17195 20777 24053 
R2 0.068 0.067 0.064 0.061 0.059 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimate results in our 
study are clustered at the household level. Control covariates also include wave dummies but are 
omitted in the result for the purpose of conserving space. 
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Table 5  IMPACT OF MD ON PATIENTS’ WELL-BEING  
 (1)~2006 (2) ~2008 (3) ~2010 (4) ~2012 (5) ~2014 
(1-1)Mental Health Baseline -0.189** -0.166** -0.193*** -0.203*** -0.184*** 
 (0.080) (0.072) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
(1-2)Mental Health Baseline 
+Log(income) 
-0.197** 
(0.079) 
-0.166** 
(0.071) 
-0.183*** 
(0.067) 
-0.183*** 
(0.066) 
-0.158** 
(0.066) 
(2-1)Drug Utilization Base-
line 
- 0.013 
(0.011) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
(2-2)Drug Utilization Base-
line + Log(income) 
- 
 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
(3-1)OOP Baseline - -22.936 -27.276 -21.045 -18.552 
  (30.549) (30.008) (30.140) (30.206) 
(3-2)OOP Baseline 
+Log(income) 
- -21.532 
(31.471) 
-25.145 
(31.422) 
-18.788 
(31.606) 
-18.788 
(31.606) 
(4-1)Mortality Baseline -0.018 -0.020 -0.017 -0.011 - 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) - 
(4-2)Mortality Baseline 
+Log(income) 
-0.018 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
- 
- 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimate results in our study are 
clustered at the household level. For drug utilization and OOP, wave 2006 is dropped due to ambiguous data 
coverage. For mortality, data in wave 2014 is not available. 
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Table 6  DRUG UTILIZATION DD RESULT  
 (1)Drug 
Utilization 
~2008 
(1)Drug 
Utilization 
~2010 
(1)Drug Uti-
lization 
~2012 
(1)Drug 
Utilization 
~2014 
Post×I(Age≥65) 0.013 0.023** 0.024*** 0.028*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Treatment 0.002 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.045*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Black/African Americans 0.012 0.012* 0.011* 0.012* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Other Race -0.010 -0.015 -0.016 -0.020* 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Never Married -0.029 -0.019 -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) 
Other  Marriage Type -0.012* -0.015** -0.015*** -0.018*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
College or Higher 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
N 9792 13332 16760 19843 
R
2
 0.016 0.025 0.026 0.026 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimate results in 
our study are clustered at the household level. Control covariates also include wave dummies 
but are omitted in the result for the purpose of conserving space. 
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Table 7  OOP DD RESULT 
 (1)OOP 
~2008 
(2)OOP 
~2010 
(3)OOP 
~2012 
(4)OOP 
~2014 
Post×I(Age≥65) -22.936 -27.276 -21.045 -18.552 
 (30.549) (30.008) (30.140) (30.206) 
Treatment 5.864 7.426 7.700 6.963 
 (40.636) (36.601) (34.938) (34.089) 
Age -8.862 -4.996 -6.540 -5.932 
 (26.872) (17.722) (14.168) (12.490) 
Age Squared 0.075 0.044 0.056 0.052 
 (0.205) (0.136) (0.110) (0.097) 
Female 25.174** 21.221** 17.132** 15.646** 
 (12.673) (9.661) (7.911) (6.951) 
Black/African 
Americans 
-47.252*** -30.797*** -20.589** -17.504** 
 (12.735) (9.445) (8.083) (7.080) 
Other Race -32.611* -12.952 -7.039 -8.010 
 (16.748) (14.259) (11.087) (9.241) 
Never Married 1.838 -0.422 -7.247 -6.907 
 (22.355) (15.561) (12.179) (10.382) 
Other  Marriage 
Type 
12.175 7.966 3.517 2.365 
 (17.016) (12.563) (10.094) (8.763) 
College or Higher 16.074 11.269 8.560 6.035 
 (30.621) (21.951) (17.129) (14.524) 
N 8057 10953 13738 15930 
R
2
 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimate 
results in our study are clustered at the household level. Control covariates also include 
wave dummies but are omitted in the result for the purpose of conserving space. 
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Table 8  MORTALITY DD RESULT 
 (4)Mortality 
~2006 
(1) Mortality 
~2008 
(2) Mortality 
~2010 
(3)Mortality 
~2012 
Post×I(Age≥65) -0.018 -0.020 -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Treatment 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.010 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Female -0.009 -0.007 -0.012* -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Black/African 
Americans 
-0.004 -0.011 -0.017** -0.020** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Other Race -0.007 0.001 0.012 0.004 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Never Married 0.038 0.024 0.013 0.022 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) 
Other  Marriage 
Type 
-0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
College or 
Higher 
0.008 0.006 0.002 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
N 2958 3484 3758 3888 
R
2
 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.032 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimate 
results in our study are clustered at the household level. Control covariates also include 
wave dummies but are omitted in the result for the purpose of conserving space. 
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Table 9  MENTAL HEALTH LATE EFFECT 
  (1) 
Mental 
Health 
~2006 
(2) 
Mental 
Health 
~2008 
(3) 
Mental 
Health  
~2010 
(4) 
Mental 
Health  
~2012 
(5) 
Mental 
Health 
~2014 
OLS PDC -0.239*** -0.164*** -0.185*** -0.180*** -0.143*** 
  (0.056) (0.044) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) 
 N 10180 13505 17195 20777 24053 
 R
2
 0.070 0.068 0.065 0.062 0.059 
IV-FS PT .086
***
 .426
***
 .540
***
 .587
***
 .606
***
 
  (.017) (.014) (.013) (.012) (.012) 
F Statistics  33.40 416.54 1111.17 1491.84 1646.55 
IV-SS PDC -2.179** -0.389** -0.357*** -0.346*** -0.303*** 
  (1.011) (0.168) (0.125) (0.114) (0.110) 
 N 10180 13505 17195 20777 24053 
 R
2
 . 0.066 0.064 0.061 0.058 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated results in our study are clustered 
at the household level. FS denotes the first stage and SS denotes the second stage in the 2SLS regression. PDC denotes 
prescription drug coverage and PT denotes the interaction Post×I(Age≥65). In the regression results shown in the Table, 
control covariates including demographics are used in the estimate but omitted in the result for the purpose of con-
serving space. The covariates include age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, education, dummies for waves and 
indicator for MD-eligible patients. In the first-stage (IV-FS) estimation, the dependent variable is prescription drug 
coverage (PDC). 
 
 
Table 10  DRUG UTILIZATION LATE EFFECT 
  (1) 
Drug Utili-
zation 
~2008 
(2) 
Drug Utili-
zation 
~2010 
(3) 
Drug Uti-
lization 
~2012 
(4) 
Drug Uti-
lization 
~2014 
OLS PDC 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
 N 9792 13332 16760 19843 
 R
2
 0.041 0.041 0.038 0.035 
IV-FS PT .800
***
 .771
***
 .756
***
 .738
***
 
  (.014) (.013) (.013) (.013) 
F Statistics  2421.02 2354.56 2220.47 2081.78 
IV-SS PDC 0.016 0.030** 0.031*** 0.037*** 
  (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 N 9792 13332 16760 19843 
 R
2
 0.024 0.035 0.034 0.033 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated results in our study are 
clustered at the household level. FS denotes the first stage and SS denotes the second stage in the 2SLS re-
gression. PDC denotes prescription drug coverage and PT denotes the interaction Post×I(Age≥65). In the re-
gression results shown in the Table, control covariates including demographics are used in the estimate but 
omitted in the result for the purpose of conserving space. The covariates include age, age squared, gender, race, 
marital status, education, dummies for waves and indicator for MD-eligible patients. In the first-stage (IV-FS) 
estimation, the dependent variable is prescription drug coverage (PDC). 
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Table 11  OOP LATE EFFECT 
  (1) 
OOP~2008 
(2) 
OOP~2010 
(3) 
OOP~2012 
(4) 
OOP~2014 
OLS PDC -102.395*** -78.988*** -66.165*** -57.798*** 
  (39.372) (27.937) (22.399) (19.558) 
 N 8057 10953 13738 15930 
 R
2
 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 
IV-FS PT .825
***
 .800
***
 .782
***
 .767
***
 
  (.016) (.015) (.014) (.014) 
F Statistics  2161.13 2119.96 1990.74 1863.18 
IV-SS PDC -27.792 -34.060 -26.892 -24.183 
  (36.941) (37.395) (38.447) (39.313) 
 N 8057 10953 13738 15930 
 R
2
 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated results in our study are 
clustered at the household level. FS denotes the first stage and SS denotes the second stage in the 2SLS regression. 
PDC denotes prescription drug coverage and PT denotes the interaction Post×I(Age≥65). In the regression results 
shown in the Table, control covariates including demographics are used in the estimate but omitted in the result for 
the purpose of conserving space. The covariates include age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, education, 
dummies for waves and indicator for MD-eligible patients. In the first-stage (IV-FS) estimation, the dependent 
variable is prescription drug coverage (PDC). 
 
 
Table 12  MORTALITY LATE EFFECT 
  (1) 
Mortali-
ty~2006 
(2) 
Mortality 
~2008 
(3) 
Mortality 
~2010 
(4) 
Mortality 
~2012 
OLS PDC 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 N 4535 5393 5875 6104 
 R
2
 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.030 
IV-FS PT .145
***
 .405
***
 .478
***
 .502
***
 
  (.042) (.031) (.028) (.027) 
F Statistics  8.79 26.68 44.98 52.77 
IV-SS PDC -0.058 -0.028 -0.017 -0.007 
  (0.137) (0.042) (0.034) (0.033) 
 N 4535 5393 5875 6104 
 R
2
 . 0.002 0.009 0.030 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated 
results in our study are clustered at the household level. FS denotes the first stage and 
SS denotes the second stage in the 2SLS regression. PDC denotes prescription drug 
coverage and PT denotes the interaction term Post×I(Age≥65). In the regression re-
sults shown in the Table, control covariates including demographics are used in the 
estimate but omitted in the result for the purpose of conserving space. The covariates 
include age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, education, dummies for waves 
and indicator for MD-eligible patients. In the first-stage (IV-FS) estimation, the de-
pendent variable is prescription drug coverage (PDC). 
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Table 13  ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
Conditions (1)Mental 
Health 
~2006 
(2)Mental 
Health 
~2008 
(3)Mental 
Health 
~2010 
(4)Mental 
Health 
~2012 
(5)Mental 
Health 
~2014 
(1)I(Post) -0.189** -0.169** -0.184*** -0.193*** -0.173*** 
 (0.080) (0.072) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division 
-0.187** 
(0.080) 
-0.172** 
(0.071) 
-0.181*** 
(0.067) 
-0.191*** 
(0.067) 
-0.167** 
(0.066) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division + 
(3) unemployment 
rate 
-0.188** 
(0.080) 
-0.170** 
(0.071) 
-0.192*** 
(0.067) 
-0.201*** 
(0.067) 
-0.174*** 
(0.066) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division+ 
(3)unemployment 
rate+ 
(4)unemployment 
rate× I(Post) 
-0.188** 
(0.080) 
-0.170** 
(0.071) 
-0.193*** 
(0.067) 
-0.203*** 
(0.067) 
-0.177*** 
(0.066) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated results in our study are 
clustered at the household level. I(Post) indicates the period post-MD. Exclude the one census division that is 
outside the U.S. The average unemployment rate is calculated at census-division level. DD denotes the dif-
ference-in-difference coefficient. 
 
 
Table 14  ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR DRUG UTILIZATION 
Conditions (1)Drug 
Utilization 
~2008 
(2) Drug 
Utilization 
~2010 
(3) Drug 
Utilization 
~2012 
(4) Drug 
Utilization 
~2014 
(1)I(Post) 0.013 0.023** 0.023*** 0.027*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.024** 
(0.009) 
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division + 
(3) unemployment rate 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division+ 
(3)unemployment rate+ 
(4)unemployment rate× 
I(Post) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated results 
in our study are clustered at the household level. I(Post) indicates the period post-MD. Ex-
clude the one census division that is outside the U.S. The average unemployment rate is 
calculated at census-division level. DD denotes the difference-in-difference coefficient. 
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Table 15  ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR OOP 
Conditions (1) OOP 
~2008 
(2) OOP 
~2010 
(3) OOP 
~2012 
(4) OOP 
~2014 
(1)I(Post) -23.136 -27.908 -21.586 -18.855 
 (30.706) (29.945) (30.132) (30.251) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division 
-23.336 
(31.230) 
-27.951 
(30.161) 
-21.750 
(30.363) 
-19.016 
(30.572) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division + 
(3) unemployment rate 
-23.085 
(30.611) 
-27.557 
(30.343) 
-21.442 
(30.436) 
-18.643 
(30.600) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division+ 
(3)unemployment rate+ 
(4)unemployment rate× I(Post)+ 
-23.085 
(30.648) 
-27.035 
(30.212) 
-20.907 
(30.448) 
-18.175 
(30.672) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated results in our 
study are clustered at the household level. I(Post) indicates the period post-MD. Exclude the one census 
division that is outside the U.S. The average unemployment rate is calculated at census-division level. 
The coefficient denotes the difference-in-difference result. 
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Table 16  ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR MORTALITY 
 (1) Mor-
tality 
~2006 
(2) Mor-
tality 
~2008 
(3) Mor-
tality 
~2010 
(4) Mor-
tality 
~2012 
(5) 
Mortal-
ity 
~2014 
(1)I(Post) -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division + 
(3) unemployment rate 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
(1)I(Post)+ 
(2)Census Division+ 
(3)unemployment rate+ 
(4)unemployment rate× 
I(Post) 
-0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The estimated results in 
our study are clustered at the household level. I(Post) indicates the period post-MD. Exclude the 
one census division that is outside the U.S. The average unemployment rate is calculated at 
census-division level. The coefficient denotes the difference-in-difference result. 
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Appendix B 
Table 17  SUMMARY STATISTICS BY ADLS 
NO INFORMAL CARE (ADLS)  INFORMAL CARE (ADLS) 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
Long-term Care Insurance: 
  
 
   No 61,995 0.890 0.313  1,302 0.939 0.240 
Yes 61,995 0.110 0.313  1,302 0.061 0.240 
#TSP 61,607 1.550 0.874  1,300 1.642 0.836 
#Private Plan 62,005 0.707 0.572  1,302 0.262 0.454 
OOP 62,050 3047 10314  1,306 5063 19945 
Own Child: 
   
 
   No 0.032 0.177  0.003 0.055 
Yes  0.968 0.177   0.997 0.055 
Age  62.0 6.221   61.8 6.371 
Labor Status: 
  
  
  Stop working  0.497 0.500   0.911 0.285 
 
 
Continue  work  0.503 0.500   0.089 0.285 
 
 
Race: 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  White/Caucasian 0.759 0.428   0.492 0.500 
Black/African  0.172 0.377   0.371 0.483 
Other Race  0.069 0.254   0.137 0.344 
Gender: 
   
  
  Male 0.425 0.494   0.181 0.386 
Female  0.575 0.494   0.819 0.386 
Education: 
  
  
  <=High School   0.781 0.414   0.936 0.244 
>=College   0.219 0.414   0.064 0.244 
# Living Siblings: 
  
  
  0  0.094 0.292   0.086 0.280 
>=1  0.906 0.292   0.914 0.280 
# Living Children: 
  
  
  1  0.103 0.304   0.077 0.266 
>=2  0.897 0.304   0.923 0.266 
Marital Status: 
  
  
  married  0.699 0.459   0.391 0.488 
married, sp/absent  0.005 0.074   0.008 0.087 
separated  0.023 0.150   0.093 0.290 
divorced  0.143 0.350   0.223 0.416 
widowed  0.106 0.308   0.230 0.421 
never married  0.023 0.150   0.055 0.228 
Resident Child  0.423 0.767   0.884 0.858 
Household Income  74009 189310   25714 43190 
Household Asset  432928 1102741   111532 700323 
Health Level: 
  
  
  Excellent  0.122 0.328   0.010 0.099 
Very Good  0.312 0.463   0.037 0.188 
Good  0.315 0.465   0.119 0.324 
Fair  0.185 0.388   0.377 0.485 
Poor  0.065 0.247   0.458 0.498 
N 62,050    1,306   
Notes:  Data are from the HRS sampled from wave 2002 to 2012. 
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Table 18   SUMMARY STATISTICS BY IADLS 
NO INFORMAL CARE (IADLS)   INFORMAL CARE (IADLS) 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
Long-term Care Insurance: 
 
 
   No 61,316 0.889 0.314  1,981 0.953 0.212 
Yes 61,316 0.111 0.314  1,981 0.047 0.212 
#TSP 60,940 1.549 0.874  1,967 1.652 0.841 
#Private Plan 61,326 0.711 0.571  1,981 0.274 0.468 
OOP 61,374 3024.2 9624.7  1,982 5088.2 26892.3 
Own Child: 
   
 
   No 0.032 0.177  0.012 0.107 
Yes  0.968 0.177   0.988 0.107 
Age  62.048 6.221   62.598 6.301 
Labor Status: 
  
  
  Stop working  0.492 0.500   0.913 0.282 
Continue  work  0.508 0.500   0.087 0.282 
Race:  
  
  
  White/Caucasian  0.761 0.427   0.521 0.500 
Black/African  0.170 0.376   0.350 0.477 
Other Race  0.069 0.253   0.129 0.335 
Gender:  
  
  
  Male  0.428 0.495   0.195 0.396 
Female  0.572 0.495   0.805 0.396 
Education: 
  
  
  <=High School   0.779 0.415   0.941 0.236 
>=College   0.221 0.415   0.059 0.236 
# Living Siblings: 
  
 
   0  0.094 0.292   0.088 0.284 
=0  0.093 0.292   0.088 0.284 
>=1  0.906 0.292   0.912 0.284 
# Living Children: 
  
  
  1  0.103 0.304   0.075 0.264 
>=2  0.897 0.304   0.925 0.264 
Marital Status: 
  
  
  married  0.703 0.457   0.372 0.484 
married, Sp/absent  0.005 0.073   0.013 0.114 
separated  0.023 0.150   0.072 0.258 
divorced  0.142 0.349   0.234 0.424 
widowed  0.104 0.305   0.252 0.434 
never married  0.023 0.149   0.057 0.232 
Resident Child  0.421 0.767   0.779 0.839 
Household Income  74533 190216   25967 44941 
Household Asset  436715 1108354   103890 559385 
Health Level: 
  
 
   Excellent  0.124 0.329   0.012 0.107 
Very Good  0.315 0.465   0.031 0.173 
Good  0.317 0.465   0.132 0.338 
Fair  0.182 0.386   0.402 0.490 
Poor  0.062 0.241   0.424 0.494 
Covariates N 61,374    1,982   
Notes:  Data are from the HRS sampled from wave 2002 to 2012. The sample is restricted to those 
50-72-year-old individuals, who have at least one living child, do not receive any informal from other 
relatives and do not reside in a nursing home at the time of the survey. Private denotes the private plans 
other than long-term care insurance. LTC means private long-term care excluding government plans. 
OOP denotes out-of-pocket payment during the past two years.  TSP means total supplement plans for 
public and private. 
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Table 19  INFORMAL CARE AND PARENT’S HEALTH INSURANCE (FE) 
 (1)Private  (2)Private (3)Private (1)TSP (2)TSP (3)TSP 
Informal Care(ADL) -0.0201   -0.00444   
 (0.0144)   (0.0290)   
Informal Care(IADL)  -0.00925   -0.0144  
  (0.0122)   (0.0238)  
ADL and IADL  Care   -0.00655   -0.0125 
   (0.0178)   (0.0367) 
N 63307 63307 63307 62907 62907 62907 
R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.076 0.076 0.076 
 (1)LTC (2)LTC (3)LTC (1)OOP (2) OOP (3) OOP 
Informal Care(ADL) 0.0131   155.1   
 (0.00835)   (1012.5)   
Informal Care(IADL)  0.00653   1281.7**  
  (0.00687)   (651.4)  
ADL and IADL Care   0.0131   1319.4 
   (0.0101)   (1385.6) 
N 63297 63297 63297 63356 63356 63356 
R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the household 
level. The covariates in the baseline estimate include the parent’s age, age squared, marital status, labor status of the 
respondent.  Fixed effects include dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and individuals. Outputs about these co-
variates and constant are omitted for the purpose of space conservation. Private denotes the private plans other than 
long-term care insurance. LTC means private long-term care excluding government plans. OOP denotes out-of-pocket 
payment during the past two years.  TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. ADLs are defined as the 
Activities of Daily Living indices, including bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in or out of 
bed. In contrast, IADLs include activities such as using a telephone, taking medication, handling money, shopping, 
preparing meals. 
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Table 20  INFORMAL CARE AND PARENT’S HEALTH INSURANCE (IV) 
 (1)Private 
Plan 
(2)Private 
Plan 
(3)Private 
Plan 
(1)TSP (2)TSP (3)TSP 
ADL Care 0.465   1.478*   
 (0.529)   (0.835)   
IADL Care  0.322   1.003*  
  (0.366)   (0.560)  
ADL and 
IADL Care 
  0.675   2.108* 
   (0.769)   (1.206) 
First Stage .01*** .014*** .007*** .01*** .007*** .007*** 
 (.0013) (.0016) (.001) (.0013) (.0012) (.0012) 
F Statistic 55.92 71.02 38.72 54.39 37.521 34.97 
N 59447 59447 59447 59071 59071 59071 
 (1)LTC (2)LTC (3)LTC (1)OOP (2) OOP (3) OOP 
ADL Care -0.514*   -25481.4**   
 (0.264)   (11899.8)   
IADL Care  -0.357**   -17497.5**  
  (0.181)   (8093.0)  
ADL and 
IADL  Care 
  -0.747* 
(0.390) 
  -36615.5** 
     (17409.8) 
First Stage .0096*** .0138*** .0066*** .0095*** .014*** .0066*** 
 (.001) (.0016) (.001) (.0013) (.0016) (.001) 
F Statistic 55.91 71.01 38.71 54.28 71.00 38.68 
N 59438 59438 59438 59517 59517 59517 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level. The covariates in the baseline IV estimate include parent’s age, age squared, marital status, labor 
status of the respondent, dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and individuals’ fixed effects. Outputs about these 
covariates and constant are omitted for the purpose of space conservation. The IV is the geographic proximity from 
the parent to the closest child. Private denotes the private plans other than long-term care insurance. LTC means 
private long-term care excluding government plans. OOP denotes out-of-pocket payment during the past two years.  
TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. ADLs are defined as the Activities of Daily Living indices, 
including bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in or out of bed. In contrast, IADLs include 
activities such as using a telephone, taking medication, handling money, shopping, preparing meals. The disability 
level increases as the corresponding number of ADLs/IADLs increases. 
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Table 21  HOURS-BASED INFORMAL CARE ESTIMATE (IV) 
 (1) 
LTC 
(2)  
LTC 
(3)  
LTC 
(4) 
 LTC 
Hours children  
helped last month 
-0.00257* 
(0.00133) 
-0.00429** 
(0.00200) 
-0.00466** 
(0.00212) 
-0.00458** 
(0.00210) 
First Stage 1.923*** 1.443*** 1.381*** 1.394*** 
 (.294) (.254) (.251) (.253) 
F Statistic 42.67 32.27 30.23 30.42 
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control A  Yes Yes Yes 
Control B   Yes Yes 
Control C    Yes 
N 59438 52429 52043 52026 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level. The control covariate A in all of the estimates includes the log of the household income 
and the log of the household asset. The control covariate B includes the number of living children, the 
number of living siblings, the number of drinking per day, current smoking status and Self-rated health 
level. The control covariate C includes the number of own children, the number of step-children, the 
number of children who help with health cost and the number of children working part-time. Fixed effects 
include dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and individuals. Outputs about these covariates and constant 
are omitted for brevity purpose. The instrumental variable is the geographic distance to the closest child. 
LTC denotes long-term care.  
 
 
Table 22  DAYS-BASED INFORMAL CARE ESTIMATE (IV) 
 (1) 
LTC 
(2)  
LTC 
(3)  
LTC 
(4) 
 LTC 
Days children  
helped last month 
-0.00990** 
(0.00501) 
-0.0161** 
(0.00721) 
-0.0172** 
(0.00748) 
-0.0171** 
(0.00749) 
First Stage .499*** .385*** .374*** .374*** 
 (.052) (.045) (.045) (.045) 
F Statistic 89.54 72.80 69.58 69.11 
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control A  Yes Yes Yes 
Control B   Yes Yes 
Control C    Yes 
N 59438 52429 52043 52026 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level. The control covariate A in all of the estimates includes the log of the household 
income and the log of the household asset. The control covariate B includes the number of living 
children, the number of living siblings, the number of drinking per day, current smoking status and 
Self-rated health level. The control covariate C includes the number of own children, the number of 
step-children, the number of children who help with health cost and the number of children working 
part-time. Fixed effects include dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and individuals. Outputs about 
these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity purpose. The instrumental variable is the geo-
graphic distance to the closest child. LTC denotes long-term care.  
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Table 23  HOURS-BASED INFORMAL CARE ESTIMATE (IV) 
 (1) 
TSP 
(2)  
TSP 
(3)  
TSP 
(4) 
 TSP 
Hours children  
helped last month 
0.00718* 
(0.00409) 
0.00994* 
(0.00586) 
0.0110* 
(0.00619) 
0.0106* 
(0.00613) 
First Stage 1.964*** 1.484*** 1.423*** 1.436*** 
 (.296) (.255) (.253) (.254) 
F Statistic 43.99 33.68 31.64 31.82 
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control A  Yes Yes Yes 
Control B   Yes Yes 
Control C    Yes 
N 59071 52107 51723 51708 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level. The control covariate A in all of the estimates includes the log of the household 
income and the log of the household asset. The control covariate B includes the number of living 
children, the number of living siblings, the number of drinking per day, current smoking status and 
Self-rated health level. The control covariate C includes the number of own children, the number of 
step-children, the number of children who help with health cost and the number of children working 
part-time. Fixed effects include dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and individuals. Outputs about 
these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity purpose. The instrumental variable is the geo-
graphic distance to the closest child. TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. 
 
 
Table 24  DAYS-BASED INFORMAL CARE ESTIMATE (IV) 
 (1) 
TSP 
(2)  
TSP 
(3)  
TSP 
(4) 
 TSP 
Days children  
helped last month 
0.0278* 
(0.0155) 
0.0376* 
(0.0216) 
0.0408* 
(0.0224) 
0.0401* 
(0.0224) 
First Stage .507*** .392*** .381*** .381*** 
 (.052) (.045) (.045) (.045) 
F Statistic 91.73 74.17 71.01 70.46 
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control A  Yes Yes Yes 
Control B   Yes Yes 
Control C    Yes 
N 59071 52107 51723 51708 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level. The control covariate A in all of the estimates includes the log of the household 
income and the log of the household asset. The control covariate B includes the number of living children, 
the number of living siblings, the number of drinking per day, current smoking status and Self-rated 
health level. The control covariate C includes the number of own children, the number of step-children, 
the number of children who help with health cost and the number of children working part-time. Fixed 
effects include dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and individuals. Outputs about these covariates and 
constant are omitted for brevity purpose. The instrumental variable is the geographic distance to the 
closest child. TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. 
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Table 25  INTERACTION EFFECTS BY DISABILITY LEVEL (ADLS) 
  (1)LTC (2)LTC (3)TSP (4) TSP 
 ADL Care -2.253*  7.093*  
  (1.174)  (3.859)  
 ADL Care ×ADL  
Disability   
0.629* 
(0.323) 
 -2.005* 
(1.054) 
 
 ADL Disability   -0.00769 -0.0115* 0.0358* 0.0529** 
  (0.00642) (0.00674) (0.0188) (0.0214) 
 IADL Care  -0.695**  2.109** 
   (0.343)  (1.061) 
 IADL Care ×ADL  
Disability   
 0.167** 
(0.0803) 
 -0.554** 
(0.250) 
First Stage: 
(I)ADL Care 
Closest Child -.0032*** .004*** -.003*** .0046*** 
 (.0009) (.0013) (.0009) (.0013) 
 Closest Child ×  
ADL Disability   
.05*** .037*** .05*** .038*** 
 (.003) (.0037) (.0034) (.0037) 
First Stage: 
(I)ADL Care × 
ADL Disability   
Closest Child -.02*** -.013*** -.020*** -.013*** 
 (.0024) (.0024) (.0024) (.0024) 
Closest Child ×  
ADL Disability   
.18*** .167*** .19*** .168*** 
 (.013) (.014) (.0126) (.014) 
 F statistic 10.16 23.36 9.7 23.92 
10% weak ID critical value 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 
 N 59438 59438 59071 59071 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level. The control covariates in all of the estimates include parent’s age, age squared, marital 
status, labor status of the respondent, dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and fixed effects of individuals. 
Outputs about these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity purpose. The IVs include the geographic 
proximity to the closest child and its interaction with the parent’s ADLs disability level. LTC means private 
long-term care excluding government plans. TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. 
ADLs are defined as the Activities of Daily Living indices, including bathing, eating, dressing, walking 
across a room, and getting in or out of bed. In contrast, IADLs include activities such as using a telephone, 
taking medication, handling money, shopping, preparing meals. The disability level increases as the cor-
responding number of ADLs/IADLs increases. 
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Table 26  INTERACTION EFFECTS BY DISABILITY LEVEL (IADLS) 
  (1)LTC (2)LTC (3)TSP (4) TSP 
 ADL Care -0.829**  2.228*  
  (0.399)  (1.259)  
 ADL Care ×IADL 
Disability   
0.328** 
(0.141) 
 -0.785*  
   (0.439)  
 IADL Disability  -0.0142 -0.00933 0.0641** 0.0504* 
  (0.00912) (0.00798) (0.0301) (0.0284) 
 IADL Care  -0.530**  1.409* 
   (0.255)  (0.785) 
 IADL Care ×IADL 
Disability  
 0.235** 
(0.100) 
 -0.566* 
    (0.310) 
First Stage: 
(I)ADL Care 
Closest Child .005*** .0063*** .005*** .006*** 
 (.0011) (.0015) (.0011) (.0015) 
Closest Child ×  
IADL Disability   
.051*** 
(.006) 
.083*** 
(.0066) 
.051*** 
(.005) 
.083*** 
(.0066) 
First Stage: 
(I)ADL Care × 
ADL Disability   
Closest Child -.004*** -.009*** -.004*** -.009*** 
 (.0011) (.0013) (.0011) (.0013) 
Closest Child ×  
IADL Disability   
.154*** 
(.014) 
.218*** 
(.015) 
.154*** 
(.014) 
.218*** 
(.015) 
 F statistic 21.04 27.93 20.33 28.68 
10% weak ID critical value 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 
 N 59435 59435 59068 59068 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level. The control covariates in all of the estimates include parent’s age, age squared, marital status, 
labor status of the respondent, dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and fixed effects of individuals. Outputs 
about these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity purpose. The IVs include the geographic proximity to 
the closest child and its interaction with the parent’s IADLs disability level. LTC means private long-term care 
excluding government plans. TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. ADLs are defined as the 
Activities of Daily Living indices, including bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in or out 
of bed. In contrast, IADLs include activities such as using a telephone, taking medication, handling money, 
shopping, preparing meals. The disability level increases as the corresponding number of ADLs/IADLs increases. 
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Table 27  TIME-BASED INFORMAL CARE  
DISABILITY-INTERACTION EFFECT (ADLS) 
 (1)LTC (2) LTC (3)TSP (4) TSP 
Hours helped LM -0.00697** 
(0.00353) 
 0.0205* 
(0.0107) 
 
Hours helped LM × 
ADL  Disability 
0.00167** 
(0.000836) 
 -0.00516** 
(0.00254) 
 
ADL  Disability -0.00573 -0.00675 0.0315** 0.0356** 
 (0.00437) (0.00456) (0.0139) (0.0147) 
Days helped LM  -0.0214** 
(0.0105) 
 0.0642** 
(0.0323) 
Days helped LM× 
ADL  Disability 
 0.00531** 
(0.00253) 
 -0.0171** 
(0.00787) 
F statistic 16.09 36.95 17.45 38.33 
10% weak ID  
critical value 
7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 
N 59438 59438 59071 59071 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the household level. The control covariates in all of the estimates include parent’s age, age 
squared, marital status, labor status of the respondent, dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and 
fixed effects of individuals. Outputs about these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity 
purpose. The IVs include the geographic proximity to the closest child and its interaction with the 
parent’s ADLs disability level. LTC means private long-term care excluding government plans. 
TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. ADLs are defined as the Activities of 
Daily Living indices, including bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in or 
out of bed. In contrast, IADLs include activities such as using a telephone, taking medication, 
handling money, shopping, preparing meals. The disability level increases as the corresponding 
number of ADLs/IADLs increases. 
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Table 28  TIME-BASED INFORMAL CARE  
DISABILITY-INTERACTION EFFECT (IADLS) 
 (1)LTC (2) LTC (3)TSP (4) TSP 
Hours helped LM -0.00409** 
(0.00202) 
 0.0108* 
(0.00615) 
 
Hours helped LM × 
IADL  Disability 
0.00168** 
(0.000750) 
 -0.00416* 
(0.00230) 
 
IADL  Disability -0.0101 
(0.00773) 
-0.00639 0.0583** 
(0.0261) 
0.0463* 
(0.0237)  (0.00654) 
Days helped LM  -0.0147** 
(0.00698) 
 0.0388* 
(0.0215) 
Days helped LM× 
IADL  Disability 
 0.00622** 
(0.00259) 
 -0.0146* 
(0.00801) 
F statistic 18.25 37.12 19.07 38.25 
10% weak ID  
critical value 
7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 
N 59435 59435 59068 59068 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the household level. The control covariates in all of the estimates include parent’s age, age 
squared, marital status, labor status of the respondent, dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012 and 
fixed effects of individuals. Outputs about these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity 
purpose. The IVs include the geographic proximity to the closest child and its interaction with the 
parent’s IADLs disability level. LTC means private long-term care excluding government plans. 
TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. ADLs are defined as the Activities of 
Daily Living indices, including bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in or 
out of bed. In contrast, IADLs include activities such as using a telephone, taking medication, 
handling money, shopping, preparing meals. The disability level increases as the corresponding 
number of ADLs/IADLs increases. 
 
 
Table 29  DISTANCE-BASED IV ROBUSTNESS CHECK  
 (1) 
LTC 
(2)  
LTC 
(3)  
LTC 
(4) 
 LTC 
(5)  
LTC 
(6) 
 LTC 
(7)  
LTC 
(8)  
LTC 
(9)  
LTC 
ADL Care -0.867** -0.934** -0.915**       
 (0.403) (0.424) (0.428)       
IADL Care    -0.542** -0.580** -0.565**    
    (0.246) (0.256) (0.257)    
ADL and  
IADL Care 
      -1.251** 
(0.599) 
-1.328** 
(0.623) 
-1.301** 
(0.627) 
First Stage .0071*** .007*** .007*** .011 *** .011*** .011*** .0049*** .0048*** .0048**
* 
 (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0015) (.0016) (.0016) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
F Statistic 36.87 34.45 33.46 53.44 50.57 49.75 25.58 24.42 23.86 
Control A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control B  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Control C   Yes   Yes   Yes 
N 52429 52043 51668 52429 52043 51668 52429 52043 51668 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. The control 
covariate A in all of the estimates includes the log of the household income and the log of the household asset. The control covariate B 
includes the number of living children, the number of living siblings, the number of drinking per day, current smoking status and 
Self-rated health level. The control covariate C includes the number of own children, the number of step-children, the number of chil-
dren who help with health cost and the number of children working part-time. Fixed effects include dummies of waves from 2002 to 
2012 and individuals. Outputs about these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity purpose. The instrumental variable is the 
geographic distance to the closest child. LTC denotes long-term care. ADLs are defined as the Activities of Daily Living indices, in-
cluding bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in or out of bed. In contrast, IADLs include activities such as using 
a telephone, taking medication, handling money, shopping, preparing meals.  
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Table 30  DISTANCE-BASED IV ROBUSTNESS CHECK  
 (1) 
TSP  
(2)  
TSP 
(3) 
TSP 
(4) 
TSP 
(5) 
TSP 
(6) 
TSP 
(7) 
TSP 
(8)  
TSP 
(9)  
TSP 
ADL Care 2.033* 2.233* 2.079*       
 (1.191) (1.252) (1.260)       
IADL Care    1.275* 1.386* 1.282*    
    (0.735) (0.764) (0.764)    
ADL and IADL 
Care 
      2.952* 
(1.765) 
3.187* 
(1.828) 
2.966 
(1.833) 
First Stage .007*** .007*** .007*** .014*** .012*** .012*** .005*** .0049*** .0049*** 
 (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
F Statistic 37.52 34.97 33.94 72.84 53.81 50.35 25.64 24.51 23.96 
Control A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control B  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Control C   Yes   Yes   Yes 
N 52107 51723 51351 52107 51723 51351 52107 51723 51351 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. The 
control covariates A in all of the estimates include the log of the household income and the log of the household asset. The control 
covariates B include the number of living children, number of living siblings, number of drinking per day, current smoking status and 
Self-rated health level. The control covariates C include the number of own children, the number of step-children, the number of 
children who help with health cost and the number of children working part-time. Fixed effects include dummies of waves from 2002 
to 2012 and individuals. Outputs about these covariates and constant are omitted for brevity purpose. The instrumental variable is the 
geographic distance to the closest child. TSP means total supplement plans for public and private. ADLs are defined as the Activities 
of Daily Living indices, including bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in or out of bed. In contrast, IADLs 
include activities such as using a telephone, taking medication, handling money, shopping, preparing meals.  
 
 
Table 31  DISTANCE-BASED IV ENDOGENEITY CHECK  
 (1)# children 
within 10miles 
(2) )# children 
within 10miles 
(3) )# children 
within 10miles 
Parent’s Health Level 0.00311 
(0.00579) 
0.00432 
(0.00597) 
0.000465 
(0.00738) 
N 59483 53467 53152 
R2 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Disability Level(ADL) 0.00424 
(0.00835) 
0.00677 
(0.00925) 
0.00717 
(0.00955) 
N 59483 53467 53152 
R2 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Disability Level(IADL) 0.00220 
(0.0167) 
0.0202 
(0.0186) 
0.0217 
(0.0187) 
N 59481 53466 53151 
R2 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Baseline  Yes Yes Yes 
Controls A No Yes Yes 
Controls B No No Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the household level. The baseline controls include dummies of waves from 2002 to 2012, 
parent’s age, age squared, marital status, employment status and fixed effects of dummies and in-
dividuals. The control covariates A in all of the estimates include the log of the household income 
and the log of the household asset. The control covariates B include the number of living children, 
number of living siblings, number of drinking per day, current smoking status and Self-rated health 
level. The disability level increases as the corresponding number of ADLs/IADLs increases. 
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Appendix C 
Table 32  SAMPLE SIZE AFTER EACH SELECTION CRITERIA 
Sample Selection Criteria 
 
N Number of In-
dividuals 
(person-wave) 
Exclude if wave information missing 159,067 33,484 
Exclude if census division is outside the U.S. 
and exclude if the occupation is army service 
158,821 33,458 
Exclude if the likelihood of losing one’s job  
information is missing 
158,065 33,441 
Exclude other missing  covariates  31,249 11,955 
Restrict to ages from 50 to 64 22,711 9,932 
Restrict to working and not self-employed  
workers only (Final Sample) 
21,692 9,594 
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Table 33  SUMMARY STATISTICS BY GENDER 
Male     Female   
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
Self-rated health   9,439 2.434 .948  12,249 2.414 .942 
Mental Health  9,438 .955 1.486  12,250 1.185 1.750 
Any New Health Conditions  7,815   .166 .372  10,665 .164 .371 
BMI 9,409 28.754 4.907  11,974 28.441 6.126 
Obesity 9,409 .331 .470  11,974 .338 .473 
Drinking 9,439 .704 .456  12,250 .607 .488 
Smoking  9,426 .180 .385  12,210 .168 .374 
CFDZ  .279 .448   .263 .440 
Job Insecurity  16.61 23.546   16.96 24.42 
Age  57.4 3.694   57.00 3.847 
Race:        
White/Caucasians  .789 .407   .772 .418 
Black/Africans  .131 .338   .170 .376 
Other Race  .078 .269   .056 .230 
Education:        
High School or Less  .677 .467   .721 .448 
College or Higher  .322 .467   .278 .448 
Marriage:        
Married/Partnered  .840 .366   .701 .457 
Divorced/ Separated  .106 .308   .177 .381 
Widowed  .015 .123   .076 .265 
Never married  .037 .190   .044 .206 
Household Income  98007.8 107973.9   85928.9 109042.4 
Household Asset  334346.3 736156.6   336728.6 1051027 
Job Tenure (year):        
Tercile 1  .2761 .447   .279 .448 
Tercile 2  .305 .460   .367 .482 
Tercile 3  .418 .493   .353 .477 
Firm Size (number of workers):        
<50  .425 .494   .466 .498 
(50,100)  .158 .365   .174 .379 
>100  .416 .492   .358 .479 
Employer Plan Coverage:        
  .220 .414   .320 .466 
  .779 .414   .679 .466 
N(covariates) 9,440    12,252   
Notes: Sample is restricted to 50-64 years old working employees and not self-employed, from 
wave 1998 to wave 2014 with 2008 excluded. 
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Table 34  SUMMARY STATISTICS BY FIRM DOWNSIZE 
No Permanent reduction in  
employment(N=15,837) 
 
   Permanent reduction in 
employment(N=5,855) 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Job Insecurity 14.76 22.75  22.33 26.44 
Gender:      
Male .429 .495  .450 .497 
Female .570 .495  .549 .497 
Age 57.3 3.79  56.8 3.739 
Race:      
White/Caucasians .786 .409  .761 .426 
Black/Africans .147 .354  .170 .375 
Other Race .065 .247  .068 .252 
Education:      
High School or Less .713 .451  .671 .469 
College or Higher .286 .451  .328 .469 
Marriage:      
Married/Partnered .761 .426  .763 .424 
Divorced/ Separated .144 .351  .150 .357 
Widowed .053 .225  .039 .194 
Never married .039 .195  .046 .210 
Household Income 89192.65 114099.7  96575.83 92502.3 
Household Asset 334525.2 992407.7  338847.6 722035.6 
Job Tenure (year):      
Tercile 1 .321 .467  .161 .367 
Tercile 2 .339 .473  .342 .474 
Tercile 3 .339 .473  .496 .500 
Firm Size (number of  
workers): 
  
 
  
<50 .485 .499  .347 .476 
(50,100) .167 .373  .168 .374 
>100 .346 .475  .483 .499 
Employer Plan Coverage:      
No .302 .459  .207 .405 
Yes .697 .459  .792 .405 
Notes: Sample is restricted to 50-64 years old working employees and not self-employed.  
And time ranges from wave 1998 to 2014 with wave 2008 excluded. 
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Table 35  IMPACT OF JOB INSECURITY ON HEALTH  
(POOLED OLS) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Control covariates also include dummy indicators of waves (from 1998 to 2014 with 2008 excluded) and census divisions (with 
the census division outside the U.S. excluded).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
Self-rated  
Health 
(2) 
Mental 
Health 
(3) 
Any New 
Health Condi-
tions  
(4) 
BMI 
(5) 
Obesity 
(6) 
Drinking 
(7) 
Smoking  
Job  
Insecurity 
0.00301*** 0.00707*** 0.000333*** 0.00462** 0.000322** -0.000242 -0.00000660 
 (0.000297) (0.000576) (0.000118) (0.00195) (0.000158) (0.000154) (0.000129) 
Age 0.153*** 0.109 0.0301 -0.253 -0.0382 -0.0258 0.0430** 
 (0.0487) (0.0841) (0.0225) (0.296) (0.0253) (0.0250) (0.0201) 
Age Squared -0.00125*** -0.00110 -0.000251 0.00182 0.000306 0.000139 -0.000425** 
 (0.000424) (0.000733) (0.000195) (0.00257) (0.000220) (0.000218) (0.000175) 
Male 0.0327* -0.155*** -0.000772 0.333*** -0.00418 0.0962*** 0.0306*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0283) (0.00570) (0.121) (0.00998) (0.00864) (0.00787) 
Black/African  0.102*** 0.0111 0.00113 1.391*** 0.0989*** -0.0771*** -0.0185 
 (0.0251) (0.0439) (0.00845) (0.192) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0124) 
Other Race 0.176*** 0.145** -0.00706 -0.416* -0.0552*** -0.0936*** -0.0233 
 (0.0371) (0.0644) (0.0114) (0.233) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0145) 
College Or Higher -0.241*** -0.147*** -0.0156** -0.741*** -0.0526*** 0.0235** -0.0952*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0317) (0.00652) (0.144) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.00851) 
Di-
vorced/Separated 
-0.105*** 0.196*** -0.00818 -0.785*** -0.0541*** 0.0987*** 0.0490*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0476) (0.00841) (0.184) (0.0145) (0.0139) (0.0125) 
Widowed -0.0897** 0.420*** -0.0176 0.109 0.0121 0.0352 0.0300 
 (0.0385) (0.0837) (0.0127) (0.297) (0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0190) 
Never Married -0.110** 0.0463 -0.0113 0.0737 0.00245 0.0612*** 0.0286 
 (0.0470) (0.0737) (0.0147) (0.334) (0.0257) (0.0233) (0.0208) 
log(Household 
Income) 
-0.127*** -0.139*** -0.00381 -0.0721 -0.00623 0.0627*** -0.0152*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0203) (0.00413) (0.0707) (0.00587) (0.00618) (0.00485) 
log(Household 
Asset) 
-0.0810*** -0.0948*** -0.00288 -0.459*** -0.0300*** 0.0254*** -0.0234*** 
 (0.00628) (0.0108) (0.00208) (0.0429) (0.00332) (0.00330) (0.00286) 
2/3 quantiles of 
Current Job Ten-
ure 
0.0603*** 0.0578* -0.0111 -0.0138 0.00449 -0.0153 -0.00778 
 (0.0186) (0.0318) (0.00689) (0.121) (0.00981) (0.00978) (0.00804) 
3/3 quantiles of 
Current Job Ten-
ure 
0.0693*** 0.0534 -0.00493 0.189 0.0241** -0.0135 -0.0317*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0348) (0.00720) (0.144) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.00908) 
Firm Size(50,100) -0.0124 0.0654* 0.00605 0.102 0.00496 0.0149 -0.000329 
 (0.0233) (0.0393) (0.00784) (0.156) (0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0101) 
Firm Size(>100) 0.00187 0.0264 0.00962 0.379*** 0.0236** -0.00445 0.000630 
 (0.0190) (0.0313) (0.00622) (0.132) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.00843) 
Employer Plan 
Coverage 
0.00383 0.0169 0.00622 0.547*** 0.0316*** -0.00510 -0.00110 
 (0.0187) (0.0314) (0.00631) (0.127) (0.0102) (0.00952) (0.00809) 
N 21650 21650 18470 21345 21345 21651 21598 
R2 0.106 0.063 0.004 0.067 0.046 0.086 0.056 
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Table 36  IMPACT OF JOB INSECURITY ON HEALTH (FIXED EFFECTS) 
 (1) 
Self- Re-
ported 
Health 
(2) 
Mental 
Health 
(3) 
Any New 
Health 
Conditions 
(4) 
BMI 
(5) 
Obesity 
(6) 
Drinking 
(7) 
Smoking 
Job 
Insecu-
rity  
0.000102 
(0.000278) 
0.00217*** 
(0.000626) 
-0.0000100 
(0.000195) 
-0.000115 
(0.000772) 
0.0000303 
(0.000101) 
0.0000569 
(0.000131) 
-0.0000121 
(0.0000747) 
N 21650 21650 18470 21345 21345 21651 21598 
R2 0.022 0.010 0.004 0.038 0.013 0.008 0.012 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Control covariates also include age, age squared, marital status, log of the household asset, log of the household income, current job 
tenure length in year, firm size, whether the correspondent is covered by the employer’s plan. Fixed effects include dummies of 
waves (from 1998 to 2014 with wave 2008 excluded), individuals and census divisions (with the division outside the U.S. ex-
cluded). 
 
 
Table 37  NON-LINEAR ESTIMATE OF JOB INSECURITY 
  (1) 
Self- Re-
ported Health 
(2) 
Mental 
Health 
(3) 
Any New 
Health 
Conditions 
(4) 
BMI 
(5) 
Obesity 
(6) 
Drinking 
(7) 
Smoking 
OLS tercile 2 -0.00447 -0.0702** 0.000861 -0.132 -0.0152 0.0172* -0.0172** 
  (0.0173) (0.0276) (0.00696) (0.110) (0.00949) (0.00934) (0.00746) 
 tercile 3 0.142*** 0.308*** 0.0121* 0.172 0.00796 -0.00262 -0.0120 
  (0.0172) (0.0306) (0.00647) (0.115) (0.00932) (0.00906) (0.00743) 
 N 21650 21650 18470 21345 21345 21651 21598 
 R2 0.105 0.062 0.004 0.067 0.047 0.086 0.057 
FE tercile 2 -0.0307** -0.00233 0.00556 -0.0790* -0.0129** 0.0141* -0.00487 
  (0.0155) (0.0307) (0.0114) (0.0446) (0.00623) (0.00745) (0.00392) 
 tercile 3 -0.0182 0.0889*** -0.00250 -0.0327 -0.00315 0.00971 -0.000405 
  (0.0159) (0.0341) (0.0113) (0.0461) (0.00615) (0.00781) (0.00435) 
 N 21650 21650 18470 21345 21345 21651 21598 
 R2 0.022 0.010 0.004 0.038 0.013 0.008 0.012 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Control covariates also include dummy indicators of waves (from 1998 to 2014 with wave 2008 excluded) and census divisions 
(with the division outside the U.S. excluded). Control covariates are the ones discussed in the baseline specification. The result of 
the first lowest tercile is omitted. 
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Table 38  MARGINAL PREDICTION OF WELL-BEING LOSS  
  (1)Income 
Loss 
  (2)Income 
Loss 
(3)Layoff (4)Layoff 
Job Insecurity .00108*** .0009*** .000349*** .000198*** 
 (.00021) (.00021) (.000051) (.000048) 
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Census-division 
Dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
Covariates A No Yes No No 
Covariates B No No No Yes 
N 10,163 10,161 21,692 21,654 
R
2
 0.0029 0.0146 0.0032 0.0704 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Control covariates A include age, age squared, gender, race, 
education, marital status, current job tenure status, firm size, and employer-provided plan 
coverage status. Control covariates B include age, age squared, gender, race, education, marital 
status, current job tenure status, firm size, coverage status of the employer-provided plan, log 
of the household income and log of the household asset. The results shown in the table are the 
marginal effects. 
 
 
Table 39  ANTICIPATION EFFECT OF FIRM-LEVEL LAYOFF  
   (1) Job  
Insecurity(t) 
  (2) Job In-
security(t)  
(3) Job In-
security(t) 
(4) Job In-
security(t) 
OLS Firm-level  
Layoff(t+1)  
5.500*** 
(0.675) 
5.797*** 
(0.676) 
3.325*** 
(0.683) 
3.830*** 
(0.683) 
 Firm-level  
Layoff(t) 
- - 6.302*** 
(0.678) 
6.155*** 
(0.687) 
 R
2
 0.012 0.047 0.027 0.061 
FE Firm-level  
Layoff(t+1)  
-0.609 
(0.990) 
-0.508 
(1.016) 
0.412 
(1.024) 
0.535 
(1.061) 
 Firm-level  
Layoff(t) 
  4.125*** 
(1.090) 
3.926*** 
(1.120) 
 R
2
 0.000 0.015 0.008 0.021 
 Year Dummies No Yes No Yes 
 Census-division 
Dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
 Control Covariates No Yes No Yes 
 N 6557 6555 6557 6555 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Control covariates include age, age squared, gender, race, education, marital 
status, current job tenure status, firm size, coverage status of the employer-provided plan, log of the 
household income and log of the household asset. 
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Table 40  IMPACT OF JOB INSECURITY ON HEALTH (POOLED-OLS IV) 
 (1) 
Self- Re-
ported 
Health 
(2) 
Mental 
Health 
(3) 
Any  new 
health con-
ditions 
(4) 
BMI 
(5) 
Obesity 
(6) 
Drinking 
(7) 
Smoking 
Job Inse-
curity 
0.00837*** 
(0.00187) 
0.0239*** 
(0.00338) 
0.00258*** 
(0.000774) 
0.0194 
(0.0123) 
0.00180* 
(0.00102) 
0.00127 
(0.000960) 
0.000231 
(0.000776) 
First Stage 8.574*** 8.587*** 8.609*** 8.586*** 8.586*** 8.589*** 8.595*** 
 (.421) (.421) (.455) (.423) (.423) (.421) (.422) 
F Statistic 414.42 415.73 356.66 410.80 410.80 415.85 415.14 
N 21650 21650 18470 21345 21345 21651 21598 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Control covariates also include gender, race, education, age, age squared, marital status, log of the household asset, log of the 
household income, current job tenure length in year, firm size, whether the correspondent is covered by employer’s plan. 
Dummy controls include waves (from 1998 to 2014 but excludes 2008) and census divisions. F statistics range from 356.66 to 
415.85, and first-stage coefficients range from 8.574 to 8.609 (all significant at conventional levels). 
 
 
Table 41  IMPACT OF JOB INSECURITY ON HEALTH  
(FIXED-EFFECTS IV) 
 (1) 
Self- Re-
ported 
Health 
(2) 
Mental 
Health 
(3) 
Any  new 
health con-
ditions 
(4) 
BMI 
(5) 
Obesity 
(6) 
Drinking 
(7) 
Smoking 
Job Inse-
curity  
0.00210 
(0.00242) 
0.0177*** 
(0.00548) 
0.00317* 
(0.00184) 
0.00340 
(0.00696) 
0.000722 
(0.000919) 
0.000608 
(0.00113) 
0.000703 
(0.000659) 
First Stage 5.600*** 5.610*** 5.592*** 5.579*** 5.579*** 5.617*** 5.590*** 
 (.508) (.508) (.570) (.510) (.510) (.508) (.510) 
F Statistic 121.54 121.95 96.00 119.32 119.32 122.21 120.20 
N 18270 18271 14943 17952 17952 18272 18217 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Control covariates also include age, age squared, marital status, log of the household asset, log of household income, current 
job tenure length in year, firm size, whether the correspondent is covered by the employer’s plan. Fixed effects include 
dummies of waves (from 1998 to 2014 but excludes 2008), individuals and census divisions. In the first-stage specification, 
the coefficients range from 5.579 to 5.622 (significant at conventional levels), F statistics range from 96.00 to 122.23.   
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Table 42  HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS BY GENDER  
(FIXED-EFFECTS IV) 
Male  Female 
 Job Inse-
curity 
N  Job Inse-
curity 
N 
(1)Self -Reported Health 0.000821 
(0.00404) 
7883  0.00361 
(0.00304) 
10387 
(2)Mental Health 0.0206** 7882  0.0163** 10389 
 (0.00860)   (0.00703)  
(3)Any New Health Conditions 0.00171 6221  0.00425* 8722 
 (0.00296)   (0.00236)  
(4)BMI 0.00197 7854  0.00217 10098 
 (0.0101)   (0.00934)  
(5)Obesity 0.00174 7854  0.0000924 10098 
 (0.00157)   (0.00114)  
(6)Drinking -0.00171 7882  0.00208 10390 
 (0.00174)   (0.00148)  
(7)Smoking 0.000564 7870  0.000697 10347 
 (0.00114)   (0.000781)  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control covariates also include age, age squared, marital 
status, log of household income, log of the household asset, current job tenure length in year, 
firm size, whether the correspondent is covered by the employer’s plan. Fixed effects include 
dummies of waves (from 1998 to 2014 but excludes 2008), individuals and census divisions. 
As the chow test cannot be applied to fixed-effect and IV model currently, we only derive the 
OLS-based chow test results and apply this policy to the subsequent analysis. For the seven 
outcomes listed, the p-values of comparing the difference of the two groups are 0.0866, 
0.0980, 0.6515, 0.4515, 0.9543, 0.2068 and 0.2264 respectively. None of the difference of 
coefficients is statistically significant. 
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Table 43  HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS BY EDUCATION 
(FIXED-EFFECTS IV) 
College or Higher  High School or Lower 
 Job Insecu-
rity 
N  Job Insecu-
rity 
N 
(1)Self -Reported Health 0.00960 5679  0.00000416 12591 
 (0.00624)   (0.00258)  
(2)Mental Health 0.0339** 5681  0.0140** 12590 
 (0.0137)   (0.00583)  
(3)Any New Health Conditions 0.00771 
(0.00600) 
4590  0.00223 10353 
   (0.00182)  
(4)BMI -0.00719 5618  0.00671 12334 
 (0.0175)   (0.00745)  
(5)Obesity 0.00565** 5618  -0.000468 12334 
 (0.00274)   (0.000944)  
(6)Drinking 0.00148 5679  0.000327 12593 
 (0.00279)   (0.00120)  
(7)Smoking -0.000884 5663  0.00109 12554 
 (0.00121)   (0.000774)  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control covariates also include age, age squared, marital 
status, log of the household income, log of the household asset, current job tenure length in 
year, firm size, whether the respondent is covered by the employer’s plan. Fixed effects in-
clude dummies of waves (from 1998 to 2014 but excludes 2008), individuals and census di-
visions. For the seven outcomes listed, the p-values of comparing the difference of the two 
groups are 0.9102, 0.3053, 0.5079, 0.0975, 0.0504, 0.3330 and 0.1617 respectively. None of 
the difference of coefficients is statistically significant. 
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Table 44  HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS BY EMPLOYABILITY 
(FIXED-EFFECTS IV) 
LOW  
EMPLOYABILITY 
 High EMPLOYA-
BILITY 
 Job Inse-
curity 
N  Job Inse-
curity 
N 
(1)Self -Reported Health 0.000671 10006  -0.000841 5388 
 (0.00354)   (0.00667)  
(2)Mental Health 0.0234*** 10010  0.00719 5386 
 (0.00810)   (0.0135)  
(3)Any New Health Conditions 0.00368 
(0.00263) 
8111  0.00207 4291 
   (0.00529)  
(4)BMI 0.00787 9800  -0.00265 5310 
 (0.00986)   (0.0199)  
(5)Obesity 0.00199 9800  -0.00250 5310 
 (0.00133)   (0.00271)  
(6)Drinking 0.0000801 10009  0.00290 5388 
 (0.00164)   (0.00339)  
(7)Smoking 0.000336 9967  0.00155 5369 
 (0.000937)   (0.00166)  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control covariates also include age, age squared, marital 
status, log of the household income, log of the household asset, current job tenure length in 
year, firm size, whether the respondent is covered by the employer’s plan. Fixed effects 
include dummies of waves (from 1998 to 2014 but excludes 2008), individuals and census 
divisions. For the seven outcomes listed, the p-values of comparing the difference of the 
two groups are 0.4628, 0.0222, 0.6182, 0.3805, 0.8766, 0.8396 and 0.3187 respectively. 
The difference of coefficients for mental health is significant and all the others are insig-
nificant. 
 
 
Table 45  PLACEBO TEST  
 (1) 
Mother’s 
Alive 
(2) 
Mother’s 
Age(at 
death) 
(3) 
Father’s 
Alive 
(4) 
Father’s 
Age(at 
death) 
(5) 
Height 
Job Insecurity 
(OLS IV)  
-0.00134 
(0.00105) 
-0.0183 
(0.0265) 
-0.000393 
(0.000857) 
-0.000478 
(0.0290) 
0.000151 
(0.000150) 
N 21296 21075 21358 20823 21621 
Job Insecurity 
(FE IV)  
0.00119 
(0.000929) 
-0.00259 
(0.00760) 
0.000776 
(0.000751) 
-0.00188 
(0.00610) 
0.0000081 
(0.000058) 
N 17914 17724 18003 17566 18240 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control covariates also include age, age squared, marital status, log of the 
household asset, log of the household income, current job tenure length in year, firm size, whether the 
correspondent is covered by the employer’s plan. Fixed effects include dummies of waves (from 1998 
to 2014 but excludes 2008), individuals and census divisions. 
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Table 46  LAGGED IMPACT ON HEALTH (FIXED-EFFECTS IV) 
 (1) 
Self- Re-
ported 
Health(t) 
(2) 
Mental 
Health(t) 
(3) 
Any New 
Health Condi-
tions (t) 
(4) 
BMI(t) 
(5) 
Obesity(t) 
(6) 
Drinking 
(t) 
(7) 
Smoking 
(t) 
Job Insecurity (t-1) -0.000313 
(0.00484) 
-0.00480 
(0.0104) 
-0.00241 
(0.00352) 
-0.00300 
(0.0166) 
0.00275 
(0.00221) 
0.0000652 
(0.00250) 
-0.00199 
(0.00132) 
First Stage 4.250*** 4.236*** 4.252*** 4.073*** 4.073*** 4.296*** 4.289*** 
 (.786) (.785) (.785) (.783) (.783) (.785) (.787) 
F Statistic 29.24 29.09 29.28 27.03 27.03 29.93 29.68 
N 7869 7870 7872 7709 7709 7870 7836 
Job Insecurity (t-2) -0.00177 
(0.00551) 
0.00845 
(0.0115) 
-0.00400 
(0.00409) 
0.0130 
(0.0202) 
0.00127 
(0.00260) 
0.00437 
(0.00292) 
-0.000755 
(0.00161) 
First Stage 5.632*** 5.658*** 5.651*** 5.408*** 5.408*** 5.651*** 5.724*** 
 (1.156) (1.156) (1.154) (1.150) (1.150) (1.154) (1.158) 
F Statistic 23.70 23.98 23.97 22.12 22.12 23.97 24.42 
N 3566 3564 3567 3494 3494 3567 3534 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Control covariates also include age, age squared, marital status, log of the household asset, log of the household income, 
current job tenure length in year, firm size, whether the correspondent is covered by employer’s plan. Fixed effects include 
dummies of waves (from 1998 to 2014 but excludes 2008), individuals and census divisions. In the one-period lagged 
measure, the first-stage coefficients range from 4.073 to 4.296 (significant at conventional levels), F statistics range from 
27.03 to 29.93  Comparatively, the two-period lagged first-stage coefficients range from 5.408 to 5.724 (significant at 
conventional levels) and F statistics change from 22.12 to 24.42. 
 
 
Table 47  ROBUSTNESS CHECK I 
 (1) 
Self- Re-
ported 
Health 
(2) 
Mental 
Health 
(3) 
Any New 
Health 
Conditions 
(4) 
BMI 
(5) 
Obesity 
(6) 
Drinking 
(7) 
Smoking 
(1)Job Insecurity 
 
0.00190 
(0.00264) 
0.0168*** 
(0.00584) 
0.00359* 
(0.00207) 
-0.000341 
(0.00760) 
0.000619 
(0.00102) 
0.00169 
(0.00123) 
0.000830 
(0.000703) 
N(Full-Time Only) 14958 14961 12048 14712 14712 14961 14922 
(2)Job Insecurity 0.000228 
(0.00292) 
0.0112* 
(0.00638) 
0.00293 
(0.00209) 
-0.00396 
(0.00825) 
0.00103 
(0.00109) 
0.00132 
(0.00143) 
0.000802 
(0.000869) 
N(Add Indus-
try-Occupation FE) 
11414 11411 10337 11204 11204 11415 11369 
(3)Job Insecurity 
 
0.00222 
(0.00269) 
0.0131** 
(0.00591) 
0.00355* 
(0.00193) 
0.00275 
(0.00767) 
0.000374 
(0.00101) 
0.000685 
(0.00128) 
0.000481 
(0.000753) 
N(Second Job Not For 
Pay) 
15516 15517 12713 15230 15230 15517 15467 
(4)Job Insecurity 
 
0.00169 
(0.00244) 
0.0165*** 
(0.00550) 
0.00326* 
(0.00183) 
0.00377 
(0.00710) 
0.000604 
(0.00094
2) 
0.000893 
(0.00114) 
0.000668 
(0.000658) 
N(post-65 working 
probability) 
17380 17378 14082 17079 17079 17380 17325 
(5)Job Insecurity 
 
0.00635 
(0.00444) 
0.0189** 
(0.00963) 
0.00639* 
(0.00372) 
-0.00243 
(0.0136) 
0.00127 
(0.00191) 
0.000615 
(0.00199) 
0.000274 
(0.00118) 
N (exclude 0% and 
50%) 
7033 7033 5606 6918 6918 7034 7000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Control covariates in baseline specification include age, age squared, marital status, log of the household asset, log of the 
household income, current job tenure length in year, firm size, whether the correspondent is covered by the employer’s plan. 
Baseline Fixed effects include dummies of waves (from 1998 to 2014 but excludes 2008), individuals and census divisions.  
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Table 48  ROBUSTNESS CHECK II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1)Self-rated  Health 0.00210 
(0.00242) 
0.00210 
(0.00242) 
0.00186 
(0.00238) 
-0.0000353 
(0.00332) 
0.00234 
(0.00260) 
(2)Mental Health 0.0177*** 
(0.00548) 
0.0177*** 
(0.00548) 
0.0180*** 
(0.00541) 
0.0146** 
(0.00723) 
0.0150*** 
(0.00574) 
(3) Any New Health Con-
ditions 
0.00317* 
(0.00184) 
0.00318* 
(0.00183) 
0.00308* 
(0.00182) 
0.00430* 
(0.00254) 
0.00323* 
(0.00196) 
(4)BMI 0.00340 
(0.00696)) 
0.00344 
(0.00696) 
0.00380 
(0.00688) 
0.00250 
(0.00926) 
0.00415 
(0.00738) 
(5)Obesity 0.000722 
(0.000919) 
0.000722 
(0.000919) 
0.000848 
(0.000909) 
0.000941 
(0.00131) 
0.000735 
(0.000973) 
(6)Drinking 0.000608 
(0.00113) 
0.000607 
(0.00113) 
0.000588 
(0.00111) 
0.000863 
(0.00162) 
0.000445 
(0.00120) 
(7)Smoking 0.000703 
(0.000659) 
0.000704 
(0.000658) 
0.000623 
(0.000648) 
0.000373 
(0.000914) 
0.000740 
(0.000694) 
(A)Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(B)Exclude characteristics 
of the household wealth 
No Yes Yes No No 
(C)Exclude characteristics 
of the worker and firm 
No No Yes No No 
(D)Include characteristics 
of other family members 
No No No Yes No 
(E)Include other charac-
teristics of labor status, job 
context, and psychologic 
factors 
No No No No Yes 
      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the household level,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. Control covariates in baseline specification include age, age squared, marital status, log of the 
household asset, log of the household income, current job tenure length in year, firm size, whether the corre-
spondent is covered by the employer’s plan. Fixed effects include dummies of waves (from 1998 to 2014 but 
excludes 2008), individuals and census divisions. Characteristics of the household wealth in specification B 
include log of the household asset and log of the household income, Characteristics of the worker and firm in 
specification C include whether covered by the employer’s plan, current job tenure size scale of the firm. 
Characteristics of the other family members in specification D include the labor force status of spouse and the 
number of living children. Other characteristics of labor status, job context and psychologic factors in specifi-
cation E include whether current job needs moving heavy loads, whether the current job requires lots of physical 
effort, number of jobs with missing dates, whether moved to less demanding work, whether enjoy work, whether 
current job requires stoop/kneel/crouch, whether required more difficult things, whether current job requires 
good eyesight, and whether the respondent is looking for the second job. 
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Figure 1  JOB INSECURITY DISTRIBUTION 
 
 
 
Figure 2  JOB INSECURITY AND HEALTH                                                                             
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Figure 3  JOB INSECURITY AND LAYOFF 
 
 
 
Figure 4  JOB INSECURITY AND INCOME LOSS 
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